我国国有垄断行业收入分配机制研究

发布时间：2018-06-23 01:07

本文选题：国有垄断行业 + 利润共享　；参考：《山东大学》2013年博士论文

【摘要】：目前我国的国民收入分配问题,已成为改革进程中亟待解决的问题之一。收入分配不仅关乎公众的个人生活,同时与社会稳定和国家的命运前途,有着密切的关联,因而受到经济学家的高度重视和社会公众的普遍关注。在目前存在的我国国民收入分配的诸多问题中,国有垄断行业因其垄断性质所获得远远高于社会平均水平的高收入,成为人们对于国民收入分配问题关注的焦点。部分国有垄断行业凭借国家赋予的垄断地位,通过无偿或低价使用国家资源、独家垄断经营等方式,获得了巨额的垄断利润。具有全民所有制性质的国有垄断行业的企业并没有将这部分巨额垄断利润惠及全民,用以改善全体人民的社会福利,而是“内部人所得而私”,将本应属于全民的财富内化为企业内部的私利,引发了社会对国有垄断行业收入分配制度的强烈不满。这一现象的存在所涉及到的核心问题--是我国国有垄断行业的收入分配的机制问题。从目前的研究现状看,对部分国有垄断行业收入畸高问题的研究,主要以实证分析为主,研究停留在表层,没有融入系统的理论框架。“所有者缺位”、“缺乏政府监管”等因素虽然可以部分地解释垄断行业高收入的现象,但这样的分析没有真正触及这一问题的内部根源和内部形成机制,由于缺乏规范的分析框架和深入的理论基础,因而研究中存在着缺乏理论性、系统性的不足。本文以我国国有垄断行业收入分配机制作为主要研究对象。我们首先考虑到将垄断行业收入分配问题的形成过程称之为一种“机制”,这就表明这一问题的研究是一个由众多相互因素共同作用的系统工程。而同时,这种“机制”并不是静态不变的,而是呈现出不断动态变化和发展的趋势。这种“机制”涉及到相互联系的方方面面,呈现出复杂的相互制约、相互作用的关系。因此本文的研究着力于对于这种“机制”的全面剖析和把握,因而与以往重“实证”的研究方法相比,具有方法论上的创新意义。作为一个“机制”研究,我们有意识、有目的地将研究的触角深入到“国有垄断行业(企业)”这种经济运行方式深层关系中的方方面面。为实现这个目的,我们首先建立了一个区分国有经济-非国有经济,以及垄断-非垄断的理论框架模型；在上述框架的基础上,通过比较研究的方式,系统地阐述了垄断行业内部的收入分配机制。在我们的模型中,包含了影响垄断行业内部收入分配的各种因素及其对垄断收入所起作用的比重,这些因素在所有制分割和市场结构分割的大背景下,会通过不同的方式对最后的分配结果产生影响。在对垄断行业收入分配产生影响的因素中,我们重点研究了行业垄断因索和所有制因素对行业收入的决定作用,特别是二者的交互作用,这在以往的研究中是被忽视的。为了证明我们的结论,论文建立了一个包含劳动力特征、企业特征、市场特征等控制变量的工资方程,利用个体微观数据考察各种因素对于企业职工收入的综合影响作用和它们对收入的交互作用。为了更加深刻和透彻地展现这一问题,在理论分析的基础上,我们采用了多种数理模型和讨量实证方法。为了区分国有经济和非国有经济的不同的分配机制,论文分别对其建立了“利润共享模型”和“劳资谈判模型”,利用前者,可以揭示国有垄断企业劳动者、经理人以及政府共同分享企业利润的过程,三者均可以按照一定的比例实现对于企业利润的分享；利用后者,可以全面地模拟在非国有企业中劳资之问相互博弈过程,博弈过程将会形成市场均衡工资。另外,论文通过分位数回归和Blinder-Oaxaca分解测算了垄断行业和其他行业收入差距中不合理因素的比例,按照我们的计算,两者之间的收入差距至少有55%是是不合理的。最后,论文利用目前较为前沿的时变弹性生产函数模型和Profile半参数估计方法建立了一个测算企业分红比例的模型,并通过模型对部分垄断企业应缴的红利进行测算,测算出不同企业在不同盈利状况下的应缴红利的比例和数额。通过数理模型和实证分析的方法,实现在系统的理论框架内,全面研究和清晰揭示影响垄断行业内部分配的系统“机制”,不仅具有对问题展示的直观性,而且具有科学性。同样作为一个“机制”研究,我们宏观地注意到,国有垄断行业高收入不仅仅是一个经济学领域的问题,还是一个历史问题,同时也是一个政治问题。因此,对于这一问题的研究,需要从多个学科角度、多个维度上可以把握,并将它们有机地联系在一起。本文尽力在多种因素的历时性和共时性的复杂联系中,细致地、有分寸地探析和把握多种因索的作用及具体比重,以期从该经济现象的发展和运行机理上,对其做出准确的、符合实际的展现和论析。首先,本文回顾了国有垄断行业的历史演变和分配制度变迁历程,从历史演变的角度分析了国有垄断与当今国有经济之间的关系,以及由原来的计划经济体制控制的资源配置权力逐渐转化为垄断权力的过程；详细阐述了目前国有垄断企业“数量越来越少,垄断程度越来越高,垄断势力越来越大”的形成路径。同时,我们还探讨了在分配制度上,现有国有垄断行业的企业对计划经济时期国营企业的平均主义的“共享式”分配方式的继承。