论1956年匈牙利的“中立”
发布时间：2018-08-10 22:32
【摘要】： 1956年10月爆发了震惊中外的匈牙利事件,11月1日纳吉领导的匈牙利政府在革命走向失败的最后,宣告退出华沙条约并宣布国家中立,同时,纳吉向联合国发出请求包括苏联在内的四大国对匈牙利中立的保证,这在苏联为首的社会主义阵营中是前所未有的事情。中立最终在苏联的武力镇压下失败,纳吉呈交给联合国的请求也不了了之。然而,为什么匈牙利政府会选择在革命最混乱的时刻提出中立的要求,中立是否是纳吉政府最后的选择?中立对匈牙利人民而言有着怎样的意义?英法、美、苏等国家在匈牙利宣布中立的前后各个政府的应策变化又如何?我们又如何更客观的评价这一事件?1956年匈牙利政府宣布中立这一事件在国内外的研究著作中多是在论述匈牙利事件的同时,以叙事的方式简要的论述中立的宣布和失败的历程,许多匈牙利革命的研究者评论纳吉政府这一举措是轻率的不理智的,而且是引起苏联第二次出兵干涉的导火索。但随着近几年苏联、匈牙利以及美国档案和相关资料的陆续解密,这些观点都有待商榷。纳吉政府宣布中立并非是苏联出兵干涉的原因而是结果,匈牙利政府之所以在当时做此决定是为了挽救革命做出的最后的努力。本文就试图在前人研究匈牙利事件成就的基础上,借助新近公开的资料对1956年匈牙利政府的中立这一事件,站在客观的角度上,更系统、全面的记述和评析1956年匈牙利政府宣布中立这一事件的历史原因和发生历程和结果,希望能够对这方面的研究和探讨提供一些帮助。 正文分为五个部分: 前言:介绍国内外有关1956年匈牙利政府宣布中立这一事件的研究现状及选题意义。 第一部分:匈牙利“中立”的由来。简要介绍了“中立”的涵义和概念,大概论述了匈牙利历史上相关中立思想的提出和实施结果。 第二部分:匈牙利寻求“中立”的内外历史因素。这是本文的重点,主要论证了匈牙利在1956年提出中立并非纳吉政府一时的冲动,而是有着深远的国内外因素影响的。就匈牙利本国而言,本民族坎坷历史经历以及二战后受苏联模式的困扰,裴多菲俱乐部这个在匈牙利有着广泛影响的民间爱国组织对自由、民主、独立的宣传,以及纳吉早就形成了比较成熟的“中立”思想是推动匈牙利走向中立的内部因素。而南斯拉夫自治道路的开辟以及奥地利中立模式的成功,加之革命前后自由欧洲电台的舆论宣传的煽动对匈牙利人民和纳吉政府而言,不止给让他们看到了追求匈牙利中立的曙光,也更坚定了他们的信心。这部分旨在说明匈牙利人民以及纳吉政府对中立的诉求是具有着一定的现实意义。 第三部:论述1956年匈牙利革命前后,匈牙利政府在各种因素的推动下走向“中立”的历程。 第四部分:大国及联合国对匈牙利“中立”的应策。这一部分分别分析了苏联以及阵营,英、法、美以及联合国会议上在匈牙利宣布中立前后各国政府的应策变化。在论述中借助最新材料对一些观点做了进一步的分析求证,在对这部分内容的分析基础之上指出匈牙利作为冷战对峙时期的东欧小国家,追求独立自由的愿望往往是被操纵世界命脉的大国践踏,抑或沦为被利用来实现本国利益的工具。 第五部分:匈牙利“中立”的结局及其相关问题的思考,这部分是在前面的论述的基础之上,分析了匈牙利人们在宣布中立之后的欣喜,苏联武力镇压匈牙利革命带来的损失以及纳吉等人受到的不公平的审判的结果。重点评述了1956年匈牙利“中立”这一事件,笔者认为中立虽然以失败告终,但反映了匈牙利人民为追求独立自由的勇气和毅力,同时也反映了在冷战的特殊时期,民族国家命运总是受到美苏两个超级大国阵营的复杂关系的牵制。纳吉政府在革命最后时期提出中立有着一定的现实意义,但是复杂的国际和国内局势并不具备中立实现的现实条件。同时,卡达尔之所以选择“背叛”,也许是拯救当时匈牙利的最理智的选择。
[Abstract]:On November 1, 1956, the Hungarian government led by Naji declared its withdrawal from the Warsaw Treaty and declared its national neutrality. At the same time, Naji appealed to the United Nations for the assurance of Hungary's neutrality by the four major powers, including the Soviet Union, which was the socialist front led by the Soviet Union. Camp neutrality is unprecedented. Neutrality ultimately failed under the Soviet repression, and Naji's request to the United Nations was lost. However, why did the Hungarian government choose to ask for neutrality at the most chaotic moment of the revolution? Is neutrality the last choice of the Naji government? What is neutrality for the Hungarian people? What's the significance of this? What are the changes in the policies of the governments before and after Hungary's declaration of neutrality in Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union? How can we evaluate this event more objectively? Many Hungarian revolutionary researchers commented on the neutrality's proclamation and failure, and that the Naji government's move was imprudent and irrational, and was the trigger for the Soviet Union's Second Military intervention. The government's declaration of neutrality was not the result of the Soviet Union's military intervention, but was the result of the Hungarian government's final attempt to save the revolution. From an objective point of view, a more systematic and comprehensive account and analysis of the historical causes, the course and the results of the Hungarian government's declaration of neutrality in 1956 is made in the hope of providing some help for the study and discussion in this regard.
