内部审计能够抑制哪一类高管腐败？

发布时间：2018-05-16 04:06

本文选题：高管腐败 + 内部审计　；参考：《云南财经大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：我国的腐败问题和反腐行动已成为全球关注的热点问题。在政府官员腐败之外,企业也是腐败滋生的重灾区。但到现在为止,除了少数几篇文章从薪酬管制、高管权力的角度研究了高管腐败的成因外,国内外少有学者从企业微观层面研究公司高管的腐败问题。本文利用2007-2012年沪深A股上市公司相关数据,基于内部审计独立性和专业胜任能力构建了内部审计质量的两因素交乘模型,我们实证验证了内部审计能否抑制高管腐败。并按照职位高低将高管腐败区分高职位高管腐败和低职位高管腐败,探讨了内部审计对于不同职位的管理层腐败的治理效果是否相同。最后,还从内部控制的角度考察了内部审计高管腐败治理的作用路径。本文研究发现:(1)高管腐败与内部审计质量无显著关系。具体来看,内部审计的专业胜任能力与高管腐败显著负相关,内部审计的独立性与高管腐败无显著关系。(2)按照高管职位高低进行区分以后,内部审计质量与高职位高管腐败无显著关系,而与低职位高管腐败显著负相关。其原因可能在于两个方面,一是内部审计部门面临董事会和企业最高管理层的双重领导,从而使得内部审计会受到高职位高管的影响,对于高职位高管腐败的监督意愿下降,在监督高职位高管腐败时,内部审计的独立性无法得到保障。二是高职位高管可以利用其权力超脱于内部审计制度之上。(3)本文还进一步的研究了内部审计的腐败治理作用路径。实证结果证明,内部审计能通过完善内部控制质量(控制活动、内部监督)来抑制低职位高管腐败。控制活动、内部监督的中介效应的大小约占总效应的4%至8%。此外,本文还发现内部控制对高职位高管腐败无显著关系,与低职位高管腐败显著负相关。这部分解释了为什么内部审计对不同职位高管腐败治理效果不同。采用Heckman两阶段法控制了样本受限问题后,本文的结论依然成立。
[Abstract]:The problem of corruption and the action of anti-corruption in China have become a hot issue in the world. In addition to corruption among government officials, businesses are also the worst-hit areas for corruption. But up to now, except for a few articles on compensation control and executive power, there are few scholars at home and abroad to study the problem of corporate corruption from the micro level. Based on the relevant data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2012, this paper constructs a two-factor multiplication model of internal audit quality based on the independence of internal audit and professional competence. We empirically verify whether internal audit can restrain senior executives' corruption. According to the level of position, the corruption of senior executives is distinguished from that of high and low positions, and the governance effect of internal audit on management corruption in different positions is discussed. Finally, from the perspective of internal control, the paper examines the role of internal audit executives in the governance of corruption. This paper finds that there is no significant relationship between executive corruption and internal audit quality. Specifically, the professional competence of internal audit is negatively correlated with executive corruption, and the independence of internal audit has no significant relationship with executive corruption. There is no significant relationship between internal audit quality and senior executives corruption, but there is a negative correlation between internal audit quality and senior executives corruption. The reasons may lie in two aspects. One is that the internal audit department faces the dual leadership of the board of directors and the top management of the enterprise, so that the internal audit will be influenced by the senior executives, and the willingness to supervise the corruption of the senior executives will be reduced. The independence of internal audit cannot be guaranteed when supervising the corruption of senior executives. Second, senior executives can use their power to transcend the internal audit system. The empirical results show that internal audit can control the corruption of junior executives by improving the quality of internal control (control activities, internal supervision). The mediating effect of internal supervision accounts for about 4% to 8% of the total effect. In addition, this paper also found that internal control has no significant relationship with the corruption of senior executives in high positions, but negatively correlated with corruption of senior executives in lower positions. This part explains why internal audit has different effects on corruption management of senior executives in different positions. The conclusion of this paper is still true after the Heckman two-stage method is used to control the sample-limited problem.
【学位授予单位】：云南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D262.6;F239.45

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