族群冲突的理性主义逻辑及其对中国的启示
发布时间:2018-08-08 20:46
【摘要】:对于由某一族群主导的中央政府与国内其他族群发生的族群冲突,通常的理论解释主要关注后者对前者的不满以及其武装反抗能力。但是,这种研究路径不能解释为什么冲突双方不能达成反映双方实力对比的妥协方案以避免族群冲突。为了解答这一疑问,有必要关注冲突双方的战略互动。在战略互动过程中,族群冲突双方对彼此实力、意图和战争决心的评估方面的信息不对称,阻碍双方达成基于真实实力对比的和平协议;即使双方掌握对称信息,但由于担心彼此不能真正履行和平承诺,同样阻碍和平协议的达成;更为重要的是,冲突双方争执的核心问题可能具有不容妥协、不可分割的价值。和平谈判的失败意味着族群冲突的爆发。因此,要防止族群冲突的发生或重建战后和平,第三方的调解和安全保证至关重要,这对于中国介入非洲的族群冲突具有重要启示。
[Abstract]:For the ethnic conflict between the central government dominated by one ethnic group and other ethnic groups in China, the theoretical explanation mainly focuses on the latter's dissatisfaction with the former and its ability of armed resistance. However, this approach does not explain why the parties to the conflict cannot reach a compromise that reflects the strength of the two sides in order to avoid ethnic conflict. In order to answer this question, it is necessary to pay attention to the strategic interaction between the parties to the conflict. In the process of strategic interaction, the information asymmetry between the two sides of the ethnic conflict on the evaluation of each other's strength, intention and war determination prevents the two sides from reaching a peace agreement based on a true power comparison; even if the parties have symmetrical information, But the fear that they will not truly live up to their peace commitments also impedes the conclusion of a peace agreement; more importantly, the core issue of the dispute between the two parties to the conflict may have intransigent and indivisible value. The failure of the peace talks meant the outbreak of ethnic conflict. Therefore, in order to prevent the occurrence of ethnic conflicts or to re-establish post-war peace, third-party mediation and security guarantees are of great importance, which has important implications for China's involvement in ethnic conflicts in Africa.
【作者单位】: 中国社会科学杂志社;
【分类号】:D81
本文编号:2172991
[Abstract]:For the ethnic conflict between the central government dominated by one ethnic group and other ethnic groups in China, the theoretical explanation mainly focuses on the latter's dissatisfaction with the former and its ability of armed resistance. However, this approach does not explain why the parties to the conflict cannot reach a compromise that reflects the strength of the two sides in order to avoid ethnic conflict. In order to answer this question, it is necessary to pay attention to the strategic interaction between the parties to the conflict. In the process of strategic interaction, the information asymmetry between the two sides of the ethnic conflict on the evaluation of each other's strength, intention and war determination prevents the two sides from reaching a peace agreement based on a true power comparison; even if the parties have symmetrical information, But the fear that they will not truly live up to their peace commitments also impedes the conclusion of a peace agreement; more importantly, the core issue of the dispute between the two parties to the conflict may have intransigent and indivisible value. The failure of the peace talks meant the outbreak of ethnic conflict. Therefore, in order to prevent the occurrence of ethnic conflicts or to re-establish post-war peace, third-party mediation and security guarantees are of great importance, which has important implications for China's involvement in ethnic conflicts in Africa.
【作者单位】: 中国社会科学杂志社;
【分类号】:D81
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