中小企业联保贷风险规避机制研究

发布时间：2018-07-01 18:23

本文选题：联保贷 + 策略违约　；参考：《安徽大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：中小企业联保贷融资模式缓解了银企信息不对称的困境,将银企之间的不完全信息动态博弈转化为联保小组与银行、联保小组成员之间的还款博弈,多层次的连带责任分担体系则有效地转嫁了商业银行的信用风险。通过对相关文献的解读,我们会发现目前对于联保贷的分析视角更多地是集中在联保小组成员企业之间的还款博弈分析,虽有深究但涉及面却难免局限。本文是在已有研究的基础上梳理商业银行联保贷业务的流程风险,并基于业务实践的风险频发状况,将该流程细分为准入前与准入后两个维度,据此采取针对性的风险防范对策。对于准入前的风险防控主要是从以下几个方面来实现：(1)社会资本作为一种“软约束”,通常可以视为借款企业短视行为的“机会成本”,而其作用的发挥则主要依赖于社会关系网络的覆盖状况以及成员间的依存强度,因而商业银行若想实现连带责任效用的充分发挥,则在联保体准入筛选时应该严格把关,避免风险因素的前期累积。(2)中小企业联保贷作为解决中小企业融资难的金融创新工具,虽然具有自我筛选和改善商业银行信息获取能力的机制优越性,但该种贷款面向的客户群体主要是来自同一行业或某一产业链的关联企业,成员企业的过高依存度会导致商业银行的信贷投向过于集中,一旦发生偿债困难,极易诱发具有“羊群效应”特征的系统性风险。但组合风险管理理念为我们提供了一个可行方案,一方面是为主动分散成员构成的联保小组提供外部激励,另一方面则是要求商业银行从机构层面量化某个集群产业联保体的增量授信对机构存量累计风险的边际贡献来决定其准入资格。(3)信用风险缓释工具是商业银行抵补风险敞口的最直接手段,为了尽可能地降低风险暴露,商业银行可以从提高联保体的保证金额度、要求担保公司介入或者直接由联保小组提供反担保来实现风险的有效控制。(4)联保贷体制内生的规模效应让我们可以通过适当地增加成员人数来实现较高的贷款回收率,但是规模的扩张必须是有限约束下的条件最优。格莱珉银行在联保小组的规模设定方面要求组员人数为5人,因而联保小组成员人数的界定必须与商业银行的经营战略挂钩,不能盲目扩张。上述准入标准是商业银行防范授信风险的必备参考,因而具有重要的理论借鉴意义。对于准入后的风险控制主要从下面几条途径来实现：(1)擅自改变贷款用途投资高危行业是商业银行贷中风险的高发典型,联保贷款也不例外,因此商业银行应当注重贷中资金的监管,并通过完善支付方式来实现；(2)商业银行的信用风险不仅包括交易对手直接违约的风险,同时也包括其信用等级的恶化给商业银行带来潜在损失的风险,这就要求我们不仅要对到期后的贷款采取必要的保全措施,还应当动态监控信用风险的时点变动以采取针对性的缓释措施来避免损失面积的进一步扩大,而Credit Metrics模型则为我们提高信用风险计量的精确性提供了可能,商业银行应当完善自身的信用评级体系,并应注重数据挖掘和模型开发；(3)策略违约通常是当某个成员被动违约而引起其他成员基于自身支付函数权衡比较的占优策略,也是联保贷体制过于僵化的不利结果。商业银行此时应当通过合约调整或者连带收益的外部激励来改善借款人的还款意愿,以实现银企之间的“双赢”格局。(4)信息流和声誉效应导致的从众行为是我国证券市场和信贷市场都普遍存在的一种现象,该行为的出现不仅会导致风险的过度集聚,而且还会扭曲价格信号,降低金融资源的配置效率。对于联保贷而言,商业银行的多头授信导致信贷资源投向过于集中,从而加大了单个银行增量授信的风险系数。安全性、收益性和流动性作为商业银行经营的基本原则,一旦联保小组出现经营危机而引发商业银行的集体抽贷行为时,商业银行的信贷资产安全性和流动性都将会受到极大影响,为了有效地抑制商业银行的集体非理性行为,本文通过运用贝叶斯后验法则来说明该种做法的非理智性,并提出加强同业间的信息交互机制以及必要的还款救助机制是商业银行应对该风险的占优选择。最后就本文的研究结论和不足之处进行了总结,并就联保贷的未来研究方向进行了展望,希望通过联保贷内在机制的灵活设计使其在解决中小企业融资难问题上发挥最大的功效。
[Abstract]:The SME loan financing model alleviates the dilemma of information asymmetry between banks and enterprises, transforms the dynamic game of incomplete information between banks and enterprises into the joint insurance group and the bank, the repayment game between the members of the joint insurance group, and the multi-level joint responsibility sharing system has effectively passed on the credit risk of the commercial bank. We will find that the analysis angle of the current insurance loan is more focused on the analysis of the repayment game between the members of the joint insurance group. Although there is a deep study, it is difficult to avoid the limitation. This paper is based on the existing research and combs the process risk of the commercial bank's joint loan service, and is based on the frequent risk of business practice, The process is divided into two dimensions: before admission and after admission. Accordingly, targeted risk prevention measures are adopted.
The risk prevention and control before access is realized mainly from the following aspects: (1) as a "soft constraint", social capital can usually be regarded as the "opportunity cost" of the short sight behavior of the borrower, and its role is mainly dependent on the coverage of social network and the intensity of dependence among its members, so the commercial silver is so important. In order to realize the full play of joint liability utility, we should strictly control the entry and screening of the joint insurance body to avoid the early accumulation of risk factors. (2) as a financial innovation tool to solve the financing difficulties of small and medium sized enterprises, the medium and small enterprises' joint insurance loan is superior to the mechanism of self screening and improving the information acquisition ability of commercial banks. The customer group oriented by the kind of loan is mainly from the same industry or the associated enterprise of a certain industrial chain. The high dependence of the member enterprises will lead to the excessive concentration of the credit investment of the commercial banks. Once the debt paying difficulties occur, the systematic risk of "herd effect" is easily induced. But the concept of combined risk management provides us with the risk. One feasible scheme is to provide external incentives for the active decentralization group, and on the other hand, it requires commercial banks to quantify the marginal contribution of