基于系统动力学的城中村改造的三方演化博弈研究
发布时间:2018-07-17 09:13
【摘要】:随着城市发展速度的加快,于上个世纪80年代末首次出现的城中村现象至90年代中后期已经成为一种普遍现象。城中村问题关乎政治、经济、环境等诸多方面,其存在与城市的历史发展和产生机制密不可分,因此合理改造城中村是构建和谐社会的有效途径。改造城中村过程是一个涉及利益相关者多重博弈的过程,通过适当的方法和途径找到一个恰当的改造路径是最终解决城中村问题的关键。 本研究共分为五个部分,第一部分简单介绍本文的研究背景、意义和研究内容,并对城中村相关文献进行综述。第二部分主要介绍本文的理论基础,即演化博弈理论和系统动力学,并阐述其适用性。第三部分定性分析博弈主体之间的博弈焦点,提出博弈假设并设置研究参数,在简单分析各博弈主体策略收益的基础上对城中村改造过程中的三方博弈系统进行演化博弈理论分析。第四部分运用系统动力学的理论方法对城中村改造过程中涉及到的三方利益主体的演化博弈系统进行仿真分析,找出演化博弈的均衡状态以及相关因素对均衡状态的敏感性。第五部分主要概括了本文的研究结论,对城中村改造提出针对性建议,并指出本研究的不足和未来研究方向。
[Abstract]:With the acceleration of urban development, the phenomenon of village in the city, which first appeared in the late 1980s, has become a common phenomenon since the middle and late 1990s. The problem of village in city is related to politics, economy, environment and many other aspects. Its existence is closely related to the historical development and production mechanism of the city, so it is an effective way to construct a harmonious society to reform the village in city reasonably. The process of rebuilding the village in the city is a multi-game process involving the stakeholders. Finding a proper transformation path is the key to solve the problem of the village in the city through appropriate methods and approaches. This research is divided into five parts. The first part briefly introduces the research background, significance and research content. The second part mainly introduces the theoretical basis of this paper, namely evolutionary game theory and system dynamics, and expounds its applicability. The third part qualitatively analyzes the game focus between the main players of the game, puts forward the hypothesis of the game and sets up the research parameters. On the basis of simply analyzing the benefits of game agents' strategies, the evolutionary game theory of the three-party game system in the process of village transformation in city is analyzed. The fourth part uses the theory method of system dynamics to simulate and analyze the evolution game system of the three-party stakeholders involved in the transformation of the village in the city, and find out the equilibrium state of the evolutionary game and the sensitivity of the relevant factors to the equilibrium state. The fifth part mainly summarizes the research conclusion of this paper, puts forward the targeted suggestions to the village transformation in the city, and points out the deficiency of this study and the future research direction.
【学位授予单位】:暨南大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2013
【分类号】:N941.3;TU984.114
本文编号:2129950
[Abstract]:With the acceleration of urban development, the phenomenon of village in the city, which first appeared in the late 1980s, has become a common phenomenon since the middle and late 1990s. The problem of village in city is related to politics, economy, environment and many other aspects. Its existence is closely related to the historical development and production mechanism of the city, so it is an effective way to construct a harmonious society to reform the village in city reasonably. The process of rebuilding the village in the city is a multi-game process involving the stakeholders. Finding a proper transformation path is the key to solve the problem of the village in the city through appropriate methods and approaches. This research is divided into five parts. The first part briefly introduces the research background, significance and research content. The second part mainly introduces the theoretical basis of this paper, namely evolutionary game theory and system dynamics, and expounds its applicability. The third part qualitatively analyzes the game focus between the main players of the game, puts forward the hypothesis of the game and sets up the research parameters. On the basis of simply analyzing the benefits of game agents' strategies, the evolutionary game theory of the three-party game system in the process of village transformation in city is analyzed. The fourth part uses the theory method of system dynamics to simulate and analyze the evolution game system of the three-party stakeholders involved in the transformation of the village in the city, and find out the equilibrium state of the evolutionary game and the sensitivity of the relevant factors to the equilibrium state. The fifth part mainly summarizes the research conclusion of this paper, puts forward the targeted suggestions to the village transformation in the city, and points out the deficiency of this study and the future research direction.
【学位授予单位】:暨南大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2013
【分类号】:N941.3;TU984.114
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