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所有权性质、党员高管与腐败治理

发布时间:2018-05-12 07:06

  本文选题:党员高管 + 在职消费 ; 参考:《浙江财经大学》2017年硕士论文


【摘要】:腐败给人们的社会生活和经济发展带来了巨大的危害。腐败治理乃是大势所趋、大众所望。2012年,中共中央政治局审议通过了关于改进工作作风、密切联系群众的“八项规定”,将我国的腐败治理推向了高潮。在刚刚结束的举世瞩目的G20杭州峰会上,反腐败是峰会的重点议题之一,G20各国领导人一致批准通过了《二十国集团反腐败追逃追赃高级原则》和《二十国集团2017-2018年反腐败行动计划》,从此,腐败治理更是上升到了国际合作的层面。既然腐败治理如此重要,那么大到国家,小到每一家上市公司都应该将腐败治理作为一项重要工作来抓。从上市公司的微观角度来看,除了不恰当的高薪酬之外,与“八项规定”有关的办公费、差旅费、业务招待费、通讯费、出国培训费、董事会费、小车费和会议费等在职消费是治理腐败的重要阵地,因为高管人员可以轻易通过这些项目报销私人支出,将其转嫁为公司费用。但是上市公司的党员高管作为高管中的一类特殊群体,一般比普通高管具有更高的思想觉悟意识和更硬的组织纪律素质,更能自觉接受党中央关于腐败治理的精神。因此,本文的研究意在考察党员高管是否对公司的超额在职消费起到了抑制作用,从而促进了腐败治理。本文的主要内容包括规范研究和实证研究两部分。规范研究提出了本文要研究的问题,研究的理论意义和现实价值,重点梳理了目前学术界有关高管特征几方面维度的文献,包括高管性别、年龄、学历、任期、职业经历和政治联系六个方面。腐败治理文献综述分为腐败成因、腐败后果和腐败治理。所有权性质文献综述主要从国企和非国企在各方面表现的差异进行梳理。本文的理论基础主要有委托代理理论、契约理论、党员干部学理论和高层梯队理论,在上述理论的基础上,本文做出了党员高管影响腐败治理的作用机理。在实证研究部分,本文以2013—2015年全部A股上市公司为研究样本,利用超额在职消费计量模型研究党员高管对企业腐败治理的影响。首先,本文检验了党员高管人数、党员占高管比例、董事长是否为党员、党员高管的平均年龄、学历和任期对腐败治理的影响。其次,检验所有权性质对党员高管影响腐败治理的调节效应,即考察在国有企业和非国有企业中,党员高管治理腐败的差异。最后,进一步搜集2009-2011年的相关数据,检验“八项规定”前党员高管对腐败治理的影响,并与“八项规定”后即2013-2015年的结果作对比。本文的研究结论如下:(1)党员高管对腐败治理具有显著促进作用。(2)党员高管的平均年龄越大、平均学历越高、平均任期越长,腐败治理的效果越好。(3)相比非国有企业,国有企业党员高管对腐败的治理力度更大。(4)相比于“八项规定”颁布前,“八项规定”颁布后党员高管加大了对腐败的治理强度。本文的主要贡献在于:第一,现有文献除了对公司党建方面的研究,单单针对高管是否为党员这一特征的研究还不够充分,尤其是在实证研究方面,有关党员高管的经验证据比较稀缺。本文的研究为学术界对高管特征的研究打开了一个新视角。第二,对于企业腐败的治理,除了有学者注意到内部控制质量和管理层权力这两个因素外,还有很大领域等待着学者们去挖掘。本文从公司治理的角度,研究党员高管在企业的腐败治理中发挥的作用,为企业的腐败治理找到了一个新对策。第三,本文将总体样本分为国有企业样本和非国有企业样本,分别检验党员高管对腐败治理的影响,并分析其中的差异,为不同所有权性质导致的差异提供了一个新证据。本文的研究结果验证了党员高管清正廉洁的道德修养,肯定了他们在企业的腐败治理中发挥的正向作用。对于企业而言,适当增加党员高管比例,组建一支适合公司健康发展的、远离腐败的高管队伍至关重要。最后,本文的研究可能会对存在奢靡在职消费的公司起到警示作用,号召全体高管学习党的先进思想,遵守党的规章制度,从而在一定程度上减少企业高管的道德风险和逆向选择,希望本文的研究能够在抑制超额在职消费方面给企业的腐败治理提供些许借鉴。
[Abstract]:Corruption has brought great harm to people's social life and economic development. Corruption governance is the trend of the times. In.2012, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China examined and passed the "eight provisions" on improving work style and close contact with the masses, and pushed our country's corruption governance to a climax. In the just end of the world's attention G20 At the summit in Hangzhou, anti-corruption is one of the key issues of the summit. The leaders of the G20 countries approved the adoption of the "senior principle of the anti corruption pursuit and pursuit of stolen goods" by the group of twenty countries and the 2017-2018 year action plan for the anti corruption of the group of twenty. From then on, corruption governance has risen to the level of international cooperation. Since corruption governance is so important, it is so important. From the microcosmic point of view of the listed companies, in addition to the inappropriate high pay, the office fee, travel expenses, business hospitality, communication, training, board, car and conference fees are in service from the microcosmic angle of the listed company. Consumption is an important position to govern corruption, because executives can easily reimburse private expenditures through these projects and transfer them to company costs. However, as a special group of senior executives, senior executives of listed companies generally have higher awareness and more rigid organizational discipline than ordinary executives, and more conscientious. Accept the spirit of corruption governance by the Party Central Committee. Therefore, the research of this article is intended to examine whether the party members and executives have played a restraining effect on the excessive on-the-job consumption of the company, thus promoting the governance of corruption. The main contents of this paper include two parts: normative and empirical research. On the significance and practical value, it focuses on the literature of several aspects of the current academic circles, including six aspects of senior executive sex, age, education, term of office, career experience and political connection. The literature review of corruption governance is divided into corruption causes, corruption consequences and corruption governance. The literature review of ownership is mainly