其次,探讨了国有垄断行业收入问题的政治背景和政治因素,从新政治经济学的视角重新审视了国有垄断行业高收入问题的背景、现状和解决的困难性,认识到作为既得利益集团的垄断企业集团依赖其与政府的“共容性”关系和强大的政治活动能力,阻挠改革的进行,这也使得国有垄断行业收入分配改革迟迟难以推进。总之,本文力图在政治与经济相互作用的联系中,在国有垄断行业的企业发展历史与现实的连接点上,尽可能详细深入地揭示造成国有垄断行业高收入分配现象的带有“机理”性质原因,以期为这个方面的改革提供理论上特别是实际操作层面上的借鉴依据。对于国有垄断行业高收入问题的解决,本文提出了完善垄断国企分红制度的政策建议。分红制度可以减少垄断企业集团内部大量的留存资金,对垄断企业的盲目投资和内部分利起到约束作用。虽然国家于2007年开始对国有企业收缴红利,但通过我们的研究发现,目前的效果并不理想,一方面的原因是绝大部分红利又通过财政支出的形式返回到了企业,而用于民生建设、公共需求和社会保障的比例极低；另一方面,国家对于国有垄断行业的企业收缴分红的比例偏低,也是一个极为重要的因素。论文的主要结论是：作为一种“机制”研究,国有垄断行业高收入问题是一个由众多相互因素共同作用的系统工程。从历史演进角度上看,脱胎于国营企业的国有垄断企业“继承”了传统国有企业的“分享式”的利润共享模式,在巨额垄断利润的保障下,垄断行业内部“平均水平”的高收入成为可能。从分配形式上看,国有垄断行业的分配具有更强的向内部人倾斜的倾向,由于国有垄断行业的企业是以国有经济为主体的经济形式,劳动者是以主人的身份而不是仅仅作为劳动要素提供者的身份参与公有制经济中的生产与分配的,国有垄断企业的资本所有者、经营者和劳动者之间具有内生的一致性和非对抗性。企业职工与企业所有者共同分享了企业的利润,获得了部分垄断租金。从新政治经济学的角度分析,国有垄断行业收入分配改革之所以难以推进,是包括少数垄断国企高管在内的既得利益集团强势阻挠的结果,垄断企业集团由于存在与政府规制集团利益的“共容性”关系,以及强大的经济实力和政治话语权,在与其他利益集团的博弈中占据优势。最后我们指出,国有企业的分红制度的完善是目前解决国有垄断行业高收入问题的有效途径。但由于目前垄断国企分红过程中存在的诸多问题,分红的成效没有显现出来,这是国企分红政策急需完善的地方。论文的框架安排如下：第1章,首先根据我国国有垄断行业高收入的现象提出了本文的研究命题,然后对本文的研究思路、研究方法、主要内容、技术路线以及主要创新点和不足进行了简要说明。同时,对本文中出现的重要的相关概念进行了界定。第2章,相关理论介绍和文献评述。首先对本文所使用的相关理论进行阐述；然后系统描述了目前国内外对该领域的研究状况,对重要的研究文献进行梳理。目前对该领域的文献的系统整理和深入挖掘的工作还比较欠缺,因而本章依据研究的定位,从两个维度对相关文献进行了归纳和评述,既包含了我国国有垄断行业现状描述、成因分析、改革建议等方面的文献的汇总,又包含对文献中理论模型和实证分析方法的使用的归纳和总结。第3章,对国有经济和国有垄断行业的历史沿革和分配制度的历史演变进行回顾和探析。通过研究我们发现,国有垄断行业所凸显的种种问题,在很大程度上是传统的计划经济体制在转型时期所表现出的某些残留形式,同时,在市场经济改革过程中,国有垄断行业又出现了新的变化并展现出新的特点。因此,我国国有垄断行业存在的很多问题,都能从历史的变革和演化中找到根源。本文注重对与国有垄断行业收入分配机制相关的基本制度及其变迁规律的研究,分析阐述了新中国成立以来一直到现阶段,影响国有垄断行业收入分配机制的各种制度,并对各个时间段所呈现的不同状况进行比较分析和原因探究。第4章,理论分析部分。目前能够解释收入分配和收入差距问题的经济学原理很多,但并不是每个理论都能够对现有问题进行完美的解释。因此,我们首先尝试利用不同理论对所研究的问题进行分析解释,然后建立了一个区分国有经济—非国有经济及垄断—非垄断的理论框架模型,并以框架模型为基础比较研究了国有垄断行业和非国有行业的内部分配机制的差异,运用利润分享理论、要素分配理论和劳资谈判理论等,分析了不同所有制之间、不同市场结构之间的工资决定机制的不同。并在此基础上,建立了“利润共享模型”和“劳资谈判模型”,对我国垄断行业的收入机制进行数理推导。最后,运用实证分析对我们的理论模型进行了模拟和验证。第5章,对国有垄断行业收入分配问题进行更深入地探讨。国有垄断行业的高收入并非完全的不合理,而是有其合理的因素和不合理的因素,我们分别对它们进行了探讨和研究,并利用实证方法对合理因素和不合理因素进行了分解。同时,探讨了国有垄断企业内部的隐性福利、高管薪酬激励过度、高额在职公务消费等问题。第6章,主要考察国有垄断行业高收入背后的政治因素。我们利用新政治经济学的利益集团理论,从利益集团博弈的视角阐述垄断行业改革的艰巨性。我们区分了垄断行业改革中可能涉及到的四个利益集团：政府规制集团、消费者利益集团、垄断企业集团以及潜在竞争厂商集团,并描述了它们之间相互博弈的过程。证明垄断企业集团作为既得利益集团,会通过其强大的政治影响力和话语权阻碍改革的进行。第7章,提出了当前改变国有垄断行业高收入的现状的可行路径——完善垄断国企分红制度。主要阐述了垄断国企分红的理论基础、国内和海外分红的现状、分红的必要性和紧迫性,以及实行分红制度的效果研究等。同时,本章通过一个数学模型估算了部分行业的合理的分红比例,以期起到抛砖引玉的作用。第8章,主要结论、和未来的研究展望。
