相机授权体制下央地政府间博弈行为的潜规则化问题及其矫正路径研究

发布时间：2018-06-23 16:49

本文选题：相机授权体制 + 央地政府间博弈　；参考：《浙江财经学院》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：中央和地方政府间关系历来是政治学、经济学研究的重点问题之一。我国自改革开放以来,中央地方政府间关系出现了各种复杂的变化。一方面,中央作为全国整体的治理者,必须要调动地方的积极性,同时要保证地方对国家的忠诚;另一方面,随着经济体制改革序幕的拉开,尤其是在财政体制改革的推动下,地方自主性不断增强,各地方之间竞争不断加剧的过程中,地方政府和中央政府展开的各种形式的博弈。政府之间的博弈形式实质上是一种正常的关系行为,通过博弈行为能够取得双方在既定规则下可能的最大化预期。目前各国政府间博弈无论是在理论上还是在实践上都已存在应趋向发展成熟。然而,在我国中央和地方政府之间的博弈过程中却存在着各种不利于各个政府通过博弈达到一种稳定的均衡状态的问题。相机授权体制是经济体制改革以后中央政府处理政府间关系的一种体制,是指中央政府在处理与地方政府的关系中,以中央的总体目标为标准,根据不同时机、不同事件、不同对象所作出的不同授权以达到调控央地政府间关系的一种体制。相机授权体制本身的产生和发展所形成的固有的特点对我国中央和地方政府间关系以及不通过地方政府间关系都产生了深刻的影响。相机授权体制是央地政府间潜规则化博弈现象的体制根源。相机授权体制的形成是基于国家改革过程中的一种尝试性结果,而我国在国家治理过程中的预算软约束、信息不对称以及监督机制不规范也加剧了相机授权体制在改革步入正轨后对国家治理所产生的不良后果。相机授权体制的不规范性、不公平性、不透明性的特点改变了央地政府间的关系模式,使中央和地方政府间以及不同地方政府之间在处理各自关系时产生了各种潜规则的博弈现象。中央和地方之间的潜规则是在双方多次互动博弈过程中通过理性的计算所形成的一种隐藏于正式制度之下的非正式约定,本质是对公权力如何运用和公共利于处置方式的约定。这种非正式约定以获取各自利益为共同目标,通过正式制度的激励机制和惩处机制对双方形成约束,并通过双方互动过程中的各种行为表现出来。地方政府针对中央政府实行的财权上收,事权下放、“鞭打快牛”、晋升锦标赛、“行政化”调控及单方面改变游戏规则等相机授权下的博弈行为对中央展开分别展开“财源最大化”、“藏富于民”、“勤于跑部”、政策“选择性”执行等与中央展开博弈的行为。这些潜规则化的博弈行为在我国政府与市场职能划分不清晰的前提下产生了各种恶劣的影响,一方面侵蚀着国家和人民的利益,制造着各种腐败现象,另一方面啃食着国家政府之间关系的正常和健康发展的基础。要确保我国中央和地方政府间关系的正常和健康发展,使中央和地方政府在博弈中形成稳定的均衡关系,就要对央地政府间的潜规则化博弈现象进行研究。针对目前央地关系中潜规则化博弈现象产生的体制根源,要使央地之间的博弈行为健康化,必须要祛除相机授权体制的不规范性、不透明性和不公平性。首先要以制度化分权取代相机授权,此外,还要对目前我国央地政府间关系的其他问题进行改革。例如对预算制度的改革、对信息公开制度的改革以及对监督机制的改革等。不仅要切除不规范存在的根源,还要取消不规范生长的空间。只有这样,才能保证央地政府间关系博弈关系的正常、健康发展。
[Abstract]:The relationship between the central government and the local government has always been one of the key issues of political and economic research. Since China's reform and opening up, the relationship between the central and local governments has undergone various complicated changes. On the one hand, the central government, as a whole country, must mobilize the local polarity and ensure the loyalty of the local government to the state; On the other hand, with the opening of the reform of the economic system, especially in the promotion of the reform of the financial system, the local autonomy is constantly enhanced and the competition between the local governments and the central government are playing a variety of forms in the process of increasing competition. The game form between the governments is essentially a normal relationship behavior, through a blog. Game behavior can achieve the maximum expectation of both parties under the established rules. At present, the game between governments in each country should be mature, both in theory and in practice. However, there is a variety of governments in the game between the central and local governments which are not conducive to the stability of each government through game. The problem of the equilibrium state.
The camera authorization system is a system for the central government to deal with the Intergovernmental Relations after the reform of the economic system. It refers to the central government, in dealing with the local government, with the overall goal of the central government as the standard, according to the different authorizations made by different machines, different events and different objects in order to control the relationship between the central government. The inherent characteristics of the production and development of the camera authorizing system itself have a profound influence on the intergovernmental relations between the central and local governments and the relationship between the local governments. The camera authorization system is the institutional source of the phenomenon of the latent regularization of the central government. The formation of the phase machine authorization system is based on the state reform. A tentative result in the process of leather process, and the soft constraints of budget in the process of national governance, asymmetric information and unregulated supervision mechanism also aggravate the adverse consequences of the camera authorization system on the national governance after the reform is on the right track. The characteristics of the unstandard, unfairness, and opaque nature of the camera authorization system change The relationship mode between the central government and the central government makes the game between the central and local governments and the different local governments in dealing with their relations. The hidden rules between the central and the local governments are a kind of hidden in the formal system, which is formed by the rational calculation in the process of interactive game between the two sides. Formally agreed, the essence is the agreement on the use of public power and the way of public disposal. This informal agreement is the common goal of obtaining the respective interests. It is bound by the incentive mechanism and punishing mechanism of the formal system, and shows through the various acts in the process of mutual interaction. The local government aims at the central government. The financial power collection, the decentralization of the power, the "whip the fast cattle", the Promotion Tournament, the "administrative" regulation and the change of the game rules under the camera authorization are carried out to the Central Committee to expand the "financial resources maximization", "hide the people rich in the people", "be diligent in the running Department", "selective" implementation and other games with the central government. Yes.
Under the precondition that our government and market function are not clearly divided, these submersible game behavior has a variety of bad effects. On the one hand, it erodes the interests of the country and the people, makes various corruption, and on the other hand, nibbling on the basis of the normal and healthy development of the relations between the state governments. The normal and healthy development of the relations between the governments will make the central and local governments form a stable equilibrium relationship in the game. It is necessary to study the phenomenon of the latent regular game between the central and local governments. In view of the institutional causes of the phenomenon of the latent regularization game in the relationship between the central and local areas, the game behavior between the central and local governments should be made healthy and must be dispel. In addition to the non-standard, opaque and unfair nature of the camera authorization system.
First of all, we should replace the authority of the camera with institutionalized decentralization. In addition, we should also reform the other issues of intergovernmental relations between China and the central region. For example, the reform of the budget system, the reform of the information disclosure system and the reform of the supervision mechanism, we should not only remove the root causes of the non standard existence, but also have to cancel the space for the non standard growth. Only in this way can we ensure the normal and healthy development of the game relationship between the central government and the government.
【学位授予单位】：浙江财经学院
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：D035;F224.32

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