公司相对绩效与其环境污染行为间关系研究

发布时间：2018-05-29 21:59

本文选题：环境污染 + 绩效评价　；参考：《西北工业大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：鉴于日益严峻的环境污染现状和基于行政、法律等外部途径治理公司环境污染行为的局限性,本文提出转变治理公司环境污染行为的思路,即从内部治理和高管激励角度出发,探讨如何有效地将相对绩效考评体系与高管政治激励和薪酬激励方式相结合以治理公司环境污染行为。上市公司污染事件的不断曝光为我们评价公司现行的绩效考评和高管激励方式在治理公司环境污染行为方面的有效性提供了良好的实证研究环境。本研究通过系统整理收集2004-2012年度我国重污染行业上市公司环境污染行为的相关数据,融合前景理论,实证研究发现基于社会绩效的评价体系能够降低高管采取公司环境污染行为的动力,表现为高社会相对绩效的公司不倾向于污染环境,尤其是高管还具有政治关联的公司。然而,基于历史绩效的评价体系却激励高管采取公司环境污染行为,表现为:一方面高历史相对绩效的公司倾向于污染环境,但是给予高管高额的固定报酬可以起到削弱高历史相对绩效情况下高管采取公司环境污染行为的倾向;另一方面,低历史相对绩效与高管高额的固定报酬相结合又会促使高管采取公司环境污染行为。研究结果表明强化基于社会相对绩效的绩效评价体系,鼓励基于高管政治激励和在高的历史相对绩效情况下给予高管高额的固定薪酬能够起到激励高管规制公司污染环境行为的作用。本研究提出以下几点建议:(1)上市公司特别强调基于历史相对绩效的考评体系,要求高管持续不断地提高公司业绩。这一绩效评价方式会促使高管采取环境污染行为。我们应该引入基于社会相对评价体系的以长期绩效改善为目标的评价体系,促使公司向同行业优秀公司学习,提高核心竞争力,提升行业地位,而不是采取短视的机会主义行为来谋求短期绩效的提升,从而激励高管限制公司环境污染行为。(2)如果我们引入对高管的政治激励,通过给予社会相对绩效好的公司的高管以政治身份,那么社会相对绩效评价会产生更好的激励效果。(3)从设计高管激励契约来看,上市公司应该扭转过分看重将高管薪酬与业绩挂钩的固定模式,也应该考虑给予高管高额的固定薪酬来限制公司环境污染行为。
[Abstract]:In view of the increasingly severe situation of environmental pollution and the limitation of external ways such as administration and law to control the environmental pollution behavior of companies, this paper puts forward the idea of changing the management of environmental pollution behavior of companies, that is, from the angle of internal governance and executive incentive. This paper discusses how to effectively combine the relative performance appraisal system with the executive's political incentive and salary incentive to deal with the environmental pollution behavior of the company. The continuous exposure of pollution incidents in listed companies provides a good empirical research environment for us to evaluate the effectiveness of the current performance appraisal and executive incentive methods in the management of corporate environmental pollution behavior. In this study, we collected the related data of environmental pollution behavior of listed companies in China's heavy pollution industry from 2004 to 2012, and fused the prospect theory. The empirical study found that the evaluation system based on social performance can reduce the incentive of executives to take environmental pollution behavior. Companies with high social relative performance do not tend to pollute the environment especially those with political connections. However, the evaluation system based on historical performance encourages executives to adopt corporate environmental pollution behavior. On the one hand, companies with high historical relative performance tend to pollute the environment. However, the high fixed pay can weaken the tendency of executives to adopt corporate environmental pollution behavior in the case of high historical relative performance; on the other hand, The combination of low historical relative performance and high fixed pay will promote executives to take environmental pollution behavior. The results show that the performance evaluation system based on social relative performance should be strengthened. Encouraging executives based on political incentives and in the case of high historical relative performance to give executives high fixed pay can play an incentive role in regulating corporate environmental pollution behavior. This study puts forward the following suggestions: 1) the listed company emphasizes the appraisal system based on historical relative performance, and requires executives to continuously improve the performance of the company. This performance evaluation method will encourage executives to take environmental pollution behavior. We should introduce a long-term performance improvement evaluation system based on the social relative evaluation system to promote the company to learn from the excellent companies of the same industry, improve the core competitiveness, and enhance the status of the industry. Instead of taking short-sighted opportunistic behavior to improve short-term performance, and thus motivating executives to limit corporate environmental pollution.) if we introduce political incentives for executives, By giving political status to the executives of companies with relatively good social performance, then social relative performance evaluation will produce better incentive effects.) from the perspective of designing executive incentive contracts, Listed companies should reverse a fixed model that places too much emphasis on linking executive pay to performance, and should consider imposing high levels of fixed pay to limit environmental pollution.
【学位授予单位】：西北工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：X322;F272.5;F272.91

【参考文献】