listings Government Intervention Efficiency of Capital Alloc

  本文关键词：交叉上市、政府干预与资本配置效率，，由笔耕文化传播整理发布。

交叉上市、政府干预与资本配置效率

Cross-listings, Government Intervention, and Efficiency of Capital Allocation

[1] [2]

Qin Jiaqi ,Shao Xinjian （a： Business School, Nankai University; b： School of International Trade and Economics, UIBE）

[1]南开大学商学院,300071; [2]对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院,100029

文章摘要：本文以2007—2011年的平衡面板数据，考察中国H＋A交叉上市公司是否由于受到更多的政府干预而具有更低的资本配置效率和更低的市场价值。基于参数化生产函数方法，本文以全要素生产率和技术效率来度量资本配置的静态效率，以全要素生产率增长及其在随机边界生产函数下的次级分解指标——技术进步率、规模经济变动、技术效率变动——来度量资本配置的动态效率，采用处理效应模型进行回归分析。研究发现，H＋A公司具有更低的全要素生产率、技术效率和全要素生产率增长。在全要素生产率增长的分解项中，H＋A公司虽然具有更高的技术效率变动，但具有更低的技术进步率。交互效应回归发现，更低的效率指标降低了H＋A公司的价值。这些结果可以视为中国强制性制度变迁的一种成本。

Abstr：Based on 2070 observations of a balanced panel data set from 2007 to 2011, we investigate whether China＇s H ＋ A cross-llsted companies get lower efficiency of capital allocation and then achieve lower market value because of greater government intervention. Adopting the method of parametric function of production, we apply the total factors productivity （TFP） and technical efficiency（TE） to measure the static efficiency of capital allocation. The dynamic efficiency of capital allocation is measured by total factors productivity growth （TFPG） and its sub-index technological progress, scale economy change, and technical efficiency change. With the treatment effect model, we find that H ＋ A companies have lower TFP, TE, and TFPG. Meanwhile, the lower TFPGs of H ＋ A companies come from lower technological progress. The treatment effect model with interaction shows that the lower efficiency of capital allocation decreases the value of H ＋ A companies. These results can be viewed as a cost of China＇s imposed institutional changes.

文章关键词：

Keyword：:Cross-listings Government Intervention Efficiency of Capital Allocation Corporate Value

课题项目：国家自然科学基金项目（70902048、71102075、71232005、71372096、71472039）、国家公派访问学者项目（[2013]3018）、对外经济贸易大学优秀青年学者培育计划（2014YQ01）、中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金（NKZXB10102、CXTD5-01）资助.

  本文关键词：交叉上市、政府干预与资本配置效率，由笔耕文化传播整理发布。