城市公共交通监管博弈建模与仿真

发布时间：2018-06-13 02:05

本文选题：城市公共交通 + 监管　；参考：《哈尔滨工业大学学报》2016年09期

【摘要】：针对城市公共交通存在违规运营的问题,对管理部门与城市公共交通企业间的博弈关系展开研究。根据公交企业和管理部门相应的策略集建立双方博弈关系的收益矩阵,给出了不同策略下双方的期望收益和整体平均收益,利用复制动态方程描述双方策略的变化速度,给出了纳什均衡,利用系统动力学理论构建城市公共交通监管问题的博弈模型,并对模型进行了仿真分析。分析结果表明:采用静态惩罚策略时,博弈双方除纳什均衡外不存在演化稳定策略,波动难以控制;采用动态惩罚策略时,博弈双方存在演化稳定策略,演化时间和幅值与最大惩罚收益正相关,且博弈的稳定态与初始状态无关。
[Abstract]:Aiming at the problem of illegal operation of urban public transportation, the game relationship between management department and urban public transport enterprise is studied. According to the corresponding strategy set of the public transport enterprise and the management department, the income matrix of the game relationship between the two parties is established, and the expected income and the overall average income of the two parties under different strategies are given, and the changing speed of the two strategies is described by using the replicating dynamic equation. In this paper, Nash equilibrium is given, and the game model of urban public transportation supervision problem is constructed by using system dynamics theory, and the model is simulated and analyzed. The results show that there is no evolutionary stability strategy except Nash equilibrium, and the fluctuation is difficult to control, and when dynamic penalty strategy is adopted, there is evolutionary stability strategy on both sides of game. The evolution time and amplitude are positively correlated with the maximum penalty return, and the stable state of the game is independent of the initial state.
【作者单位】：哈尔滨工业大学交通科学与工程学院;黑龙江工程学院汽车与交通工程学院;福州大学土木学院;
【基金】：黑龙江省自然科学基金(QC2014C060) 黑龙江省交通运输厅科技项目(HJK2012A032) 黑龙江工程学院博士基金(2015BJ03)
【分类号】：U12

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