基于产权性质的会计信息与高管薪酬相关性的实证研究

发布时间：2018-09-19 06:00

【摘要】：现代企业制度出现以后，实现了所有权与经营权的分离。两权分离导致了委托代理关系的产生。但是由于“理性经济人”以及信息不对称，代理人会出现“道德风险”和“逆向选择”问题。委托人期望通过签订薪酬——业绩契约来约束代理人的行为，降低代理成本。企业的会计信息以其优于市场信息的内在科学性、准确性，外在监督性和权威性以及对外部资本市场的依赖程度小等优点，使得企业在制定薪酬契约时更多的倚重会计信息而不是市场信息。2007年开始实施的新会计准则，引入了公允价值计量模式。公允价值变动损益作为净利润的重要组成部分，必然会影响到企业的会计业绩，进而对高管薪酬的制定产生影响。因此，本文从契约角度，具体来说就是高管薪酬契约角度检验公允价值变动损益与高管薪酬之间的相关性。我国特殊的政治经济制度和特殊的国情，注定了我国还存在着大量的国有企业，这些国有企业具有特殊的身份地位和历史原因，造成其委托代理关系存在着诸多弊病，这些弊病导致国有企业的经营效率低下，影响了薪酬业绩契约的有效性。因此在研究高管薪酬契约时有必要将产权性质的因素考虑在内。基于以上分析，本文首先从上市公司高管薪酬与企业的会计业绩之间的相关性、高管薪酬与公允价值变动损益之间的相关性以及产权性质对高管薪酬与会计信息之间的相关性的影响三个方面，，分国内和国外两个部分分别对现有文献进行了分类综述以及述评。其次，基于研究现状以及相关的理论分析，提出了本文的研究假设。再次，本文以我国2008-2012沪深两市的A股上市公司作为研究样本，选取总资产收益率（ROA）和公允价值变动损益（Fair_Value）两个指标来反映会计信息，以上市公司年报中披露的前三名高管薪酬总额的自然对数来衡量高管薪酬，按最终控制人的性质将样本划分为国有控股上市公司和非国有控股上市公司，研究了基于产权性质的会计信息与高管薪酬之间的关系。最后，得出了本文的主要研究结论：（1）我国上市公司的高管薪酬与企业的会计业绩之间存在显著的正相关关系。（2）当公允价值变动损益大于0时，高管薪酬与公允价值变动损益两者具有显著的正相关性，而当公允价值变动损益小于0时，高管薪酬与公允价值变动损益两者之间并没有显著的相关性。这说明，引入公允价值计量模式后，我国高管薪酬的粘性特征依然存在。（3）与最终控制权为国有的上市公司相比，非国有控股上市公司其高管薪酬与会计业绩之间的敏感性更强。（4）当公允价值变动损益大于0时，与最终控制权为国有的上市公司相比，非国有控股上市公司其高管薪酬与公允价值变动损益之间的敏感性更强。本文不仅研究了高管薪酬与企业会计业绩之间的相关性，更进一步研究了影响企业会计业绩的因素——公允价值变动损益对高管薪酬的影响。在此基础上基于我国的国情将产权性质的因素考虑在内，进一步分析了不同产权性质下高管薪酬与企业会计信息之间的敏感性。通过以上研究分析可以看出，我国国有控股的上市公司存在着一系列的委托代理问题，同时薪酬粘性也依然存在。因此，建立有效的高管薪酬激励机制需要根据我国的实际情况，并针对上市公司所处的内外部环境采取相应的措施，包括完善对国有企业管理者的激励约束机制、减少国家的干预以及完善有关的计量准则等方面。
[Abstract]:After the emergence of modern enterprise system, the separation of ownership and management rights has been realized. The separation of ownership and management rights has led to the emergence of principal-agent relationship. Accounting information of enterprises is superior to market information because of its inherent scientificity, accuracy, external supervision and authority and less dependence on external capital market. It makes enterprises rely more on accounting information than market information when making compensation contracts. The new accounting standards introduce the fair value measurement model. As an important part of net profit, fair value change profit and loss will inevitably affect the accounting performance of enterprises, and then affect the formulation of executive compensation. Correlation with executive pay.
China's special political and economic system and special national conditions have doomed that there are still a large number of state-owned enterprises in China. These state-owned enterprises have special status and historical reasons, resulting in many shortcomings in their principal-agent relationship. These shortcomings lead to low operating efficiency of state-owned enterprises, affecting the effectiveness of the pay performance contract. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the nature of property right when studying executive compensation contracts.
Based on the above analysis, this paper firstly analyzes the correlation between executive compensation and accounting performance of listed companies, the correlation between executive compensation and changes in fair value, and the impact of property rights on the correlation between executive compensation and accounting information. It is divided into two parts: domestic and foreign. Secondly, based on the current research situation and related theoretical analysis, this paper puts forward the hypothesis of this study. Thirdly, this paper chooses the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2008 to 2012 as the research sample, and chooses ROA and Fair_Value as two indicators to reflect the accounting credit. Interest is measured by the natural logarithm of the total compensation of the top three executives disclosed in the annual reports of listed companies. The samples are divided into state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed companies according to the nature of the ultimate controller. The relationship between accounting information based on property rights and executive compensation is studied. The main conclusions are as follows: (1) There is a significant positive correlation between executive compensation and accounting performance of Listed Companies in China. (2) When the change of fair value is greater than 0, there is a significant positive correlation between executive compensation and the change of fair value. There is no significant correlation between the profit and loss of value change. This shows that the stickiness of executive compensation still exists after the introduction of fair value measurement model. (3) Compared with the ultimate control of state-owned listed companies, non-state-controlled listed companies have stronger sensitivity between executive compensation and accounting performance. (4) When fair value is introduced, the relationship between executive compensation and accounting performance is stronger. When the change profit or loss is greater than 0, the non-state-controlled listed companies are more sensitive to the change of executive compensation and fair value than the state-owned listed companies.
This paper not only studies the correlation between executive compensation and corporate accounting performance, but also further studies the factors that affect corporate accounting Performance-The impact of changes in fair value on executive compensation. The sensitivity between salary and enterprise accounting information.
Through the above research and analysis, we can see that there are a series of principal-agent problems in listed companies with state-owned shares in China, and the salary stickiness still exists. Therefore, the establishment of an effective executive compensation incentive mechanism needs to be based on the actual situation in China, and to take appropriate measures against the internal and external environment of listed companies, including We should improve incentive and restraint mechanisms for state-owned enterprise managers, reduce state intervention and improve relevant measurement standards.
【学位授予单位】：中国海洋大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F272.92;F275

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