from state-owned enterprises and non enterprises. The theoretical basis of this paper mainly includes principal-agent theory, contract theory, party cadre theory and top echelon theory. On the basis of the above theory, this paper makes the mechanism of the effect of Party members' executives on corruption governance. In the part of the research, this paper is in all A shares from 2013 to 2015. In order to study the sample, the city company uses the excess on-the-job consumption measurement model to study the effect of Party members' executives on corporate corruption governance. First, this paper examines the number of Party members, the proportion of the party members, the average age of the members of the party members, the average age of the senior executives, the influence of academic qualifications and tenure on corruption governance. Secondly, to test the nature of ownership. Party members and executives affect the regulatory effect of corruption governance, that is, to examine the differences in corruption among the members and executives in state-owned and non-state enterprises. Finally, to further collect 2009-2011 years of relevant data to test the impact of Party members' executives on corruption governance before the "eight provisions" and to match the results of the "eight provisions", that is, 2013-2015 years after the "eight provisions". The conclusions of this paper are as follows: (1) the party members' executives have a significant role in promoting corruption governance. (2) the higher the average age of the members of the party members, the higher the average academic degree, the longer the average term of office, the better the effect of corruption governance. (3) compared to non-state owned enterprises, the executives of state-owned enterprises are more effective in governance of corruption. (4) compared to the "eight regulations" Before the promulgation, after the promulgation of the "eight regulations", the members of the party members have increased the governance intensity of corruption. The main contributions of this article are as follows: first, in addition to the research on the party building of the company, the existing literature is not enough to study the characteristics of the party members as a party member, especially in the empirical research, the experience of the party members' executives. The evidence is scarce. The research of this paper opens a new perspective for the academic circles to study the characteristics of senior executives. Second, in addition to the two factors that have been paid attention to the quality of internal control and the power of management, there are many fields waiting for scholars to dig out the governance of enterprise corruption. The role of the executive in the corruption governance of the enterprise has found a new countermeasure for the corruption governance of the enterprise. Third, this paper divides the overall sample into the sample of state-owned enterprises and the samples of non-state-owned enterprises, and examines the influence of the party members and executives on corruption governance respectively, and analyzes the differences among them, which provides the difference in the nature of different ownership. A new evidence. The results of this paper verify that the honest and honest moral cultivation of the members of the members of the party members, affirms their positive role in the corruption governance of the enterprises. For enterprises, it is very important for the enterprises to increase the proportion of the party members and executives, to form a contingent of senior executives suitable for the healthy development of the company. It may serve as a warning to companies that have extravagant and on-the-job consumption. They call on all executives to learn the party's advanced ideas and abide by the rules and regulations of the party so as to reduce the moral hazard and adverse selection of the executives to a certain extent. A bit of reference.

【学位授予单位】:浙江财经大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:D262.6;F275;F832.51

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