官员家庭抑制子女创业之谜:基于教育筛选的解释

发布时间：2018-02-07 17:11

本文关键词： 官员家庭子女创业教育筛选中介效应稀有事件偏差　出处：《财经研究》2017年10期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：文章利用中国综合社会调查数据考察官员家庭对子女创业的影响,并进一步分析其内在作用机制。研究发现:第一,官员家庭显著抑制了子女的创业行为,降低了创业发生概率。第二,教育筛选机制能够解释官员家庭抑制创业现象,即官员家庭子女由于普遍拥有更长的教育年限而往往更不愿意选择风险较大的创业型工作。第三,官员家庭对创业的抑制主要来源于父亲为官,母亲为官对子女的创业影响不显著。此外,文章进一步甄别了可能与教育筛选并存的两种抑制创业的机制。出于"在位避嫌"的考虑,官员家庭会抑制子女创业,但是教育筛选仍然是其最主要的现实机制。相关的稳健性分类检验都支持了上述结论,并在此基础上得出了鼓励创业和保障就业公平的政策思路。
[Abstract]:Based on the comprehensive social survey data of China, this paper examines the influence of official families on children's entrepreneurship, and further analyzes its internal mechanism. The results show that: first, official families significantly inhibit their children's entrepreneurial behavior. Second, the educational screening mechanism can explain the phenomenon of official families restraining entrepreneurship, that is, the children of official families are often less willing to choose more risky entrepreneurial jobs because they generally have longer years of education. Third, The restraint of official families on entrepreneurship mainly comes from the fact that the father is the official, while the mother as the official has no significant influence on the children's entrepreneurship. In addition, The article further identifies two mechanisms that may co-exist with educational screening to curb entrepreneurship. For the sake of "avoiding suspicion in place," officials' families will curb their children's entrepreneurship. However, educational screening is still the most important practical mechanism. The relevant robust classification tests support the above conclusions, and on this basis, the policy ideas of encouraging entrepreneurship and ensuring employment equity are proposed.
【作者单位】：对外经济贸易大学国际经济研究院;对外经济贸易大学WTO研究院;
【基金】：对外经济贸易大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(CXTD8-03)
【分类号】：C913.11;F279.2

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