政府保证影响下的基础设施特许经营项目经济评价方法研究
发布时间:2018-02-04 15:44
本文关键词: 基础设施特许经营 政府保证 财务评价 净现值 实物期权 出处:《重庆交通大学》2014年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文
【摘要】:基础设施建设是推动国家经济发展的重要力量,但因其投资大、风险高、建设周期长,,常常受制于政府财政的预算限制,反而在一定程度上制约了经济的发展,与其初衷背道而驰。BOT作为一种民间资本参与基础设施建设的融资方式,在缓解政府财政负担的情况下,又能吸引社会资本有效参与,促进资本市场的活跃,产生综合效益。因此,BOT模式目前正以其独特优势被越来越广泛地运用于我国各地的基础设施建设中。然而,许多BOT项目在前期的可行性研究中并没有进行充分的财务评价就开始实施,或是运用不适宜的评价方法造成评价结果不准确,为后续建设埋下诸多隐患,最终导致项目失败。因此,财务评价方法的适宜性与准确性对项目的成功与否具有重要的理论与现实意义。 本文通过分析基础设施特许经营项目特点,并比较其他建设项目与特许经营项目的异同,指出其他建设项目的经济评价方法并不适用于基础设施特许经营项目,因为政府保证是该类项目需要考虑的特殊因素,它对项目经济评价的结果将产生重要影响。介绍了政府保证的主要内容及各类政府保证的适用范围,为投资方分析项目现金流量奠定了基础。在定量分析方面,以BOT高速公路项目为例,运用完全信息下的动态博弈模型,对政府购买保证的最优取值进行求解,得到双方可以接受的政府购买车流量的最优值。在政府购买保证确定的情况下,进一步讨论了特许权期的决策方法,通过分析双方的利益函数,求得特许权期的最佳取值范围。由于政府保证的存在,使得投资者拥有选择较优方案的权利,它与金融市场中的看跌期权相似,即通常所说的实物期权。利用实物期权理论中的风险中性定理及二叉树模型,可以计算政府保证的期权价值。本文提出,政府保证价值应当作为财务评价时需要考虑的重要部分,计入项目净现值中。 结合上述研究成果,本文创新地提出适用于基础设施特许经营项目的财务评价方法,它融合了政府最优保证购买量及最佳特许权期的决策方法,最终体现在项目价值的计算方法的改进上,并通过案例进行详细论证。
[Abstract]:Infrastructure construction is an important force to promote the national economic development, but because of its large investment, high risk and long construction cycle, it is often constrained by the budget constraints of government finance, on the contrary, it restricts the economic development to a certain extent. Contrary to its original intention, bot as a private capital to participate in infrastructure construction financing, in the case of easing the financial burden of the government, but also to attract social capital to participate effectively. Promote the active capital market and generate comprehensive benefits. Therefore, the bot model is more and more widely used in infrastructure construction in various parts of our country with its unique advantages. Many BOT projects in the early feasibility study did not carry out a sufficient financial evaluation began to implement, or the use of inappropriate evaluation methods resulting in inaccurate evaluation results, buried a lot of hidden dangers for the follow-up construction. Therefore, the suitability and accuracy of the financial evaluation method is of great theoretical and practical significance to the success of the project. This paper analyzes the characteristics of infrastructure franchising projects and compares the similarities and differences between other construction projects and franchise projects. It is pointed out that the economic evaluation method of other construction projects is not suitable for infrastructure franchising projects because government guarantee is a special factor to be considered for such projects. It will have an important impact on the results of the economic evaluation of the project. It introduces the main contents of the government guarantee and the applicable scope of all kinds of government guarantee, which lays the foundation for the investors to analyze the cash flow of the project. Taking the BOT expressway project as an example, the dynamic game model under complete information is used to solve the optimal value of government purchase guarantee. In the case of government purchase guarantee, the decision method of concession period is further discussed, and the benefit function of both parties is analyzed. Because of the existence of the government guarantee, investors have the right to choose the better option, which is similar to the put option in the financial market. Using the risk neutral theorem and binary tree model in real options theory, the value of government-guaranteed options can be calculated. The guaranteed value of government should be considered as an important part of the financial evaluation and be included in the NPV of the project. Combined with the above research results, this paper proposes a new financial evaluation method for infrastructure franchising projects, which combines the government's optimal guaranteed purchase amount and optimal concession period decision-making method. Finally, it is embodied in the improvement of the calculation method of project value, and the case is demonstrated in detail.
【学位授予单位】:重庆交通大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F542;F284;F812.45
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前10条
1 赵国杰;何涛;;基于实物期权的BOT项目特许期决策模型研究[J];北京理工大学学报(社会科学版);2010年05期
2 孙燕芳;张连营;韩海峰;;公共项目公私合伙制中政府保证的会计问题研究[J];财经理论与实践;2011年04期
3 赵丹青;滕晓燕;;BOT投资模式与政府保证问题研究[J];大庆社会科学;2011年04期
4 林旭菁;;BOT项目下的政府保证问题研究[J];法制与社会;2010年04期
5 解光军,庄镇泉;期权定价中的分步式预测模型[J];系统工程;2000年04期
6 许民利,张子刚;应用实物期权理论评价R&D投资[J];系统工程;2001年01期
7 唐文彬;张飞涟;马超群;;基于模糊实物期权的城市轨道交通项目投资价值[J];系统工程;2011年12期
8 赵立力;谭德庆;;基于社会效益的BOT项目特许权期决策分析[J];管理工程学报;2009年02期
9 胡晓萍;;关于BOT中“政府保证过度”的实证分析[J];河海大学学报(哲学社会科学版);2007年02期
10 张颖;郑明贵;木日根;;基于延迟期权和扩张期权的矿业投资决策研究[J];黄金;2012年09期
本文编号:1490551
本文链接:https://www.wllwen.com/kejilunwen/jiaotonggongchenglunwen/1490551.html