企业协同创新委托代理风险研究

发布时间：2018-06-03 14:54

本文选题：协同创新风险 + 代理问题　；参考：《兰州理工大学》2016年硕士论文

【摘要】：经济全球化下,企业依靠自身力量在市场竞争中很难处于优势地位,因此与科研机构的协同创新逐渐成为企业技术创新的新趋势。“2011计划”为高校、科研机构以及企业进行技术创新协同提供了机遇,越来越多的企业开始加入到产学研协同创新战略联盟中来。虽然协同创新减少了企业自主创新时所面临的一系列不确定性风险,但由于创新主体间利益目标不同、信息分布不对称,再加上不同组织之间管理方式的不同,这些都会对协同活动的顺利实现造成很大的影响,致使协同活动又会出现新的风险。本文通过委托代理理论的视角来识别企业协同创新中存在的狭义风险,即由于委托代理问题而引起的协同创新风险,并用模糊数学综合评价法来评估委托代理风险。分析风险发生的影响因素以及造成的影响,并引入汽车企业的案例来进行实证研究,分析汽车企业协同创新的特殊性,对其风险发生的可能性以及带来的损失进行定量分析,使风险防范措施能够更加具体化、高效化。本文将基于委托代理理论构建协同创新的动态激励模型,通过激励强度系数的设置使科研机构可以在信息不透明的情况下仍然选择有利于企业的努力水平,将组织的共同进步作为自身目标,以此来规避由于委托代理关系而引起的协同创新风险,对企业实现创新目标以及创新成果市场化有着重要的参考价值。
[Abstract]:Under the economic globalization, it is difficult for enterprises to be in a dominant position in the market competition by relying on their own strength. Therefore, collaborative innovation with scientific research institutions has gradually become a new trend of technological innovation of enterprises. Scientific research institutions and enterprises provide opportunities for technological innovation coordination, and more enterprises begin to join the strategic alliance of collaborative innovation of industry, education and research. Although collaborative innovation reduces a series of uncertain risks that enterprises face when they innovate on their own, due to the different interest objectives among innovation subjects, the asymmetric distribution of information, and the different management methods among different organizations. All these will have a great impact on the smooth realization of collaborative activities, which will lead to new risks. Based on the principal-agent theory, this paper identifies the narrow sense risk in the enterprise collaborative innovation, that is, the cooperative innovation risk caused by the principal-agent problem, and evaluates the principal-agent risk by the fuzzy mathematics comprehensive evaluation method. This paper analyzes the influencing factors of risk occurrence and its impact, and introduces the case of automobile enterprises to carry out empirical research, analyzes the particularity of collaborative innovation of automobile enterprises, and makes quantitative analysis on the possibility of occurrence of risk and the loss caused by it. So that risk prevention measures can be more specific, high efficiency. Based on the principal-agent theory, this paper constructs a dynamic incentive model for collaborative innovation. By setting the incentive intensity coefficient, scientific research institutions can still choose the level of effort that is beneficial to the enterprise even if the information is not transparent. Taking the common progress of organization as its own goal to avoid the risk of collaborative innovation caused by principal-agent relationship has important reference value for enterprises to achieve innovation goals and marketization of innovation results.
【学位授予单位】：兰州理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F273.1;F426.471

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