管理层权力与腐败治理研究
发布时间：2018-11-15 15:50
【摘要】：随着经济和法制大环境的变革,许多政府官员、高管的腐败案件逐渐浮出水面,激起了全社会的热烈讨论。高管腐败会对社会造成不良影响,不仅破坏股东利益,还滋生腐败的社会风气,不利于国家的稳定运转。为了防控高管腐败的发生,学术界开始思考如何治理高管腐败及影响高管腐败因素。什么是高管腐败?其本质是高管为极大满足自身私欲,通过滥用手中职权索贿,接下来本文重点探究高管权力与高管腐败之间到底具有何种关系。通过上文的描述,本文选取的样本量为2009-2015年间发生高管贪污腐败的上市企业,将高管权力细化为四个指标,即专家权、结构权、声望权与所有权,通过一些实证检验方法探究高管权力与腐败间具有何种关系,并且加入内部控制有效性这个变量,研究其对两者关系具有何种调节效应。本篇文章最终结论显示:一、高管总权力对高管腐败存在显著正向效应,即高管权力越大,越有可能发生高管贪污腐败。观察高管权力的四个细化指标可知,除了高管结构权对高管腐败存在不显著负向效应外,其他三个细化指标,即高管所有权、专家权、声望权均对高管腐败存有显著正向效应;二、内部控制有效性对由高管权力引发的腐败具有显著抑制效应,表明内部控制质量越高,越能有效抑制由高管权力导致的高管腐败行为,且这种抑制效应在国企中愈发强烈。三、国企监事会充分发挥了监管作用,其对高管腐败具有显著负向效应,可有效遏制高管进行贪污腐败。在国有上市公司中,首位股东拥有股本比重对高管腐败存在显著正向效应,而在非国有上市公司中则恰好相反。本文主要有以下贡献:(1)拓展了内部控制和腐败治理的新视角。当前学术界主要从宏观角度研究腐败治理,如调节政府干预的权力,构建政府监管体系,以及增加寻租成本等,却很少有人以内部控制视角、微观层面作为研究基点,来探究如何防控、整治腐败。纵观我国当下现状可知,我国企业具有如下特点:数量繁多、规模宏大,经常发生公司高管贪污腐败现象,其造成的恶劣后果甚至超过政府官员。笔者认为,通过优化内部控制体系,可以有效减轻寻租性腐败行为,肃清社会风气。(2)延伸了内部控制后果的研究,当下学者们主要把注意力集中于探寻内部控制带来的经济后果方面,比如保护股东利益,提高企业价值、降低企业风险等,鲜少涉及企业腐败防控方面。
[Abstract]:With the changes in the economic and legal environment, corruption cases of many government officials and executives have come to the surface, arousing heated discussion in the whole society. Executive corruption will not only destroy the interests of shareholders, but also breed corrupt social atmosphere, which is not conducive to the stable operation of the country. In order to prevent and control the occurrence of executive corruption, the academic community began to think about how to deal with executive corruption and influence the factors of executive corruption. What is executive corruption? In order to satisfy their own selfish desire, the essence of this paper is to abuse their power to ask for bribes. Next, this paper focuses on the relationship between executive power and executive corruption. According to the above description, the sample size of this paper is listed enterprises with corruption of senior executives in 2009-2015. The executive power is divided into four indicators, namely, expert power, structural right, prestige right and ownership right. Through some empirical test methods to explore the relationship between executive power and corruption and add the internal control effectiveness variable to study the regulatory effect of the two relationships. The final conclusion of this paper is as follows: first, the total executive power has a significant positive effect on executive corruption, that is, the greater the executive power, the more likely it is to have corruption. After observing the four detailed indexes of executive power, we can see that except that the executive structural power has no significant negative effect on executive corruption, the other three thinning indexes, namely executive ownership, expert right and prestige right, all have significant positive effects on executive corruption; Second, the effectiveness of internal control has a significant inhibitory effect on the corruption caused by executive power, which indicates that the higher the quality of internal control, the more effective inhibition of executive corruption caused by executive power, and this inhibition effect is becoming more and more intense in state-owned enterprises. Third, the board of supervisors of state-owned enterprises has brought into full play the role of supervision, which has a significant negative effect on the corruption of senior executives, and can effectively curb the corruption of senior executives. In state-owned listed companies, the proportion of equity owned by the first shareholder has a significant positive effect on executive corruption, while in non-state-owned listed companies the opposite is true. The main contributions of this paper are as follows: (1) expand the new perspective of internal control and corruption governance. At present, the academic circles mainly study the governance of corruption from the macroscopic angle, such as adjusting the power of government intervention, constructing the government supervision system, and increasing the rent-seeking cost, but few people take the perspective of internal control as the basic point of study. To explore how to prevent and control corruption. Looking at the present situation of our country, we can see that the enterprises of our country have the following characteristics: the number of enterprises is numerous, the scale is large, the phenomenon of corruption and corruption of company executives often occurs, and its bad consequences even exceed that of government officials. The author believes that by optimizing the internal control system, the rent-seeking corruption can be effectively alleviated and the social atmosphere eliminated. (2) the research on the consequences of internal control is extended. At present, scholars mainly focus on exploring the economic consequences of internal control, such as protecting the interests of shareholders, improving the value of enterprises, reducing the risk of enterprises, rarely involving the prevention and control of corporate corruption.
