可抵押资产、政治关系与民营企业贷款融资

发布时间：2018-02-21 20:45

本文关键词： 抵押资产政治关系民营企业银行贷款融资货币政策　出处：《广东外语外贸大学》2016年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：根据融资优序理论,银行贷款是企业外源融资的重要来源。特别是在我国以银行为主导的金融体系中,银行贷款同样是我国企业对外融资最主要的途径。然而,由于政府是我国国有银行的最终控制者,对信贷资源配置具有较大的影响力,加之,我国信贷市场存在严重的信息不对称、法律体系对金融债权的保护不够完善,导致民营企业在借贷时往往会遭受所有制歧视。并且,这种长期以来一直存在的“歧视”无法立刻得到根本性的转变。当正式机制无法满足民营企业对银行贷款的需求时,民营企业开始转向一些替代性的非正式机制来满足自己对资金的需求,其中通过参选人大代表或政协委员等途径与政府建立密切的联系就是一种非常重要并且有效的途径。国内的大多数研究均已表明,在我国处于经济转型期的特殊背景下,政治关系能够作为民营企业克服市场制度缺陷的一种非正式替代机制,缓解其受到的融资约束(余明桂、潘红波,2008;罗党论、甄丽明,2008)。然而,造成民营企业面临更为严重的融资约束的原因,除了金融制度的不完善之外,也有企业自身的问题。现阶段,抵押作为商业银行重要的信用风险缓释技术之一,在实际贷款合同中已被广泛使用。大多数民营企业,由于自身特有的性质使其面临的经营风险更大,导致其破产违约的机率更高。当银行向民营企业发放贷款时,出于对自身利益的保护,往往会规定更多也更苛刻的约束条款,要求民营企业提供更多的抵押资产作为抵押担保。而当民营企业缺少可供抵押的资产,其获取银行贷款的难度会更大,面临的融资约束会更高,严重阻碍了民营企业的发展。研究也表明,受到融资约束的企业,抵押资产能够有效降低违约风险,提高企业的贷款融资能力。因此,抵押资产作为一种外部保证机制,同样可以缓减银企之间的信息不对称程度和融资约束,可抵押资产的多寡也成为提高企业贷款融资能力的关键(李青原、王建红,2013)。本文以2006—2013年在沪深主板上市的民营企业为样本,实证检验了可抵押资产和政治关系对民营企业银行贷款能力的影响,并进一步探讨了可抵押资产与政治关系之间的关系。另外,结合宏观经济政策研究企业微观行为是目前我国学术界研究的新领域,本文也将尝试着结合货币政策,探讨企业的微观融资行为如何受到国家货币政策的影响。通过研究发现:(1)可抵押资产的多寡是决定民营企业能否获取更多银行贷款的关键因素之一,拥有较多可抵押资产的民营企业能够获得更多的银行贷款,但并不一定能够获得更长的贷款期限;(2)拥有政治关系的民营企业获得的银行贷款比没有政治关系的民营企业更多,包括抵押贷款和信用贷款;(3)可抵押资产与政治关系这两种保障机制之间存在一定的替代关系,即对于具有政治关系的民营企业,其在取得银行贷款时对可抵押资产的依赖程度要比没有政治关系的民营企业小;(4)货币政策对民营企业的银行贷款能力有一定的冲击作用。相比于货币政策宽松时期,在货币政策紧缩时期,银行会对民营企业的银行贷款条件更为苛刻。可抵押资产和政治关系对民营企业的银行贷款能力影响更大。民营企业必须提供更多的抵押资产才能获得银行贷款。而民营企业所拥有的政治关系在货币政策紧缩时期所发挥的作用显得更为重要。
[Abstract]:According to the pecking order theory of financing, bank loan is an important source of external financing of enterprises. Especially in China's Bank dominated financial system, bank loans are also the main financing way of foreign enterprises in China. However, because the government is the ultimate control of state-owned banks in China, has a greater impact on. The allocation of credit and credit market in China, the serious information asymmetry, protection legal system of financial creditor's rights is not perfect, the private enterprises will often suffer from ownership discrimination in lending. And this has long been the existence of "discrimination" can not immediately get fundamental change. When the formal mechanism cannot meet the requirements of private enterprises the demand for bank loans, private enterprises began to turn to alternative informal mechanisms to meet their own needs for funds, which run through the National People's Congress on behalf of government or Association members and the government way to establish a close relationship is a very important and effective way. Most domestic studies have shown that in the special background of our country is in the period of economic transition, political relations can be used as a substitute for private enterprises to overcome the informal mechanism of market system defects, alleviate its financingconstraints (Yu Minggui, Pan Hongbo, 2008; Zhen Liming, Luo party theory, 2008). However, due to reasons of private enterprises facing more serious financing constraints, in addition to the financial system is not perfect, also have their own problems. At this stage, as one of the most important mortgage credit risk mitigation techniques of commercial banks, has been widely in the actual use of the loan contract. The majority of private enterprises, due to the nature of its own which is faced with greater risks, leading to the higher probability of default. When the bank to private enterprises When lending to protect their own interests, often prescribed more harsh terms, for private enterprises to provide more mortgage assets as collateral. When the private enterprises lack of mortgage assets, the difficulty of obtaining bank loans will be greater, the financing constraints faced will be more serious. Hinder the development of private enterprises. The research also shows that the financing constraints of enterprises, can effectively reduce the default risk of mortgage assets, improve the enterprise financing ability. Therefore, mortgage assets as a kind of external guarantee mechanism, also can reduce the degree of information asymmetry between banks and financing constraints, the amount of mortgage assets has become the key to improve the enterprise loan financing capacity (Li Qingyuan, Wang Jianhong, 2013). Based on the 2006 - 2013 listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen motherboard of private enterprises as samples, empirically examines mortgage The impact of asset and the political relations of private enterprise bank loan ability, and further discusses the relationship between the relationship of mortgage assets and politics. In addition, combined with the enterprise macro economic policy microcosmic behavior research is a new field of academic research in China, this paper will try to combine monetary policy, explores the financing behavior of enterprises to the impact of national monetary policy. Through the study found: (1) the amount of mortgage assets is one of the key factors of private enterprises can get more bank loans, mortgage assets have more private enterprises to obtain more bank loans, but not necessarily be able to get a longer loan period; (2) the political relationship the private enterprises to obtain bank loans more than no political relations of private enterprises, including mortgage loans and credit loans; (3) can be mortgaged assets and Politics There is a certain relationship between alternative relationship between the two kinds of security mechanism, has the political relations of private enterprises, the bank loans are obtained when the degree of dependence on mortgage assets than no political relations of private enterprises; (4) have a certain impact on the monetary policy of bank loans to private enterprises. Compared to the loose monetary policy in the period, the period of monetary policy tightening, Bank of private enterprise banks more stringent loan conditions. Mortgage assets and political relations of private enterprise bank loan ability greater impact. Private enterprises must provide more mortgage assets in order to obtain bank loans and private enterprises have political the relationship between play in the period of monetary policy tightening effect is more important.

【学位授予单位】：广东外语外贸大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：D0;F276.5;F832.4

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