发电厂商市场行为与可再生能源配额制的共生演化研究

发布时间：2018-03-30 11:07

本文选题：共生演化　切入点：演化博弈　出处：《华北电力大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：为消除可再生能源发电、上网和市场消纳这三大主要障碍,优化能源结构,促进可再生能源的大规模开发与利用,政府提出将推出了可再生能源配额制(Renewable Portfolio Standard, RPS)。RPS的有效性与参与主体(发电厂商)的应对策略密不可分。RPS的实施影响发电厂商的行为决策,发电厂商的市场行为也会反过来影响RPS的顺利推行。因此,研究发电厂商的市场行为和可再生能源配额制的交互影响与共生演化具有十分重要的科学意义与实践参考价值。基于上述背景,本文研究了发电厂商的市场行为和可再生能源配额制共生演化的机理。首先,界定了可再生能源配额制的主要政策参数内涵,并建立了火电和绿电厂商行为决策树,因此构建了不同情境下火电、绿电厂商的收益函数；其次,建立火电厂商和绿电厂商的演化博弈模型,在不同参数设置范围内,讨论了厂商策略的稳定性情况,并使用Simulink对不同的参数进行灵敏性因素分析；最后,基于哈耶克的社会秩序二元观和第三章的结论,建立了发电厂商企业与可再生能源配额制的共生演化框架。研究结果表明：①政策参数的变化会影响厂商的行为选择。只有合理的配额比例、较高的单位罚金、较低的交易成本和绿电生产成本才有利于厂商选择交易可交易绿色证书。②政府应该设置科学的政策参数以促进绿色证书交易。充分考虑发电厂商的收益成本现状,保证配额比例的合理性；对于未完成配额任务的火电厂商予以高额惩罚,其罚金应该高于TGC出清价格；及时发布绿证交易信息、简化审批程序、规范市场,以减少交易成本；鼓励可再生能源发电技术进步,并出台配套的激励政策以降低绿电的生产成本。③发电厂商必须不断优化自身的策略。可再生能源配额制在与发电厂商群体共生演化的过程中不断完善,因此发电厂商也应相应的调整自身策略,使“内部规则”与“外部规则”达成一致性。
[Abstract]:In order to eliminate the three major obstacles of renewable energy generation, access to the Internet and market acceptance, optimize the energy structure and promote the large-scale development and use of renewable energy, The government has proposed that the renewable Portfolio standard will be introduced. The effectiveness of RPS).RPS is closely related to the coping strategies of the main players (power producers). The implementation of RPS affects the behavior decisions of power producers. In turn, the market behavior of power generation firms will affect the smooth implementation of RPS. It is of great scientific significance and practical reference value to study the market behavior of power producers and the interaction and symbiotic evolution of renewable energy quota system. In this paper, the market behavior and the mechanism of symbiotic evolution of renewable energy quota system are studied. Firstly, the connotation of main policy parameters of renewable energy quota system is defined, and the decision tree of thermal power and green power producer behavior is established. Therefore, the profit function of thermal power and green power manufacturers is constructed under different circumstances. Secondly, the evolutionary game model of thermal power and green power manufacturers is established, and the stability of the manufacturer's strategy is discussed in different parameter settings. Finally, based on Hayek's dualistic view of social order and the conclusion of chapter three, the sensitivity factors of different parameters are analyzed by using Simulink. In this paper, a symbiotic evolution framework between power generation enterprises and renewable energy quota system is established. The results show that the change of the policy parameters of 1 / 1 will affect the behavior choice of the manufacturer. Only a reasonable quota ratio and a higher unit fine can be obtained. The lower transaction cost and green electricity production cost are helpful for manufacturers to choose tradeable green certificate. 2. The government should set up scientific policy parameters to promote green certificate trading. To ensure the rationality of quota proportion; to punish the coal-fired power plants that have not completed the quota task, the fine should be higher than the TGC clearing price; to release the green card transaction information in time, to simplify the examination and approval procedure, to standardize the market, so as to reduce the transaction cost; Encouraging advances in renewable energy generation technologies, And to reduce the production cost of green electricity, 3 power generation companies must constantly optimize their own strategies. The renewable energy quota system is constantly improved in the process of symbiotic evolution with the power generation manufacturers. Therefore, power generation companies should adjust their own strategies accordingly to achieve consistency between "internal rules" and "external rules".
【学位授予单位】：华北电力大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F426.2

【引证文献】