the incremental credit of a cluster industry group from the institutional level to the cumulative risk of the institutional stock. (3) the credit risk sustained-release tool is business. The most direct means to offset the risk exposure, in order to reduce the risk exposure as much as possible, the commercial banks can increase the margin of the bond, require the Guarantee Corporation to intervene or provide the counter guarantee directly by the co insurance group to achieve the effective control of the risk. (4) the internal scale effect of the joint insurance loan system allows us to pass the appropriate scale. To increase the number of members to achieve a higher rate of loan recovery, the expansion of the scale must be the optimal condition under limited constraints. The Grameen Bank requires a number of 5 members in the scale setting of the joint insurance group, so the definition of the membership of the joint insurance group must be linked to the business strategy of the commercial bank and can not be expanded blindly. The access standard is a necessary reference for commercial banks to guard against credit risks, so it has important theoretical reference significance.
The risk control after access is realized mainly from the following ways: (1) the high risk industry of the loan use investment is the high risk in the commercial bank, and the joint insurance loan is no exception. Therefore, the commercial bank should pay attention to the supervision of the funds in the loan and realize the payment by improving the way of payment; (2) the credit of the commercial bank Risk not only includes the risk of direct breach of a counterparty, but also the risk of potential loss to commercial banks, which requires that we not only take necessary measures to protect the loans after maturity, but also dynamically monitor the time point changes of credit risk in order to avoid the sustained release measures. The loss free area is further expanded, and the Credit Metrics model provides us with the possibility of improving the accuracy of credit risk measurement. Commercial banks should improve their credit rating system, and should pay attention to data mining and model development; (3) strategic breach of contract is usually based on the passive default of a certain member and other members based on themselves. The dominant strategy of the balance of payment functions is also an unfavorable result of the overly ossification of the loan system. The commercial banks should at this time improve the borrower's willingness to repay the borrower through the contract adjustment or the external incentives of the income, in order to realize the "win-win" pattern between the banks and the enterprises. (4) the herd behavior caused by the interest flow and the reputation effect is our country. There is a common phenomenon in both the securities market and the credit market, which not only leads to the excessive accumulation of risk, but also distorts the price signal and reduces the allocation efficiency of the financial resources. For the loan, the multi credit of commercial banks leads to the overconcentration of credit resources, thus increasing the increment of the individual bank. The risk factor of credit, security, profitability and liquidity are the basic principles of commercial banks' management. Once the joint insurance group has the operation crisis and the collective action of the commercial banks, the security and liquidity of the credit assets of the commercial banks will be greatly affected, in order to effectively restrain the collective non rationale of commercial banks. In this paper, we use the Bayesian method to illustrate the irrational nature of the practice, and put forward that the mechanism of information interaction and the necessary repayment mechanism are the dominant choice for commercial banks to deal with the risk. Finally, the conclusions and shortcomings of this paper are summarized and the future research of the joint insurance loan is made. In the end, we hope to make the most effective effect in solving the financing difficulties of SMEs through the flexible design of the internal mechanism of UNPROFOR loan.
【学位授予单位】：安徽大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F832.4;F276.3

【参考文献】