政府外部治理结构及其优化研究

发布时间：2018-06-04 12:19

本文选题：公共治理 + 治理工具　；参考：《武汉大学》2011年博士论文

【摘要】：传统的公共行政与公共管理更多的关注公共部门内部的规则、财政预算以及公共物品,而非是一个个活生生的行为个体及其行为结构。此外它们关于行为个体价值与行为选择的规范假设也局限了对很多公共治理问题的适用性,典型的如盗版治理、环境治理以及房地产治理等各种公共问题。这都需要我们采取一种新的视角来重新审视公共问题的实质与公共治理的涵义。正是因为这个现实情况,需要形成一种治理就是对治理结构进行调整的理解,而在这其中外部治理结构优化则是实现对公共问题参与者的行为调试进而实现一种治理改进。为了达成这种理解,本研究并没有采用当前风行的公共治理整体主义和个人主义方法论,而是采用了微观个体主义。在此基础之上,我们选用了博弈论仿真作为研究工具来考察政府的外部治理结构,提出了基于行为系统、行为角色与行为契约的三维结构分析框架。通过方法论及分析框架的选择与构建来改变传统的公共治理视角与方式。在具体的结构上本文的安排如下：导论部分主要阐述问题研究的缘起与意义,并对国内外关于外部治理结构的研究现状进行了综述。此外还阐明了全文的基本逻辑框架和创新点。第一章主要是概念厘定与方法论选择,由于基本概念是本研究的一个重要根基,此外方法论和研究工具选择对于理论构建也尤为重要,因此需要单列一章。本研究的逻辑起点在于对方法论的选择,通过比对以往制度分析学派及公共治理理论所遵循过的方法论及其存在的问题,本研究提出了我们的分析起点——微观的个体主义。在这一方法论选择的基础之上达成本研究所理解的关键概念,这是一种研究语言的选择。之后我们将对研究工具进行选择,以作为分析框架的搭建基础。第二章是一个理论分析。在构建我们的理论分析框架之前先进行假设分析,提出我们的分析基础。在此基础之上提出了行为系统、行为角色以及行为契约的三维分析架构,并用这种分析架构对政府外部治理结构进行分立结构分析,指出了两种极端的结构形式,网络型和圆锥形外部治理结构。通过对两种结构的比较分析划定了两者的适用范围和条件,分析得出存在一种介于两者之间的外部治理结构。第三章则是通过案例构建博弈仿真模型来印证前面的理论分析,并重点讨论了一种混合型外部治理结构的可能和适用条件。在案例分析中,则以北京市交通拥堵治理为例,分析了各种治理结构失效的原因,并提出了我们的治理之道以及实现的前提条件。第四章则是在前面的理论与模型分析基础之上提出了关于外部治理结构优化的建议。基于所遵循的方法论,本研究认为应该针对不同的公共问题来进行研究,而无法给出一种放之四海而皆准的外部治理结构模式。由此本章将重点放在了外部治理结构优化的原则与标准之上。此外,对于外部治理结构的优化方式我们也从静态和动态两个方面提出了设想。尾论则是对全文进行总结和概括,指出我们研究的重点和未来发展的展望。
[Abstract]:The traditional public administration and public administration pay more attention to the rules of the public sector, the budget and the public goods, not the living individuals and their behavior structures. In addition, their normative assumptions about the individual values and behavior choices also restrict the applicability of many public governance issues. Such as piracy, environmental governance, and real estate governance, we need to take a new perspective to reexamine the essence of the public problem and the meaning of public governance. It is because of this reality that a governance is the understanding of the adjustment of the governance structure, and the external governance in it. Structural optimization is to realize the behavior debugging of participants in public problems and to achieve a governance improvement.
In order to achieve this understanding, this study does not adopt the prevailing public governance holism and individualist methodology, but uses micro individualism. On the basis of this, we choose the game theory simulation as a research tool to investigate the government's external governance structure, and put forward the behavior system, the behavior role and the line. In order to change the perspective and way of the traditional public governance through the selection and construction of the analytical framework, the framework for the analysis of the three-dimensional structure of the contract is made as follows:
The introduction part mainly expounds the origin and significance of the problem research, and summarizes the research status of the external governance structure at home and abroad, and also clarifies the basic logical framework and innovation points of the full text.
The first chapter is mainly the definition of concept and the choice of methodology. Since the basic concept is an important foundation of this study, the methodology and the choice of research tools are particularly important for the construction of the theory, so we need a single chapter. The logical starting point of this study lies in the choice of methodology and by comparing the previous institutional analysis school and public governance. The methodology followed by the theory and its existing problems, this study puts forward the starting point of our analysis, microindividualism. On the basis of the selection of this methodology, the key concept understood by the cost study is a choice of language research. After that, we will choose the research tools as an analytical framework. Build the foundation.
The second chapter is a theoretical analysis. Before constructing our theoretical analysis framework, we first carry out the hypothesis analysis and propose the basis of our analysis. On this basis, we put forward the three-dimensional analysis framework of the behavioral system, the behavior role and the behavior contract, and use this analytical framework to analyze the structure of the government external governance structure, and point out that the structure of the government is divided. Two kinds of extreme structural forms, network type and conical external governance structure. Through comparison and analysis of two kinds of structures, the applicable scope and conditions of the two are defined, and an external governance structure between them is found.
The third chapter is to verify the theoretical analysis by constructing game simulation model through the case, and focus on the possibility and applicable conditions of a mixed external governance structure. In the case analysis, the reasons for the inefficiency of various governance structures are analyzed with the traffic congestion control in Beijing as an example, and the ways of our governance are also put forward. The prerequisites for the realization.
The fourth chapter puts forward some suggestions on the optimization of external governance structure on the basis of the previous theory and model analysis. The principles and standards of the optimization of the external governance structure are above. In addition, we also put forward two aspects of the static and dynamic aspects of the optimization of external governance structure.
The tail theory summarizes and generalizes the whole text, pointing out the focus of our research and the prospect of future development.
【学位授予单位】：武汉大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：D035

【参考文献】