【学位授予单位】：内蒙古财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D262.6;F272.91
本文编号：2333734
[Abstract]:With the changes in the economic and legal environment, corruption cases of many government officials and executives have come to the surface, arousing heated discussion in the whole society. Executive corruption will not only destroy the interests of shareholders, but also breed corrupt social atmosphere, which is not conducive to the stable operation of the country. In order to prevent and control the occurrence of executive corruption, the academic community began to think about how to deal with executive corruption and influence the factors of executive corruption. What is executive corruption? In order to satisfy their own selfish desire, the essence of this paper is to abuse their power to ask for bribes. Next, this paper focuses on the relationship between executive power and executive corruption. According to the above description, the sample size of this paper is listed enterprises with corruption of senior executives in 2009-2015. The executive power is divided into four indicators, namely, expert power, structural right, prestige right and ownership right. Through some empirical test methods to explore the relationship between executive power and corruption and add the internal control effectiveness variable to study the regulatory effect of the two relationships. The final conclusion of this paper is as follows: first, the total executive power has a significant positive effect on executive corruption, that is, the greater the executive power, the more likely it is to have corruption. After observing the four detailed indexes of executive power, we can see that except that the executive structural power has no significant negative effect on executive corruption, the other three thinning indexes, namely executive ownership, expert right and prestige right, all have significant positive effects on executive corruption; Second, the effectiveness of internal control has a significant inhibitory effect on the corruption caused by executive power, which indicates that the higher the quality of internal control, the more effective inhibition of executive corruption caused by executive power, and this inhibition effect is becoming more and more intense in state-owned enterprises. Third, the board of supervisors of state-owned enterprises has brought into full play the role of supervision, which has a significant negative effect on the corruption of senior executives, and can effectively curb the corruption of senior executives. In state-owned listed companies, the proportion of equity owned by the first shareholder has a significant positive effect on executive corruption, while in non-state-owned listed companies the opposite is true. The main contributions of this paper are as follows: (1) expand the new perspective of internal control and corruption governance. At present, the academic circles mainly study the governance of corruption from the macroscopic angle, such as adjusting the power of government intervention, constructing the government supervision system, and increasing the rent-seeking cost, but few people take the perspective of internal control as the basic point of study. To explore how to prevent and control corruption. Looking at the present situation of our country, we can see that the enterprises of our country have the following characteristics: the number of enterprises is numerous, the scale is large, the phenomenon of corruption and corruption of company executives often occurs, and its bad consequences even exceed that of government officials. The author believes that by optimizing the internal control system, the rent-seeking corruption can be effectively alleviated and the social atmosphere eliminated. (2) the research on the consequences of internal control is extended. At present, scholars mainly focus on exploring the economic consequences of internal control, such as protecting the interests of shareholders, improving the value of enterprises, reducing the risk of enterprises, rarely involving the prevention and control of corporate corruption.
【学位授予单位】：内蒙古财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D262.6;F272.91
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