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制度改革、军力建设与国策权变——腓特列大王的大战略

发布时间:2018-01-31 02:06

  本文关键词: 制度 改革 军力 建设 国策 权变 腓特列 大王 大战略 出处:《中国人民大学》2008年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文


【摘要】: 普鲁士国王腓特烈二世(又称腓特烈大王)是18世纪欧洲杰出的大战略决策者。他结合启蒙思想、霍亨索伦王朝传统与普鲁士国情,创造出了一套自成体系的大战略思想,其根本原则是“纯粹国家利益至上”,并大致可归纳为制度改革、军力建设与国策权变三个方面。其中制度改革旨在通过立法、行政管理等手段保护生产、促进法治、施行宗教宽容,为国家注入开明、公正的新精神;军力建设则是秉承其先王传统,进一步加强军队纪律、提高战斗力,并想方设法减少军队给经济造成的负担;国策权变基于他对欧洲国际格局的宏观把握,认为国家间关系是一种现实利益纠葛,强调普鲁士利用此种关系对外扩张的必要和可能,要求果断地运用军队实现扩张目标。 基于这套思想,腓特烈大王在1740年到1786年当政期间进行了长久的大战略实践。在头六年中,他的内外政策取得辉煌成果,既推行了制度改革,又利用奥地利皇位继承纠纷夺占了西里西亚,使欧洲震惊。但此后他未能准确把握自身扩张在欧洲各国激发的敌意,也没有采取恰当的外交手段予以应对,导致1756年在空前孤立的情势下被迫投入“七年战争”,经艰苦奋战、承受巨大牺牲,终靠杰出的战术才能和惊人的运气方得惨胜。往后二十年,他吸取教训、励精图治,对内全面促进生产、推行改革,对外以平和、多元、有效的外交大大改善了国际环境。到他去世时,普鲁士的欧洲强国地位业已稳固。 腓特烈大王的大战略给后世以颇多教益。他的成功来自一套明晰的大战略体系,其基础是对“国家利益”的强调和对国际格局的现实主义认识,其战略目标定位于国内改革与对外有限扩张,既合理、集中,又互相协调。他成功地使战略手段与目标相融合,无论是立法还是作战都有明确目的,且从不因为局部胜利而盲目冒进。他的失败则主要在于对自身行为的战略后果的误判,以及由此导致的应对手段的贫乏、无力。另外,他继承先王传统、将军队这一政策工具抬高为战略目标之一,违背了大战略的根本原则,埋下了普鲁士穷兵黩武的祸根。腓特烈的大战略饱含类似的成败经验,国内至今尚无人专文论述这些史实与道理,本文试在此领域有所创新。
[Abstract]:Frederick II, King of Prussia (also known as King Frederick), was an outstanding European strategic decision-maker in 18th century. He combined the enlightenment thought, the tradition of Hohensorun dynasty and the national conditions of Prussia. It has created a set of big strategic thought of its own system, its fundamental principle is "pure national interest first", and can be roughly summed up as system reform. The system reform aims to protect production, promote the rule of law, carry out religious tolerance, and inject the new spirit of openness and justice into the country by means of legislation and administration. On the other hand, the construction of military strength is to carry on the tradition of the former king, to further strengthen the discipline of the army, to improve the combat effectiveness, and to find ways to reduce the burden caused by the army to the economy. Based on his macroscopic grasp of the European international structure, the state policy contingency thought that the inter-state relationship was a kind of realistic interest dispute, and emphasized the necessity and possibility for Prussia to make use of this kind of relationship to expand abroad. A decisive use of the army to achieve expansion goals is required. Based on this set of ideas, King Frederick carried out a long period of great strategic practice during his reign from 1740 to 1786. In the first six years, his internal and external policies achieved brilliant results, and he carried out the reform of the system. He also used the Austrian succession dispute to seize Silicia, which shocked Europe, but he failed to grasp the enmity aroused by his own expansion in European countries, nor did he take appropriate diplomatic measures to deal with it. In 1756, he was forced into the "seven-year war" in an unprecedented isolation. After hard work and great sacrifice, he was finally defeated by outstanding tactical skill and amazing luck. He learned from the lessons, worked hard to promote production at home, carried out reforms, and greatly improved the international environment with a peaceful, pluralistic and effective diplomacy. By the time of his death. Prussia is a strong European power. The great strategy of King Frederick has taught many lessons for later generations. His success comes from a set of clear strategic system, which is based on the emphasis on "national interests" and realistic understanding of the international structure. His strategic goal is aimed at domestic reform and limited expansion of foreign countries, which is both reasonable, centralized, and coordinated with each other. He has succeeded in integrating strategic means and objectives, both in legislation and in war. His failure was mainly due to the misjudgment of the strategic consequences of his own behavior, and the resulting meagre and feeble coping measures. In addition, he inherited the tradition of his ancestors. Elevating the army as a policy tool as one of the strategic objectives violated the fundamental principles of the grand strategy and buried the root of Prussian militarism. Frederick's grand strategy contained similar experience of success or failure. There is no one at home to discuss these historical facts and truth, this paper tries to innovate in this field.
【学位授予单位】:中国人民大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2008
【分类号】:K516.33

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