从邀功到避责:基层政府官员行为变化研究

发布时间：2018-04-04 16:31

  本文选题：风险社会　切入点：邀功　出处：《政治学研究》2017年02期

【摘要】：随着当前政治经济环境的变化,全球性的避责时代已经来临,避责逐渐取代邀功成为政府官员行为的主要特征。国外的相关理论和经验研究发现,经济发展、公共舆论、问责力度与政府官员避责行为之间具有紧密联系。对官员的避责策略可以用列举式、类型学和决策树三种方式进行归纳总结。中国基层政府官员常用的避责策略则包括忙而不动、纳入常规、隐匿信息、模糊因果关系、转移视线、找替罪羊等。面临社会转型带来的挑战,官员避责行为造成改革压力指数化增长,产生公共政策失败、公众信任危机、政府内部激励不足等问题。针对官员避责所导致的不作为现象,亟待完善政府官员行为规范机制的顶层设计,对其作出系统化安排,尽快实现从模糊管理向精细管理、从无限责任向有限责任、从忠诚训练向能力训练的转变。
[Abstract]:With the change of the current political and economic environment, the global era of avoiding responsibility has come, which gradually takes the place of inviting credit as the main characteristic of government officials' behavior.The relevant theories and experiences of foreign countries have found that there is a close relationship between economic development, public opinion, accountability and government officials' behavior of avoiding responsibility.It can be summarized by enumeration, typology and decision tree.The common strategies used by Chinese grass-roots government officials include busy and immobile, including routine, hiding information, blurring causality, diverting sight, looking for scapegoats and so on.Facing the challenge brought by social transformation, the behavior of avoiding the responsibility of officials causes the pressure of reform to increase exponentially, resulting in the failure of public policy, the crisis of public trust, and the lack of incentive within the government.In view of the omission caused by officials' evading responsibility, it is urgent to perfect the top-level design of government officials' behavior standard mechanism, make systematic arrangements for it, and realize as soon as possible from fuzzy management to fine management, from unlimited responsibility to limited liability.The shift from loyalty training to ability training.
【作者单位】： 中山大学中国公共管理研究中心、廉政与治理研究中心;中山大学政治与公共事务管理学院;
【分类号】：D630.3
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本文编号：1710765