The text is divided into five parts.
Foreword: This paper introduces the research status and significance of the Hungarian government's declaration of neutrality in 1956 at home and abroad.
The first part: the origin of Hungary's neutrality, briefly introduces the meaning and concept of neutrality, and roughly discusses the proposition and implementation results of Hungary's history of neutrality.
The second part: Hungary's internal and external historical factors of seeking "neutrality". This is the focus of this paper. It mainly demonstrates that Hungary's proposal of "neutrality" in 1956 is not a temporary impulse of the Najib government, but has far-reaching domestic and foreign factors. Excuse me, the propaganda of freedom, democracy, independence, and Naji's mature "neutrality" idea by the Podofi Club, a popular patriotic organization in Hungary, are the internal factors that propel Hungary towards neutrality. For the Hungarian people and the Najib government, the public propaganda of Free Europe Radio before and after the revolution not only gave them the dawn of pursuing Hungarian neutrality, but also strengthened their confidence.
Part three: Discusses the course of Hungarian government's neutrality under the impetus of various factors before and after the Hungarian Revolution in 1956.
Part IV: The response of the great powers and the United Nations to Hungary's neutrality. This part analyzes the changes of the response of the Soviet Union and the governments of the camps, Britain, France, the United States and the United Nations before and after Hungary's declaration of neutrality. In the discussion, some viewpoints are further analyzed and verified with the help of the latest materials. On the basis of Rong's analysis, Hungary, as a small country in Eastern Europe during the Cold War confrontation, is often trampled by the great powers that manipulate the lifeblood of the world, or become a tool to realize its own interests.
The fifth part: the conclusion of Hungary's "neutrality" and the thinking of its related problems. This part is based on the previous discussion. It analyzes the delight of Hungarians after the declaration of neutrality, the losses caused by the suppression of the Hungarian revolution by the Soviet Union and the unfair trial of Naji et al. It focuses on the review of 1956. The "neutrality" in Hungary is a failure, but it reflects the courage and perseverance of the Hungarian people in pursuit of independence and freedom. It also reflects that in the special period of the cold war, the fate of the nation-state was always constrained by the complex relationship between the two superpowers camps. However, the complicated international and domestic situation does not have the realistic conditions to realize neutrality. At the same time, Kadar's choice of "betrayal" may be the most rational choice to save Hungary at that time.
