基于博弈论的危险品运输网络恐怖袭击损失概率研究
发布时间：2018-08-24 17:02
【摘要】：从2014年云南昆明火车站策划砍人事件到2015年法国巴黎杂志社武装分子武器恐怖袭击事件；国际恐怖主义愈演愈烈,恐怖袭击对象转向平民,恐怖势力开始蔓延至各个国家的中心城市。危险品运输网络作为城市中承载危险品运输的道路交通网络,极易成为袭击目标。基于此,本文就危险品运输网络恐怖袭击风险定量问题进行研究。首先,为解决恐怖袭击事件中袭击者与防御者之间对抗关系的模型描述问题,通过理论学习和文献分析,建立了混合策略博弈模型,在构建了恐怖袭击事件博弈双方之间为严格竞争博弈后,通过对恐怖袭击特点的研究,根据恐怖袭击可能针对的目标,确定了博弈双方的策略选择方式和策略选择对象,将可能发生的恐怖袭击中袭击方和防御方的行为模型化,加以数学描述,为恐怖袭击目标损失概率模型提供总体框架设置。其次,为解决危险品运输网络中作为恐怖袭击目标的网络节点的数学描述问题,构建了危险品运输网络模型,通过复杂网络传统统计指标,定义新的适用于本文研究的重要度统计指标,通过该指标对危险品运输网络目标节点重要程度进行排序,为恐怖袭击目标损失概率模型提供了参数支持。基于以上两个模型,本文提出了基于博弈论的危险品运输网络恐怖袭击目标损失概率模型；针对恐怖袭击特性,危险品运输网络特性,提出危险品运输网络恐怖袭击目标损失概率模型,利用混合策略纳什均衡条件,通过平衡损失期望得到混合策略纳什均衡点,根据均衡点实现模型计算；通过赋值运算法为节点赋予目标值,经过模型计算,分析得出损失概率、目标值、防御资源之间的关系。最后,通过复杂网络模型抽象石油配送网络验证了模型的科学有效性。研究结果表明：网络目标节点损失概率随着目标值的增长而降低,同时,目标节点损失概率随着目标防御资源的增大而减小：计算结果总体表明目标值越大的节点由于分配到的防御资源也相应较大,该类节点遇袭的损失概率反而并不大,该结论符合博弈双方在策略选择上的逻辑合理性；本文研究结论可为政府部门分配恐怖袭击防御资源提供参考依据,为政府部门防范恐怖袭击提供决策支持。
[Abstract]:From the planned chopping incident at Kunming Railway Station in Yunnan Province in 2014 to the 2015 terrorist attack on armed elements of Paris magazine in France; international terrorism has intensified, and the target of terrorist attacks has turned to civilians. The terrorist forces began to spread to the central cities of various countries. As a road traffic network carrying dangerous goods in cities, dangerous goods transportation network is easy to be attacked. Based on this, this paper studies the risk quantitative problem of dangerous goods transportation network terrorist attacks. First of all, in order to solve the problem of model description of the antagonistic relationship between attackers and defenders in terrorist attacks, a mixed strategy game model is established through theoretical study and literature analysis. After constructing a strict competition game between the two sides of the game of terrorist attack, through the study of the characteristics of the terrorist attack, according to the possible targets of the terrorist attack, the strategy selection mode and the target of the game are determined. The behavior of the attacking party and the defending side in the possible terrorist attack is modeled and described mathematically to provide the overall framework for the probability model of the loss of the terrorist attack target. Secondly, in order to solve the problem of mathematical description of the network nodes which are the targets of terrorist attacks in the dangerous goods transportation network, a dangerous goods transportation network model is constructed, and the traditional statistical index of the complex network is established. This paper defines a new statistical index of importance, which is suitable for the study of this paper, and sorts the importance of target nodes in dangerous goods transportation network by this index, which provides the parameter support for the probability model of loss of terrorist attack target. Based on the above two models, this paper puts forward the loss probability model of dangerous goods transportation network based on game theory, aiming at the characteristics of terrorist attack, the characteristics of dangerous goods transportation network, The loss probability model of terrorist attack target in dangerous goods transportation network is put forward. By using the Nash equilibrium condition of mixed strategy, the Nash equilibrium point of mixed strategy is obtained by balancing loss expectation, and the model is calculated according to equilibrium point. The target value is assigned to the node by assignment operation. The relationship among loss probability, target value and defense resource is obtained by model calculation. Finally, the scientific validity of the model is verified by abstracting the oil distribution network with complex network model. The results show that the loss probability of the target node decreases with the increase of the target value, and at the same time, The loss probability of the target node decreases with the increase of the target defense resource. The calculation results show that the node with the larger target value is less likely to be attacked because of the larger defense resources assigned to the node. This conclusion is in line with the logical rationality of the strategy choice of both sides of the game. The conclusion of this paper can provide a reference basis for government departments to allocate resources for the defense of terrorist attacks and provide decision support for government departments to prevent terrorist attacks.
【学位授予单位】：西南交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：U16;D815.5
[Abstract]:From the planned chopping incident at Kunming Railway Station in Yunnan Province in 2014 to the 2015 terrorist attack on armed elements of Paris magazine in France; international terrorism has intensified, and the target of terrorist attacks has turned to civilians. The terrorist forces began to spread to the central cities of various countries. As a road traffic network carrying dangerous goods in cities, dangerous goods transportation network is easy to be attacked. Based on this, this paper studies the risk quantitative problem of dangerous goods transportation network terrorist attacks. First of all, in order to solve the problem of model description of the antagonistic relationship between attackers and defenders in terrorist attacks, a mixed strategy game model is established through theoretical study and literature analysis. After constructing a strict competition game between the two sides of the game of terrorist attack, through the study of the characteristics of the terrorist attack, according to the possible targets of the terrorist attack, the strategy selection mode and the target of the game are determined. The behavior of the attacking party and the defending side in the possible terrorist attack is modeled and described mathematically to provide the overall framework for the probability model of the loss of the terrorist attack target. Secondly, in order to solve the problem of mathematical description of the network nodes which are the targets of terrorist attacks in the dangerous goods transportation network, a dangerous goods transportation network model is constructed, and the traditional statistical index of the complex network is established. This paper defines a new statistical index of importance, which is suitable for the study of this paper, and sorts the importance of target nodes in dangerous goods transportation network by this index, which provides the parameter support for the probability model of loss of terrorist attack target. Based on the above two models, this paper puts forward the loss probability model of dangerous goods transportation network based on game theory, aiming at the characteristics of terrorist attack, the characteristics of dangerous goods transportation network, The loss probability model of terrorist attack target in dangerous goods transportation network is put forward. By using the Nash equilibrium condition of mixed strategy, the Nash equilibrium point of mixed strategy is obtained by balancing loss expectation, and the model is calculated according to equilibrium point. The target value is assigned to the node by assignment operation. The relationship among loss probability, target value and defense resource is obtained by model calculation. Finally, the scientific validity of the model is verified by abstracting the oil distribution network with complex network model. The results show that the loss probability of the target node decreases with the increase of the target value, and at the same time, The loss probability of the target node decreases with the increase of the target defense resource. The calculation results show that the node with the larger target value is less likely to be attacked because of the larger defense resources assigned to the node. This conclusion is in line with the logical rationality of the strategy choice of both sides of the game. The conclusion of this paper can provide a reference basis for government departments to allocate resources for the defense of terrorist attacks and provide decision support for government departments to prevent terrorist attacks.
【学位授予单位】：西南交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：U16;D815.5
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相关期刊论文 前4条
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