从“援助之手”到“攫取之手”:地方政府行为差异的政治经济学分析

发布时间：2018-03-20 16:04

本文选题：理性行为者　切入点：软化的制度约束　出处：《财政研究》2017年01期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：从"援助之手"到"攫取之手"凸显了地方政府作为自我理性行为者行为差异问题,但该差异绝不仅仅源于地方政府及官员的激励机制,而是与地方政府所处的制度约束空间紧密关联。如果说激励机制是地方政府行为差异的内在诱因的话,那么,软化的制度约束则是地方政府行为差异的外因。本文认为,行政"以官治官"下的地方政府选择性政府职能和机会主义下的道德风险问题凸显了有效的官员治理制度机制缺失对地方政府行为的影响;委托代理视角下切实可行的公众和人民代表大会的监督问责制度机制的缺失凸显了对地方政府理性行为者和行为差异的强化作用;政企关系视角下有效廓清政府-市场边界制度机制的缺失和地方政府角色的多元化却进一步强化了地方政府理性行为者角色和行为差异。而进一步矫正和规范地方政府行为,不仅要对地方政府进行激励,还要加强对地方政府的约束,加快制度机制匹配,构建地方政府行为约束的制度机制空间,打造一个更加合意和守规的地方政府,回归政府本分。
[Abstract]:From "the hand of aid" to "the hand of grab", it highlights the behavior difference of local government as a self-rational actor, but the difference is not only from the incentive mechanism of local government and officials. If the incentive mechanism is the internal inducement of the local government behavior difference, then the softened institutional constraint is the external cause of the local government behavior difference. The selective government function of local government and the moral hazard under opportunism under the condition of administration "governing officials by officials" highlights the influence of the absence of effective governance system on the behavior of local governments; From the perspective of principal-agent, the lack of a feasible system of supervision and accountability of the public and the people's Congress highlights the strengthening role of rational actors and behavioral differences in local governments; From the perspective of the relationship between government and enterprise, the absence of the government-market boundary system mechanism and the diversification of the local government role further strengthen the role and behavior differences of the rational actors of the local government, and further correct and standardize the behavior of the local government. It is necessary not only to encourage the local government, but also to strengthen the restraint to the local government, to accelerate the matching of the system and mechanism, to construct the institutional mechanism space of the behavior constraint of the local government, to create a more suitable and obedient local government, and to return to the responsibility of the government.
【作者单位】：山东大学商学院;山东大学经济学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金面上项目“资本化效应、土地财政与地方公共品提供:因‘地’而异的中国式分权”(批准号:71573160)的阶段性成果
【分类号】：D625

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