基于地方政府异质性的污染联控机制研究

发布时间：2018-12-13 11:03

【摘要】：本文从中央政府的角度出发,分析了污染治理的外部性会带来市场的非效率,研究了地方政府污染联控机制在占优均衡与子博弈精炼纳什均衡下的执行问题。研究发现:市场效率损失来源于私有信息与机制设计者的监管力度不够,得到了纳什均衡下机制执行的充分必要条件,并构建了一个动态机制来实现污染联控问题,同时通过非对称信息的引入,给出了占优均衡下机制实现目标的方式。
[Abstract]:From the point of view of the central government, this paper analyzes the non-efficiency of the market caused by the externality of pollution control, and studies the implementation of the local government pollution control mechanism under the dominant equilibrium and the sub-game refined Nash equilibrium. It is found that the loss of market efficiency comes from the insufficient supervision of private information and mechanism designers, and obtains the necessary and sufficient conditions for the implementation of the mechanism under Nash equilibrium, and constructs a dynamic mechanism to realize the problem of joint pollution control. At the same time, through the introduction of asymmetric information, the mechanism to achieve the goal under dominant equilibrium is given.
【作者单位】：北方工业大学经济管理学院;
【基金】：北京市优秀人才青年骨干资助项目(2016000020124G021)
【分类号】：X321

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