执政党的决策逻辑及其调适

发布时间：2018-02-11 18:28

本文关键词： 决策逻辑从群众中来压力型体制民众参与　出处：《天津社会科学》2017年01期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：执政党的决策逻辑可简要概括为两个方面:一是“从群众中来”的决策形成逻辑,二是压力型体制的决策执行逻辑。这种带有中国特色的决策逻辑很大程度上可以解释改革开放以来执政党在治理方面的不俗成就,但其亦有一定局限性。“从群众中来”的民意代表环节具有部分的民主替代功能,但不能完全等同于健全的民主制度本身,其对社会成员个别化、差异化的利益诉求具有一种过滤与遮蔽作用。单纯的压力型体制会造成一定程度上的系统性官民疏离,内生出一种不尽平衡的发展格局,治理能力方面有其限度。针对上述局限性,执政党的决策逻辑应相应地予以合理化调适。相比较既有决策体制内部的调适,有序推进民众参与的体制机制对于执政党决策逻辑的进一步完善而言具有更为重要的意义。这也是执政党民主执政的必然要求。
[Abstract]:The decision logic of the ruling party can be summarized in two aspects: first, the decision-making logic of "coming from the masses". Second, the decision execution logic of the pressure-type system. This kind of decision-making logic with Chinese characteristics can to a large extent explain the great achievements of the ruling party in governance since the reform and opening up. However, it also has some limitations. The representative link of public opinion "coming from the masses" has part of the function of democratic substitution, but it cannot be completely equated with a sound democratic system itself, and it is individualized to the members of society. The differential interest demand has a filtering and shadowing function. A simple pressure type system will result in a certain degree of systematic alienation of the government and the people, resulting in an unbalanced development pattern. In view of the above limitations, the decision logic of the ruling party should be rationalized and adjusted accordingly. The institutional mechanism of promoting popular participation in an orderly manner is of more important significance to the further improvement of the decision-making logic of the ruling party, which is also the inevitable requirement of the ruling party in democratic governance.
【作者单位】：中共中央党校马克思主义学院;北京中医药大学马克思主义学院;

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