职业生涯关心对高管薪酬绩效敏感性的影响研究

发布时间：2018-01-20 02:20

本文关键词： 职业生涯关心高管薪酬企业绩效激励　出处：《华中科技大学》2015年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：自从所有权和经营权两权分离的现代企业形成,对于管理者的激励约束问题一直是现代企业理论研究的重点。委托代理理论是高管薪酬激励研究的理论基础,然而,国内外大量的实证研究结果与委托代理理论预期不符,并没有发现高管薪酬与企业绩效存在很强的正相关性,甚至我国有研究表明我国高管薪酬与企业绩效负相关。高管薪酬绩效低敏感性的困惑使得研究者跳出委托代理理论的框架,开始探讨企业外部市场因素对管理者行为的影响,职业生涯关心就是依托于经理人市场而产生,能够对管理者形成自我激励约束的行为。本文将绩效薪酬契约激励和职业生涯关心激励结合起来考察,在委托代理理论框架下将绩效薪酬契约的设计问题模型化,推导出在职业生涯关心激励作用下最优绩效薪酬契约的结构,发现职业生涯关心激励对绩效薪酬激励具有替代作用,当职业生涯关心激励增强时,薪酬绩效敏感性降低。为了研究我国高管职业生涯关心激励对薪酬绩效敏感性的影响情况,本文首先基于理论分析结果提出了本文的研究假设:随着高管的年龄和任职时间增长,职业生涯关心激励减弱,因此薪酬绩效敏感性增强。紧接着,选取了我国制造业的234个非国有上市公司在2009—2012年的面板数据进行实证分析,结果表明随着我国高管年龄的增长,薪酬绩效敏感性增强,但是随着任职时间的增长,薪酬绩效敏感性反而减弱。实证结果从一定程度上反映了我国高管职业生涯关心发挥了激励作用,并对薪酬绩效敏感性产生影响。最后,作为政策性建议,本文认为在设计高管薪酬契约时,将职业生涯关心激励与绩效薪酬激励结合起来考虑是有益的,针对处于职业发展初期的高管,充分利用职业生涯关心激励可以降低企业激励成本,而对于接近退休的高管,适当加大绩效薪酬激励则有益于企业绩效的增长。
[Abstract]:Since the formation of modern enterprises with the separation of ownership and management, the incentive and constraint of managers has been the focus of modern enterprise theory research. The principal-agent theory is the theoretical basis of executive compensation incentive research. However, a large number of empirical research results at home and abroad are not consistent with the principal-agent theory, and there is no strong positive correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance. Even some studies in our country show that executive compensation is negatively correlated with corporate performance. The confusion of low sensitivity of executive pay makes researchers jump out of the framework of principal-agent theory. Starting to explore the influence of external market factors on managers' behavior, career care is based on the managers' market. The performance compensation contract incentive and career concern incentive are combined to investigate the behavior of self-motivation and restraint of managers. In the framework of principal-agent theory, the design problem of performance compensation contract is modeled, and the structure of optimal performance compensation contract under the role of career motivation is deduced. It is found that career care incentive is a substitute for performance pay incentive, when career care incentive is enhanced. Pay performance sensitivity is reduced. In order to study the influence of career concern incentive on pay performance sensitivity of senior executives in China. Firstly, based on the theoretical analysis results, this paper puts forward the research hypothesis: with the increase of senior executives' age and tenure, career concern incentive weakens, so pay performance sensitivity increases. The panel data of 234 non-state-owned listed companies in China's manufacturing industry in 2009-2012 are selected for empirical analysis. The results show that pay performance sensitivity increases with the age of senior executives in China. However, with the increase of tenure, the pay performance sensitivity is weakened. The empirical results reflect the incentive role of senior executives' career concern to a certain extent. Finally, as a policy recommendation, this paper thinks that it is beneficial to combine career concern incentive and performance pay incentive when designing executive compensation contract. For the executives in the early stage of career development, the full use of career care incentives can reduce the cost of incentives, while for those close to retirement, appropriate increase of performance pay incentives will be beneficial to the growth of corporate performance.
【学位授予单位】：华中科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F272.92;F425

【相似文献】