基于Stackelberg博弈的海事安全问题研究

发布时间：2018-03-22 05:05

本文选题：安全资源分配　切入点：人类行为模型　出处：《计算机科学》2017年05期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：近年来,安全问题在全世界范围内得到了越来越多的重视,如何利用有限的安全资源最大限度地部署防御策略保护重要的设施以及目标是许多安全部门所面临的一项艰巨的挑战。针对海事安全巡逻问题,提出基于Stackelberg博弈的安全模型进行安全资源调度,在安全资源有限的情况下,对现实世界中出现的时空限制和人类行为不完全理性因素进行了综合考虑,放宽了经典安全博弈模型对攻击者是完美理性这一假设。在随机最优反应均衡理论的基础上考虑了攻击者的行为偏好,对非完全理性情况下的最佳策略和完全理性情况下的最佳策略进行对比和分析,实验结果表明,非完全理性下的新模型在现实问题中可以获得更高的收益,可更有效地用于海事安全巡逻问题。
[Abstract]:In recent years, more and more attention has been paid to the issue of security throughout the world. How to use limited security resources to maximize the deployment of defence strategies to protect critical facilities and objectives is a formidable challenge for many security sectors... addressing maritime security patrols, A security model based on Stackelberg game is proposed to schedule security resources. In the case of limited security resources, the temporal and spatial constraints and imperfect rational factors of human behavior in the real world are comprehensively considered. The assumption that the classical security game model is perfect rational for the attacker is relaxed. Based on the stochastic optimal reaction equilibrium theory, the behavior preference of the attacker is considered. The comparison and analysis of the best strategy under the condition of incomplete rationality and the best strategy in the case of complete rationality show that the new model under the condition of incomplete rationality can obtain higher returns in the practical problems. It can be used more effectively in maritime safety patrol.
【作者单位】：南京工业大学计算机科学与技术系;
【基金】：江苏省自然科学基金(BK20150960)资助
【分类号】：U698

【相似文献】