[Abstract]:At present, the issue of national income distribution in our country has become one of the problems to be solved in the process of reform. Income distribution is not only related to the personal life of the public, but also closely related to social stability and the fate of the country. Therefore, it is highly valued by economists and the general public concern.
Among the existing problems of national income distribution in China, the state-owned monopoly industry has gained much higher income than the social average because of its monopoly nature. It has become the focus of people's attention to the issue of national income distribution. The enterprises of state-owned monopoly industries with the nature of the ownership of the whole people have not benefited the whole people of this huge monopoly profit, which is used to improve the social welfare of all the people, but "the private income and private", and internalize the wealth which should belong to the whole people. The private interests of the Ministry aroused strong dissatisfaction with the income distribution system of the state-owned monopoly industries.
The core problem involved in the existence of this phenomenon is the mechanism of income distribution in the state-owned monopoly industry in China. From the current research status, the research on the abnormal high income of some state-owned monopoly industries is mainly based on the empirical analysis, and the theoretical framework that stays in the surface and does not integrate into the system. "The absence of owners", Although the "lack of government supervision" and other factors can partly explain the phenomenon of high income in the monopoly industry, this analysis does not really touch the internal root and internal formation mechanism of this problem. Because of the lack of normative analysis framework and in-depth theoretical basis, there are lack of theoretical and systematic deficiencies in the study.
