当前位置:主页 > 社科论文 > 国际关系论文 >

台湾地区“宪政改革”研究

发布时间:2019-06-05 13:48
【摘要】:台湾自古以来就是我国的一部分。1895年,日本通过《马关条约》占据日本。1945年,日本宣布无条件投降,台湾回到祖国的怀抱。1949年,国民党败逃至台湾,开始了其在台湾地区的统治。自20世纪90年代以来,台湾地区已经进行了七次“宪政改革”。本文以历次“宪政改革”为研究对象,重点关注在这一过程中司法院通过“释宪”发挥的作用,在此基础上对具有较强隐蔽性及危险性的“释宪台独”进行分析,以求对祖国统一大业提供借鉴。论文主体由三部分组成。 第一部分是台湾地区“宪政改革”的历程。本部分从“宪政改革”的背景开始,系统梳理了历次“宪政改革”的过程及结果,以时间为轴,重点关注了在这过程中司法院的的变化。随着十大建设的完成,人民受教育水平提高,外向型的经济模式扩大了台湾与世界的交流。进而台湾人民的参政意识日益强烈。国民党内政治斗争激化并且遇到了民进党的挑战。在“二月政争”及“三月学运”的推动下,国民党主导的“宪政改革”拉开大幕。七次“宪政改革”之后,司法院设十五名大法官,由总统提名,经立法院同意任命。大法官任期八年,不分届次,个别计算,不得连任。司法院大法官组成宪法法庭,审理政党违宪解散案及总统、副总统弹劾案。行政院不得删减司法预算。“宪政改革”的持续推进对台湾社会及两岸关系都产生了巨大影响,尤其是损害了两岸关系的良性发展。第二部分是司法院在“宪政改革”中的功能。根据1946年《中华民国宪法》的规定,,司法院有权解释“宪法”。司法院“释宪”所依据的法律规范有所不同,主要有三份:《司法院大法官会议规则》、《司法院大法官会议法》、《司法院大法官审理案件法》。司法院“释宪”技术问题主要是“合宪性”推定解释方法及审查密度的标准。司法院“释宪”在不同历史阶段发挥了不同的作用。主要是为《中华民国宪法》在台湾地区的适用创造条件;配合“宪政改革”调整政治体制;裁决政治纠纷。第三部分是警惕司法院“释宪台独”。通过对司法院有关两岸关系的“宪法”解释的分类,梳理出其对两岸关系的态度及发展脉络。鉴于台湾地区宪法学界对宪法解释理论的研究比较深入,“释宪台独”具有较强的可操作性,国际上已有通过司法解决统独问题的先例,我们对“释宪台独”的忽视等,因此,我们需要警惕司法院“释宪台独”。但“台独”分子通过“释宪”实现“台独”阴谋也会受到若干因素的制约,如导火索的选择,大法官对两岸关系的态度,宪法解释理论的选择等。 只要我们识破了“台独”分子“释宪台独”的把戏,综合运用政治宣传、经济协助、文化感召、法律交流等手段,紧紧依靠两岸人民的支持,我们一定能完成国家统一的大业。
[Abstract]:Taiwan has been a part of our country since ancient times. In 1895, Japan occupied Japan through the Treaty of Malaysia Customs. In 1945, Japan announced unconditional surrender and Taiwan returned to the embrace of the motherland. In 1949, the Kuomintang fled to Taiwan. It began its rule in Taiwan. Since the 1990 s, Taiwan has carried out seven constitutional reforms. This paper takes the past "constitutional reform" as the research object, focuses on the role played by the division court through the "interpretation of the constitution" in this process, and on this basis analyzes the "interpretation of constitutional Taiwan independence", which has a strong concealment and danger. In order to provide reference for the great cause of the reunification of the motherland. The main body of the paper consists of three parts. The first part is the course of constitutional reform in Taiwan. Starting from the background of "constitutional reform", this part systematically combs the process and results of "constitutional reform", taking time as the axis, focusing on the changes of the judicial court in this process. With the completion of the top ten construction and the improvement of people's education level, the export-oriented economic model has expanded the exchanges between Taiwan and the world. Furthermore, the Taiwan people's consciousness of participating in politics is becoming stronger and stronger. The political struggle within the Kuomintang intensified and met the challenges of the DPP. Driven by the political struggle in February and the student movement in March, the constitutional reform led by the Kuomintang opened the curtain. After seven constitutional reforms, the Judicial Court had fifteen judges nominated by the President and appointed with the consent of the Legislative Yuan. The term of office of the Chancellor of Justice shall be eight years, regardless of the number of times, and shall not be re-elected on a case-by-case basis. The judges of the judicial court form a constitutional court to hear the unconstitutional dissolution of political parties and the impeachment of the president and vice president. The Executive Yuan shall not delete the judicial budget. The continuous promotion of "constitutional reform" has had a great impact on Taiwan society and cross-strait relations, especially on the benign development of cross-strait relations. The second part is the function of the judicial court in the constitutional reform. According to the 1946 Constitution of the Republic of China, the judicial court has the power to interpret the Constitution. The legal norms on which the judicial court interprets the constitution are different, mainly in three parts: the rules of the meeting of judges of the Court of Justice, the Law on the meeting of judges of the Court of Justice, and the Law on the hearing of cases by the judges of the Court of Justice. The technical problems of the interpretation of constitution in the judicial court are mainly the interpretation method of constitutional inference and the standard of examining density. The Court of Justice has played different roles in different historical stages. It mainly creates conditions for the application of the Constitution of the Republic of China in Taiwan, adjusts the political system in line with the "constitutional reform", and adjudicates political disputes. The third part is to guard against the judicial court's "interpretation of constitutional Taiwan independence." Through the classification of the interpretation of the Constitution of the Judicial Court on cross-strait relations, the attitude and development of cross-strait relations are sorted out. In view of the deep research on the theory of constitutional interpretation in Taiwan, the "interpretation of constitutional Taiwan independence" has a strong maneuverability, there have been precedents in the world to solve the issue of reunification and independence through justice, and our neglect of "constitutional Taiwan independence". Therefore, We need to be vigilant against the judicial court's "interpretation of constitutional Taiwan independence." However, the conspiracy of "Taiwan independence" elements to realize "Taiwan independence" through "interpreting the constitution" will also be restricted by a number of factors, such as the choice of trigger, the attitude of judges towards cross-strait relations, the choice of constitutional interpretation theory, and so on. As long as we understand the trick of "Taiwan independence" elements in "interpreting constitutional Taiwan independence", comprehensively use political propaganda, economic assistance, cultural call, legal exchanges and other means, and rely closely on the support of the people on both sides of the strait, we will certainly be able to complete the great cause of national reunification.
【学位授予单位】:山东师范大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2015
【分类号】:D675.8

