民营企业政治关联对会计信息质量的影响研究
发布时间:2018-07-05 12:26
本文选题:政治关联 + 会计信息质量 ; 参考:《湖南大学》2014年硕士论文
【摘要】:随着越来越多的民营企业领导人当选为国家、省市或县区的人大代表或政协委员,越来越多的民营企业邀请曾经或现在就职于政府部门的官员到企业担任一官半职,拥有政治关联的民营企业在民营企业中所占的比例不断提高。与政府建立良好的政治联系能够优化民营企业的外部环境,对企业的经营管理起到重要的作用。在研究民营企业会计信息披露时,必须将其外部政治关联纳入其中,才能真实反映企业的发展状况、实际盈余等。 针对上述命题,本文首先阐述了政治关联在会计信息质量方面的演进及应用现状,从理论角度回顾了寻租理论、信号传递理论、成本收益分析理论以及利益相关者理论;接着多角度深入分析了我国民营企业的参政动机,既有个人需求层次方面的动机,也有企业需求层次方面动机,还有社会需求层面的动机;然后提出了本文的研究假设,选取2007年至2012年六年持续经营的深沪两市A股民营公司为研究样本,运用相关性检验以及线性回归分析,对不同政治关联方式与会计信息质量的关系分别进行实证研究,并对政治关联与会计信息质量的负相关关系进行了时间序列研究。 研究结论表明,从政治关联整体看,存在政治关联的民营上市公司的会计信息质量显著低于不存在政治关联的民营上市公司;不同政治关联方式对会计信息质量的影响程度不一致:政府官员类政治关联(PC_GOV)不利于民营企业披露高质量的会计信息,代表委员类政治关联(PC_CPC)则与民营上市公司的会计信息质量是显著正相关关系,,其他背景类政治关联(PC_else)对民营上市公司披露的会计信息质量影响不大;由于我国特殊的政治经济体制和整个资本市场环境的原因,在后金融危机时代,政治关联对会计信息质量的这种负面影响更为显著。为优化民营企业所处的外部环境,我国企业的财务报告体系应披露企业的政治关联信息。并且企业应弱化对政府官员类政治关联这一外部资源的依赖,减轻政府官员类政治关联对民营企业会计信息质量的负面影响。
[Abstract]:As more and more leaders of private enterprises are elected to the National people's Congress, provinces, cities, or counties, or members of the CPPCC, more and more private enterprises invite officials who have been or are now employed in government departments to serve as one-and-a-half officials in enterprises. The proportion of private enterprises with political connections in private enterprises is increasing. Establishing good political relations with the government can optimize the external environment of private enterprises and play an important role in the management of enterprises. In the study of accounting information disclosure of private enterprises, it is necessary to include its external political connections in order to truly reflect the development of enterprises, actual earnings and so on. In view of the above proposition, this paper first expounds the evolution and application of political correlation in accounting information quality, and reviews the rent-seeking theory, signal transmission theory, cost-benefit analysis theory and stakeholder theory from the theoretical point of view. Then it analyzes the motivation of private enterprises' participation in politics from many angles, including the motivation of individual demand level, enterprise demand level and social demand level, and then puts forward the research hypothesis of this paper. From 2007 to 2012, A shares private companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai stock markets were selected as the research samples, and the relationship between different political connections and accounting information quality was studied by using correlation test and linear regression analysis. The negative correlation between political association and accounting information quality is studied in time series. The results show that the quality of accounting information of private listed companies with political connection is significantly lower than that of non-political listed companies. Different ways of political connection have different influences on the quality of accounting information: government officials' political association (PCS / gov) is not conducive to the disclosure of high-quality accounting information by private enterprises. There is a significant positive correlation between PC CPC and the quality of accounting information of private listed companies, while other background political associations have little effect on the quality of accounting information disclosed by private listed companies. Due to the special political and economic system and the whole capital market environment, in the post-financial crisis era, the negative impact of political association on the quality of accounting information is more significant. In order to optimize the external environment of private enterprises, the financial reporting system of Chinese enterprises should disclose the political connection information of enterprises. And the enterprises should weaken the dependence on the external resources of the political connection of government officials and reduce the negative influence of the political association of government officials on the accounting information quality of private enterprises.
【学位授予单位】:湖南大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F276.5;F275
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