This paper takes the income distribution mechanism of China's state-owned monopoly industry as the main research object. We first consider the formation process of the distribution of income distribution in the monopoly industry as a "mechanism", which indicates that the research is a systematic project with many mutual factors. At the same time, this "mechanism" is not a "mechanism". It is static, but presents a trend of continuous dynamic change and development. This "mechanism" involves various interrelated aspects, and presents complex interaction and interaction. Therefore, the study of this paper focuses on the comprehensive analysis and grasp of this "mechanism", and therefore the study of the previous heavy "empirical" research. Compared with the method, it has the innovative meaning in methodology.
As a "mechanism" study, we consciously and purposefully deep the research tentacles into the deep relationship of the economic operation mode of "state-owned monopoly industry". In order to achieve this goal, we first set up a theoretical framework to distinguish the state-owned economy from the non state economy and the monopoly and non monopoly. On the basis of the above framework, this paper systematically expounds the income distribution mechanism within the monopoly industry through comparative study. In our model, it contains various factors affecting the distribution of internal revenue in the monopoly industry and its role in the role of monopoly income, which are divided into the division of ownership and the segmentation of the market structure. In a large background, it will affect the final results in different ways. Among the factors that affect the income distribution in the monopoly industry, we focus on the determinant role of industry monopoly and ownership factors on industry income, especially the interaction of the two. In our conclusion, the paper establishes a wage equation with control variables such as labor characteristics, enterprise characteristics and market characteristics, and uses individual microdata to investigate the comprehensive impact of various factors on the income of employees and their interaction with income.
In order to reveal this problem deeply and thoroughly, on the basis of theoretical analysis, we have adopted a variety of mathematical models and quantitative and empirical methods. In order to distinguish the different distribution mechanisms of the state economy and the non-state economy, the paper establishes a "profit sharing model" and a "labor and capital negotiation model" respectively. It reveals the process of sharing the profits of the workers, managers and the government in the state-owned monopoly enterprises. The three parties can share the profit of the enterprise according to a certain proportion. Using the latter, we can fully simulate the mutual game process between labor and capital in non-state-owned enterprises, and the game process will form a balanced wage in the market. This paper calculates the proportion of irrational factors in the income gap between monopoly industries and other industries by Quantile Regression and Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. According to our calculation, the income gap between them is at least 55%. Finally, the paper uses the current more advanced elastic production function model and Profile semi parameter estimation. A model is set up to calculate the dividend ratio of the enterprise, and a model is used to calculate the dividends paid by some monopolies. The proportion and amount of the dividends paid by different enterprises in different profits are calculated. Through the mathematical model and the empirical analysis method, the theoretical framework of the present system is fully studied and clear. Revealing the system "mechanism" that affects the internal distribution of monopoly industries is not only intuitive but also scientific.
As a study of a "mechanism", we have noticed that the high income of the state-owned monopoly industry is not only a problem in the field of economics, but also a historical problem, but also a political problem. Therefore, the study of this problem needs to be grasped from multiple aspects and the organic aspects of the study. This article tries to make a detailed analysis and grasp of the role and specific proportion of various factors in the complex relations of diachronic and synchronic factors of various factors, in order to make accurate and practical presentation and Analysis on the development and operation mechanism of the economic phenomenon. First, this paper reviews the state-owned ridge. The historical evolution of the broken industry and the transition process of the distribution system, from the perspective of historical evolution, analyzed the relationship between state-owned monopoly and the current state economy, as well as the process of transforming the resource allocation power controlled by the original planned economy system into the process of monopoly power, and elaborated that the number of state-owned monopolies is less and less in the present. At the same time, we also discuss the inheritance of the "shared" distribution mode of the equalitarianism of the state-owned enterprises in the planned economy during the distribution system. Secondly, the political background and the political background of the income problem of the state-owned monopoly industry are discussed. Political factors, from the perspective of new political economics, re examine the background of the high income problem in the state owned monopoly industry, the current situation and the difficulty of solving it. It is realized that the monopoly enterprise group as a vested interest group depends on the "conformability" relationship with the government and the powerful political ability to obstruct the reform, which also makes the state-owned monopoly. The reform of income distribution in the broken industry is difficult to push forward. In a word, this article tries to reveal the "mechanism" in the connection point of the history and reality of the enterprise development in the state monopoly industry in the link between the political and economic interaction. The reform provides theoretical basis, especially on the practical level.
