平等、移情与想象他者:普遍人权的道德情感基础

发布时间：2018-03-05 17:49

  本文选题：普遍人权　切入点：理性　出处：《清华法学》2017年04期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：在传统的法学理念和法律制度中,人权的基础被奠定在理性主义之上。然而,理性主义人权观能够解释和论证权利的基础,但很难讲明权利扩大到最广大的"人"的范围的道理。从思想史和法律史来看,理性主义的人权观容易导致人权的保护范围在国内法上被限定在特定的群体之中,而人权的实现领域在国际层面局限于特定的政治共同体之中,也即理性主义的人权观念排除了非理性的"非人"的人权,从而无法实现人权的普遍性。从历史来看,普遍性的人权观念及其制度实践须构筑于道德情感的基础之上,也即人们在情感层面认识到无论种族、肤色、阶层、族裔等差异有多大,在内心的痛苦感受力层面都是平等的,由此方能通过"移情"来在人心之中建立普遍人权的观念。
[Abstract]:In the traditional jurisprudence and legal system, the foundation of human rights is laid on the basis of rationalism. However, it is difficult to state the truth that rights should be extended to the broadest range of "human beings". From the perspective of the history of thought and the history of law, rationalist views of human rights tend to lead to the limitation of the protection of human rights in domestic law to specific groups. However, the realisation of human rights is confined to a specific political community at the international level, that is, the rational concept of human rights excludes the irrational "inhuman" human rights and thus cannot realize the universality of human rights. The universal concept of human rights and its institutional practice must be based on moral feelings, that is, people realize at the emotional level how different race, colour, class, ethnicity and so on are, and are equal in terms of inner pain sensitivity, In this way, the concept of universal human rights can be established through empathy.
【作者单位】： 清华大学法学院;
【基金】：清华大学自主科研计划资助
【分类号】：D082
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本文编号：1571280