城市轨道交通与传统公交的合作与竞争演化策略研究

发布时间：2018-07-05 04:52

本文选题：轨道交通 + 演化博弈　；参考：《兰州交通大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：自上世纪80年代起,由于我国经济的快速发展,城镇化进程的加快,机动车拥有量的增加,产生了许多交通问题,严重地影响着城市居民的日常出行,如城市道路拥堵、交通事故频发、环境污染严重等。为了有效地改善城市交通环境,本文旨在分析研究城市轨道交通与传统公交的合作与竞争演化策略,希望通过了解公交企业选取运输策略影响因素对演化路径及结果的影响,能够在城市公交体系紊乱时及时有效地判断该事件继续的发展走向,并通过采取适当的措施,实现城市公交体系和交通环境的优化,在一定程度上提升城市的整体竞争力。本文对于城市轨道交通与传统公交的合作与竞争演化策略研究是通过理论分析与仿真验证相结合的方式进行的,其主要对如下五个方面进行了深入探讨:(1)阐述了城市轨道交通与传统公交的合作与竞争演化策略研究的背景和国内外现状,并指出该问题研究的实际意义。(2)对本文研究相关的理论进行了阐述。主要有公共交通理论(公交体系的构成、交通特性比较、客流来源、吸引范围、公共交通发展存在的问题、国内外公交发展经验等);演化博弈理论(博弈论与演化博弈论的概念、区别及应用、博弈论向演化博弈论的发展);演化稳定策略(定义、性质、与纳什均衡的联系、复制动态方程)。(3)对城市轨道交通与传统公交的竞合策略进行分析。主要包括竞争分析(竞争的概念、作用及意义、目标、原则和特性);合作分析(合作的概念、作用及意义、动力、内容及目标和产生的效应);轨道交通与传统公交的竞合机理;轨道交通与传统公交的竞争与合作的超额收益、成本相关影响因素。(4)在无政府管制下,通过演化博弈的方法研究公交企业选择竞合策略的演化稳定性。通过问题的假设建立演化博弈模型,求解复制动态方程分析公交企业所选运输策略的局部稳定性,理论分析模型中变量对演化路径及结果的影响,并运用MATLAB进行数值仿真验证理论分析的正确性。(5)在政府管制下,通过演化博弈的方法修正公交企业所选竞合策略演化稳定点的不唯一性。分别对惩罚、补贴、惩罚补贴三种机制下的演化稳定策略求解,得出公交企业博弈存在唯一稳定点的约束条件,并进行相应的数值仿真分析验证。
[Abstract]:Since the 1980s, due to the rapid development of economy, the acceleration of urbanization and the increase of vehicle ownership, there have been many traffic problems, which have seriously affected the daily travel of urban residents, such as urban road congestion. Frequent traffic accidents, serious environmental pollution and so on. In order to effectively improve the urban traffic environment, this paper aims to analyze and study the evolution strategies of cooperation and competition between urban rail transit and traditional public transport, and hope to understand the influence of the factors affecting the evolution path and results of transit enterprises' selection of transport strategies. It can judge the development trend of the event in time and effectively when the urban public transport system is in disorder, and by taking appropriate measures to realize the optimization of the urban public transport system and traffic environment, to a certain extent to enhance the overall competitiveness of the city. In this paper, the evolutionary strategy of cooperation and competition between urban rail transit and traditional public transport is studied by combining theoretical analysis and simulation verification. It mainly discusses the following five aspects: (1) the background of the research on the cooperative and competitive evolution strategy between urban rail transit and traditional public transport and the present situation at home and abroad are expounded. The practical significance of the research is pointed out. (2) the related theories of this paper are expounded. There are mainly public transport theories (composition of public transport system, comparison of traffic characteristics, source of passenger flow, scope of attraction, problems existing in the development of public transport, Evolution game theory (the concept, distinction and application of game theory and evolutionary game theory, the development of game theory to evolutionary game theory), evolutionary stability strategy (definition, nature, relation with Nash equilibrium, etc.), Duplicate dynamic equation). (3) to analyze the competing strategy between urban rail transit and traditional public transportation. It mainly includes competitive analysis (concept, function and significance of competition, goal, principle and characteristic), cooperative analysis (concept, function and significance of cooperation, motive force, content and goal and effect produced), competing mechanism of rail transit and traditional public transportation. The competition between rail transit and traditional public transport and the relative factors of excess income and cost of cooperation. (4) under the control of anarchy, the evolutionary stability of bus enterprises' competitive strategy is studied by evolutionary game method. Based on the hypothesis of the problem, an evolutionary game model is established to solve the replicative dynamic equation to analyze the local stability of the transportation strategy selected by the public transport enterprises. The influence of variables on the evolution path and the results in the model is analyzed theoretically. Numerical simulation with MATLAB is used to verify the correctness of the theoretical analysis. (5) under the control of the government, the evolutionary stability of the competitive strategy selected by the public transport enterprises is corrected by the evolutionary game method. The evolutionary stability strategies under the three mechanisms of punishment subsidy and penalty subsidy are solved respectively and the constraint conditions of the unique stable point in the game of the public transport enterprise are obtained and the corresponding numerical simulation is carried out to verify them.
【学位授予单位】：兰州交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：U293.5;U491.17

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