【参考文献】

相关期刊论文 前10条

1 张妮艳;;陈诚与台湾土地改革[J];才智;2012年14期

2 周叶中;祝捷;;我国台湾地区“违宪审查制度”改革评析——以“宪法诉讼法草案”为对象[J];法学评论;2007年04期

3 周叶中;;台湾问题的宪法学思考[J];法学;2007年06期

4 刘孔中;王红霞;;台湾地区司法改革60年:司法独立的实践与挑战[J];东方法学;2011年04期

5 卢映洁;;我国台湾地区法学教育及司法考试的发展与改革介绍[J];法学教育研究;2011年02期

6 蒋惠岭;杨奕;;台湾法官选任的“双轨制”[J];法制资讯;2014年08期

7 文森;;台湾频繁“修宪”的政治风险[J];两岸关系;2015年02期

8 高宝华;台湾的“宪政改革”及其影响[J];世界经济与政治论坛;2002年01期

9 卢丹;崔贵斌;;邓小平“一国两制”宪政思想之于台湾问题[J];思想战线;2009年S2期

10 孙岩;试析台湾"宪政改革"的起因、进程及影响[J];太平洋学报;2005年02期



本文编号:2493572

资料下载
论文发表

本文链接:https://www.wllwen.com/shekelunwen/guojiguanxi/2493572.html


Copyright(c)文论论文网All Rights Reserved | 网站地图 |

版权申明:资料由用户79ad2***提供,本站仅收录摘要或目录,作者需要删除请E-mail邮箱bigeng88@qq.com