In order to solve the problem of high income in the state-owned monopoly industry, this paper puts forward the policy suggestions to improve the monopoly system of state-owned enterprises. The dividend system can reduce the large amount of retained funds within the monopoly enterprise group, and play a binding role in the blind investment and internal profit division of the monopoly enterprises. Although the state began to collect the dividend of the state-owned enterprises in 2007 But through our research, we find that the current effect is not ideal, on the one hand, the reason is that most of the dividends are returned to the enterprises through the form of financial expenditure, and the proportion of public demand and social security is very low; on the other hand, the proportion of the state to the monopoly industries of the state is low, too. It is a very important factor.
The main conclusion of this paper is: as a kind of "mechanism", the high income problem of the state-owned monopoly industry is a systematic project which is combined with many mutual factors. From the historical point of view, the state-owned monopoly enterprises born out of the state-owned enterprises "inherit" the "sharing" profit sharing model of the traditional state-owned enterprises. Under the guarantee of the profit of the monopoly, the high income of the "average level" within the monopoly industry is possible. From the form of distribution, the distribution of the state-owned monopoly industries has a stronger inclination to the insiders, because the enterprises in the state-owned monopoly industry are the economic form of the state-owned economy, and the workers are not only the owners but not the only ones. In the public ownership economy, only as the provider of labor factors participate in the production and distribution of the public ownership economy, the capital owners, the operators and the workers of the state-owned monopoly enterprises have internal consistency and non antagonism. The enterprise workers and the owners share the profits of the enterprises together and obtain some monopoly rents. From the new political economics, the new political economy is a new political economy. The reason why the reform of the income distribution reform in the state-owned monopoly industry is difficult to push forward is the result of the strong obstruction of the vested interest groups, including the few monopolized state-owned enterprises, and the monopoly enterprise group because of the "co - capacity" relationship with the government regulation of the interests of the group, and the strong economic strength and political discourse power. In the end, we point out that the perfection of the dividend system of the state-owned enterprises is an effective way to solve the high income problem of the state-owned monopoly industry at present. However, because of the many problems existing in the process of monopolization of state-owned enterprises, the results of the dividend have not come out, which is the place where the policy of the state-owned enterprise dividends need to be perfected urgently.
The framework of the paper is as follows:
The first chapter, first of all, according to the phenomenon of high income in China's state-owned monopoly industry, this paper puts forward the research proposition of this paper, and then gives a brief description of the research ideas, research methods, main contents, technical route and the main innovation points and shortcomings. At the same time, it defines the important related concepts in this paper.
The second chapter, the related theory introduction and the literature review. First, the relevant theories used in this paper are expounded, and then the research status of the field at home and abroad is described, and the important research literature is combed. At present, the systematic sorting and digging and digging of the literature in this field are still relatively short, so this chapter is based on this chapter. The orientation of the study is summed up and reviewed from two dimensions, including the summary of the status description of the state owned monopoly industry, the analysis of the causes, the suggestions for reform and so on, and the induction and summary of the use of the theoretical model and the empirical analysis method in the literature.
In the third chapter, the historical evolution and the historical evolution of the historical evolution and distribution system of the state owned and state owned monopolies are reviewed and analyzed. Through the study, we find that the problems highlighted by the state-owned monopoly industries are to a great extent the remaining forms of the traditional planned economy system in the transition period, and at the same time, in the market economy. In the process of reform, the state-owned monopoly industry has appeared new changes and showed new characteristics. Therefore, many problems existing in the state-owned monopoly industry in our country can find the root of the historical change and evolution. This paper focuses on the basic system and the law of change related to the income distribution mechanism of the state-owned monopoly industries. From the beginning of the founding of new China to the present stage, various systems that affect the income distribution mechanism of state monopoly industries have been presented and presented in different time periods.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F124.7

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