国内观众成本与印度国际危机谈判行为

发布时间：2018-04-29 14:24

本文选题：印度 + 危机谈判　；参考：《外交评论(外交学院学报)》2016年06期

【摘要】：传统观众成本理论关注领导人在危机谈判中创造和展示观众成本的能力,但是无法解释在观众成本很高的情况下,领导人为何做出有悖于国内观众偏好的选择。为此本文试图建立一个事件关注度和国内惩罚能力的双变量解释框架,并以印度为例考察领导人的危机谈判策略与面临的国内制约之间的互动机制。自独立以来,印度多次面临与中国、巴基斯坦和孟加拉等主要邻国的国际危机局面,其采取的国际危机谈判策略往往被认为是不加选择的强硬战略。但通过研究可以发现,印度危机谈判行为呈现的一味强硬策略并没有违背国内观众成本机制,恰恰相反,这是印度领导人面临有关国内制约的结果,只是在不同时期的国内政治背景下呈现的内容和形式有所不同。
[Abstract]:Traditional audience cost theory focuses on the ability of leaders to create and demonstrate audience costs in crisis negotiations, but it cannot explain why leaders make choices contrary to domestic audience preferences when audience costs are high. Therefore, this paper attempts to establish a bivariate explanatory framework of event focus and domestic punishment ability, and takes India as an example to examine the interaction mechanism between the crisis negotiation strategy of leaders and the domestic constraints faced by leaders. Since independence, India has faced many international crises with its major neighbors, such as China, Pakistan and Bangladesh, and its international crisis negotiation strategy is often seen as an unselective tough strategy. However, through the study, we can find that the rigid tactics presented by India's crisis negotiation behavior are not contrary to the domestic audience cost mechanism. On the contrary, this is the result of Indian leaders facing relevant domestic constraints. However, the contents and forms are different under the domestic political background of different periods.
【作者单位】：清华大学国际关系学系;
【基金】：清华大学国际关系学系博士生学术新人奖的资助
【分类号】：D835.1

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