我国实施自愿性环境协议的适用性及激励机制研究

发布时间：2019-04-16 09:53

【摘要】：面对当前严峻的人类生态环境,如何使企业完成所应承担的环境责任问题亟需解决。而自愿性环境协议作为具有高于法定环境标准的综合性环境管理机制,已成为国际环境政策发展的潮流和趋势,更有助于我国加快改善现有的生态环境的进程。并且,由于传统环境管理措施的失灵,善用自愿性环境管理措施也是我国应该努力的方向之一。本文通过研究自愿性环境协议在中国情境下的实施机理,得出的主要内容如下：通过文献分析法和因子分析法总结自愿性环境协议的驱动因素及其行为主体,结合我国实际情况,得出我国实施自愿性环境协议管理手段的适用性结论。基于委托代理理论,研究自愿性环境协议中的激励机制。双重委托-代理模型的均衡表明引入公众监督,降低监督成本和加重惩罚可以有效降低合谋寻租概率;政府和企业双方的委托代理模型均衡表明自愿性环境协议的激励强度应与企业的可变成本系数、绝对风险规避程度及外在不确定因素成反比,与企业实现环境效益的能力成正比；创造性地提出应将经济目标纳入自愿性环境协议的激励目标,并利用多任务委托代理锦标模型,分析企业在实现经济目标上的努力和环境目标上的努力是替代的情况下,对于企业在经济目标的最优激励强度应该随着环境效益的边际收益增加而降低,调动企业参与积极性的同时避免企业将过多的精力放在实现经济目标上。我国现行自愿性环境协议缺少对合谋寻租及企业免费搭车的预防机制,激励措施不够细致,激励目标设置不合理,针对这些问题,结合委托代理理论下的均衡结论给出政策建议,以期能够为政府合理设置激励机制提供理论和实践指导,从而促成自愿性环境协议在我国的有效实施。
[Abstract]:Facing the severe human ecological environment, it is urgent to solve the problem of how to make enterprises fulfill their environmental responsibility. Voluntary environmental agreement, as a comprehensive environmental management mechanism higher than the legal environmental standards, has become the trend and trend of international environmental policy development, and it is also helpful for our country to speed up the process of improving the existing ecological environment. Moreover, due to the failure of traditional environmental management measures, making good use of voluntary environmental management measures is also one of the directions that our country should strive for. Through the study of the implementation mechanism of voluntary environmental agreement in China, the main contents are as follows: through literature analysis and factor analysis, the driving factors of voluntary environmental agreement and its actors are summarized. Combined with the actual situation of our country, the applicability conclusion of implementing voluntary environmental agreement management means in our country is drawn. Based on the principal-agent theory, the incentive mechanism in voluntary environmental agreement is studied. The equilibrium of dual principal-agent model shows that introducing public supervision, reducing supervision cost and aggravating punishment can effectively reduce the probability of collusion rent-seeking. The equilibrium of the principal-agent model between the government and the enterprise shows that the incentive intensity of voluntary environmental agreement should be inversely proportional to the variable cost coefficient, the degree of absolute risk aversion and the external uncertainties. It is proportional to the ability of enterprises to realize environmental benefits; Creatively proposing that economic objectives should be incorporated into the incentive objectives of voluntary environmental agreements, and using the multi-tasking principal-agent model to analyze that the efforts of enterprises to achieve economic goals and environmental objectives are alternatives, The optimal incentive intensity of enterprises in the economic objectives should be reduced with the increase of marginal returns of environmental benefits, so as to mobilize the enthusiasm of enterprises to participate and avoid putting too much effort into the realization of economic objectives. The existing voluntary environmental agreement in China lacks a preventive mechanism for collusion rent-seeking and free ride for enterprises, the incentive measures are not detailed enough, the incentive target setting is unreasonable, and in view of these problems, According to the equilibrium conclusion under the principal-agent theory, this paper puts forward some policy suggestions in order to provide theoretical and practical guidance for the government to set up the incentive mechanism reasonably, so as to promote the effective implementation of voluntary environmental agreements in China.
【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：X32;F279.2

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