契约显性激励与声誉隐性激励的比较研究——以建筑承包商为例

发布时间：2018-02-08 23:23

本文关键词： 建筑承包商委托-代理契约声誉激励机制　出处：《工业工程与管理》2016年02期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：工程质量体现着建筑承包商对业主和社会的信誉与责任,由于承包商掌握更多在建工程项目的相关信息,而业主和公众处于信息弱势的状态,信息的不对称可能导致承包商为追求自身利益而做出不利于业主的行为。因此,建立有效的激励机制是保障投资者经济利益和工程项目用户财产与生命安全的关键。基于委托-代理理论和博弈论,建立相关数学模型,分析比较了建筑承包商作为代理人,在与委托人签订契约的显性激励与市场声誉的隐性激励下的效用函数,得到有效激励实现的条件和提高激励效应的途径,指出声誉的隐性激励与契约的显性激励机制相结合作用的合理性与优越性,对如何有效地建立委托-代理关系下建筑承包商的激励机制提出对策建议。
[Abstract]:The quality of the project reflects the reputation and responsibility of the construction contractor to the employer and the society. Because the contractor has more information about the project under construction, the owner and the public are in a weak state of information. Asymmetric information may lead the contractor to act against the owner in pursuit of his own interests. To establish an effective incentive mechanism is the key to ensure the economic interests of investors and the safety of property and life of project users. Based on the principal-agent theory and game theory, the relevant mathematical models are established, and the construction contractors as agents are analyzed and compared. The utility function under the explicit incentive of signing the contract with the client and the implicit incentive of the market reputation obtains the condition of effective incentive realization and the way to improve the incentive effect. This paper points out the rationality and superiority of the combination of the implicit incentive of reputation and the dominant incentive mechanism of contract, and puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions on how to effectively establish the incentive mechanism of construction contractor under the principal-agent relationship.
【作者单位】：大连理工大学商学院;大连理工大学建设管理系;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金资助项目(15BGL023)
【分类号】：F426.92

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