【学位授予单位】：陕西师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2009
【分类号】：K515.5
本文编号：2176411
[Abstract]:On November 1, 1956, the Hungarian government led by Naji declared its withdrawal from the Warsaw Treaty and declared its national neutrality. At the same time, Naji appealed to the United Nations for the assurance of Hungary's neutrality by the four major powers, including the Soviet Union, which was the socialist front led by the Soviet Union. Camp neutrality is unprecedented. Neutrality ultimately failed under the Soviet repression, and Naji's request to the United Nations was lost. However, why did the Hungarian government choose to ask for neutrality at the most chaotic moment of the revolution? Is neutrality the last choice of the Naji government? What is neutrality for the Hungarian people? What's the significance of this? What are the changes in the policies of the governments before and after Hungary's declaration of neutrality in Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union? How can we evaluate this event more objectively? Many Hungarian revolutionary researchers commented on the neutrality's proclamation and failure, and that the Naji government's move was imprudent and irrational, and was the trigger for the Soviet Union's Second Military intervention. The government's declaration of neutrality was not the result of the Soviet Union's military intervention, but was the result of the Hungarian government's final attempt to save the revolution. From an objective point of view, a more systematic and comprehensive account and analysis of the historical causes, the course and the results of the Hungarian government's declaration of neutrality in 1956 is made in the hope of providing some help for the study and discussion in this regard.
The text is divided into five parts.
Foreword: This paper introduces the research status and significance of the Hungarian government's declaration of neutrality in 1956 at home and abroad.
The first part: the origin of Hungary's neutrality, briefly introduces the meaning and concept of neutrality, and roughly discusses the proposition and implementation results of Hungary's history of neutrality.
The second part: Hungary's internal and external historical factors of seeking "neutrality". This is the focus of this paper. It mainly demonstrates that Hungary's proposal of "neutrality" in 1956 is not a temporary impulse of the Najib government, but has far-reaching domestic and foreign factors. Excuse me, the propaganda of freedom, democracy, independence, and Naji's mature "neutrality" idea by the Podofi Club, a popular patriotic organization in Hungary, are the internal factors that propel Hungary towards neutrality. For the Hungarian people and the Najib government, the public propaganda of Free Europe Radio before and after the revolution not only gave them the dawn of pursuing Hungarian neutrality, but also strengthened their confidence.
Part three: Discusses the course of Hungarian government's neutrality under the impetus of various factors before and after the Hungarian Revolution in 1956.
Part IV: The response of the great powers and the United Nations to Hungary's neutrality. This part analyzes the changes of the response of the Soviet Union and the governments of the camps, Britain, France, the United States and the United Nations before and after Hungary's declaration of neutrality. In the discussion, some viewpoints are further analyzed and verified with the help of the latest materials. On the basis of Rong's analysis, Hungary, as a small country in Eastern Europe during the Cold War confrontation, is often trampled by the great powers that manipulate the lifeblood of the world, or become a tool to realize its own interests.
The fifth part: the conclusion of Hungary's "neutrality" and the thinking of its related problems. This part is based on the previous discussion. It analyzes the delight of Hungarians after the declaration of neutrality, the losses caused by the suppression of the Hungarian revolution by the Soviet Union and the unfair trial of Naji et al. It focuses on the review of 1956. The "neutrality" in Hungary is a failure, but it reflects the courage and perseverance of the Hungarian people in pursuit of independence and freedom. It also reflects that in the special period of the cold war, the fate of the nation-state was always constrained by the complex relationship between the two superpowers camps. However, the complicated international and domestic situation does not have the realistic conditions to realize neutrality. At the same time, Kadar's choice of "betrayal" may be the most rational choice to save Hungary at that time.
【学位授予单位】：陕西师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2009
【分类号】：K515.5
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前1条
1 时殷弘;匈牙利事件和美国的政策[J];南京大学学报(哲学.人文科学.社会科学版);1998年01期
，本文编号：2176411
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