昭和天皇与太平洋战争

发布时间：2018-08-15 15:32

【摘要】： 昭和天皇作为近代日本最高的精神权威和专制君主、陆海军大元帅、无疑负有不可推卸的战争责任。但由于天皇免予起诉,逃脱了远东国际军事法庭的审判,日本的右翼势力便以“天皇无罪”来否定对外战争的侵略性,为天皇开脱。日本许多的历史著作,也把对外战争的责任推给军部或少壮派军官,而把对外侵略的总舵手天皇掩盖起来,从而使天皇的战争责任问题一直成为史学界争论的焦点之一。加之中国是遭受日本对外侵略的重灾区,所以各国史学界对天皇战争责任的研究大多集中在侵华方面,对太平洋战争中天皇的责任问题较少涉及,至今尚未见到系统全面论述这一问题的专著或论文。故此,本文拟就昭和天皇在太平洋战争前后的言行及作用逐一进行探讨,揭示天皇是如何积极参与战争的重大决策过程、指导和影响战争局势的,并指出其应负的责任,以此驳斥右翼势力所谓的“天皇是虚君、和平主义者及日本对外发动战争合法性”的辩解。正文主要由三部分组成。在第一部分昭和天皇与太平洋战争的爆发中,首先论述了太平洋战争爆发的原因,并指出主要责任在于日本天皇制政府的对外侵略扩张,接着具体分析了天皇的言行在南进政策确立、实施过程中的作用,特别是在制定和实施作战计划方面,天皇本人对作战行动施加着决定性、控制性的影响,驳斥了那种认为天皇在战前并不了解偷袭珍珠港计划的观点。最后强调指出昭和天皇是在研究了各种情况,经过与政府和军部反复商讨,又听取了重臣们的意见,经过种种考虑之后才做出的与英美开战的“圣断”。第二部分重点讲述了战争爆发后,昭和天皇是如何积极主动地参与战争决策的,揭穿了昭和天皇在战争中是个“无为之君”的假象。在战争初期,为胜利欣喜若狂的昭和天皇尚未预见到战场局势的转折,对于中途岛的惨败仍处之泰然。在瓜达尔卡纳尔岛争夺战中,大元帅昭和天皇充分利用自己的神圣权威,不断向军部施加压力,终于导致了损失惨重的消耗战。随着战争形势的恶化,为调解统帅层内部矛盾,解决战略物资和船舶分配问题,昭和天皇不得不直接出面,在有关国务和军事统帅问题上进一步发挥积极作用。塞班岛失陷后,面对国内日益高涨的“反东条运动”,天皇决定抛弃东条,继续坚持战争。在第三部分昭和天皇与日本投降的叙述中,分析了日本投降决策中的所谓“圣断”及其真相:天皇在明知败局已定的情况下,为了确保自己的统治地位,人为地拖延战争,使日本本土在此后半年中遭到本可避免的巨大破坏。在整个战争前后,几乎所有的重大军事行动与策划,或是得到天皇的批准,或是天皇在御前会议上做出的,昭和天皇对战争负有直接的责任。在某种程度上可以说,天皇是日本战争机器的实际操纵者。但战后日本政界战争史观的右倾化使天皇的战争责任问题日益模糊。最后,我们认为既不能把昭和天皇看作是率先倡导开战和积极推行开战的好战主义者,也不能因为昭和天皇对战争的一度犹豫而追认为和平主义者,这也不是天皇的本来面貌。昭和天皇决不是草率,而是反复斟酌、踌躇、动摇,在多次听取政府、军部首脑及内大臣、皇族的意见和情况介绍并一一确认之后,最终由自己做出开战的“圣断”,而天皇“圣断”的后果就是高达3000万的各国国民被残杀,310万日本国民死亡,这当然应该追究天皇的战争责任。
[Abstract]:As the supreme spiritual authority and autocratic monarch of modern Japan, the Grand Admiral of the Army and Navy undoubtedly bears the unavoidable responsibility for war. But because the emperor was exempted from prosecution and escaped the trial of the Far East International Military Court, the Japanese right-wing forces denied the aggressiveness of the foreign war with "the emperor's innocence" and excused the emperor. Many historical writings have also shifted the responsibility for foreign wars to the military or junior officers, and concealed the chief helmsman of foreign aggression, the emperor's war responsibility, which has been one of the focuses of debate in the history circles. In addition, China is a disaster area suffered from Japan's foreign aggression, so the historians of various countries are responsible for the emperor's war. Ren's research mostly focuses on the invasion of China, but seldom touches on the responsibility of the emperor in the Pacific War. Up to now, no monographs or papers have been published on this issue systematically and comprehensively. The grand decision-making process guides and influences the war situation, and points out its responsibilities, in order to refute the right-wing forces so-called "Emperor is a virtual monarch, pacifists and Japan's legitimacy to wage war abroad" argument.
The main body consists of three parts. In the first part, the reasons for the outbreak of the Pacific War between Emperor Zhao and the Pacific Ocean were discussed, and the main responsibility was pointed out to be the invasion and expansion of the Japanese imperial government. Then the role of the emperor's words and deeds in the establishment and implementation of the South-marching policy was analyzed concretely. The Emperor himself exerted a decisive and controlling influence on the operation in formulating and implementing the plan of operations, refuting the view that the emperor did not understand the plan of the attack on Pearl Harbor before the war. Opinions, after various considerations, made the "holy break" in the war with Britain and the United States.
The second part focuses on how Emperor Zhao and Emperor Zhao took an active part in the war decision-making after the outbreak of the war, debunking the illusion that Emperor Zhao and Emperor Zhao were an "inactive king" in the war. In the battle for Guadalcanal Island, the Grand Marshal Zhao and the Emperor made full use of their sacred authority and kept exerting pressure on the Ministry of the Army, which eventually led to a costly war of attrition. After the fall of Saipan, the emperor decided to abandon the "Anti-Eastern Strip Movement" and continue to persist in the war.
In the third part of the narrative of the surrender between Emperor Zhao and Japan, the author analyzes the so-called "holy judgment" in the decision-making of Japanese surrender and its truth: the emperor, knowing that the defeat had been decided, delayed the war artificially in order to ensure his dominant position, thus causing the Japanese mainland to suffer tremendous damage which could have been avoided in the next six months. To some extent, the emperor was the actual operator of the Japanese war machine. But the right deviation of the Japanese political outlook on war history caused the emperor's war. The problem of responsibility is increasingly blurred.
Finally, we believe that the emperor can neither be regarded as a militarist who initiated and actively pursued war, nor as a pacifist because of his hesitation to war. This is not the true face of the emperor. After introducing and confirming the opinions and information of the government, the head of the army, the Minister of the interior and the Royal family, the emperor finally made a "sacred judgment" by himself. The consequence of the "sacred judgment" of the emperor was that as many as 30 million nationals were murdered and 3.1 million Japanese nationals died. Of course, the emperor should be held responsible for the war.
【学位授予单位】：曲阜师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2008
【分类号】：K313.45

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