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公共权力异化的博弈分析及对策研究

发布时间:2018-09-19 10:42
【摘要】:公共权力异化作为一种社会历史现象,是各个国家在政治与经济发展过程中不得不面临的一大难题。近年来,随着我国在政治、经济等方面的改革不断深化,公共权力异化现象也日渐突出。公共权力异化的本质是,在公共管理过程中,公共权力运行的结果背离了其增进公共利益的目标,成为了公共权力代理人谋求私利的工具。公共权力异化对我国产生的消极影响主要体现在政治、经济和社会这三个领域。在政治领域,公共权力异化极大的损害了公共组织的公信力,疏远了公共部门与公众间的关系:在经济领域,公共权力异化破坏了市场的正常运行秩序,妨碍了市场资源配置职能的实现;在社会领域,公共权力异化破坏了公共组织对社会进行有序管理和提供公共服务等职能的实现,妨碍了公共组织实现社会公平与稳定的目标。面对如何遏制公共权力异化这一难题,党和政府部门都予以了深切的关注。胡锦涛总书记更是针对当前的形势,在2010年召开的十七届中央纪委第五次全会上,强调要“坚决查处违纪违法案件,严肃查处发生在领导机关和领导干部中滥用职权、贪污贿赂、腐化堕落、失职渎职案件,决不让任何腐败分子逃脱党纪国法惩处”,并深刻阐述了建设反腐倡廉制度体系对于党和人民的重要性与紧迫性。可见,面对公共权力异化这一社会病态现象,只有通过逐步挖掘其内在的成因,才能分析并找出制约公共权力异化的有效对策。 近几年,随着博弈论在经济、政治和社会等学科的广泛应用,博弈论的兴起也为研究公共权力异化现象提供了一条新的路径。由于公共权力代理人与公共权力所有者之间存在着委托一代理关系,并且公共权力的代理人和委托人符合博弈论中的一方先采取行动,而另一方根据当前的形势采取适当对策的研究方式,因此假定公共权力的相关主体为“经济人”的假设上,尝试构建公共权力相关主体的动态博弈模型,对各相关主体进行博弈分析,能够更有针对性的把握遏制公共权力异化的相关因素。 基于上述的思考,本文拟从公共权力异化的现实表现、危害和产生的一般成因入手,以博弈论为分析方法,在假定公共权力相关主体为“经济人”的基础上,构建一个涉及公共权力代理人、公共权力委托人和逐利人的三方两阶段动态博弈模型,求出三方的动态博弈均衡解,利用均衡解得出的相关结论,加深对公共权力异化问题的认识,并以此为基础提出更为有效的制约公共权力异化的对策建议。
[Abstract]:As a social and historical phenomenon, the alienation of public power is a difficult problem that every country has to face in the process of political and economic development. In recent years, with the deepening of political and economic reforms in China, the alienation of public power has become increasingly prominent. The essence of public power alienation is that in the process of public management, the result of public power operation deviates from its goal of promoting public interests and becomes the tool for public power agents to seek private interests. The negative influence of public power alienation on our country is mainly reflected in three fields: politics, economy and society. In the political field, the alienation of public power has greatly damaged the credibility of public organizations and alienated the relationship between the public sector and the public: in the economic field, the alienation of public power has undermined the normal operation order of the market. In the social field, the alienation of public power destroys the realization of public organization's function of orderly management and provision of public service, and hinders the public organization to realize the goal of social equity and stability. Faced with the problem of how to curb the alienation of public power, both the Party and the government have paid close attention to it. In view of the current situation, General Secretary Hu Jintao, at the fifth plenary session of the 17th Central Commission for discipline Inspection, held in 2010, stressed the need to "resolutely investigate and deal with cases of violation of discipline and laws, and seriously investigate and deal with abuses of power among leading organs and leading cadres." Corruption and bribery, corruption, dereliction of duty and dereliction of duty will never allow any corrupt elements to escape the punishment of party discipline and state law, "and profoundly expounds the importance and urgency of building a system of combating corruption and advocating integrity for the party and the people. It can be seen that in the face of the social pathological phenomenon of alienation of public power, only by gradually excavating its internal causes, can we analyze and find out the effective countermeasures to restrict the alienation of public power. In recent years, with the wide application of game theory in economics, politics and society, the rise of game theory provides a new way to study the alienation of public power. Because there is a principal-agent relationship between the public power agent and the public power owner, and the agent and the principal of the public power conform to the game theory, On the assumption that the relevant subject of public power is "economic man", the other party tries to construct the dynamic game model of the relevant subject of public power. The game analysis of the relevant subjects can grasp the relevant factors of containing the alienation of public power more pertinently. Based on the above thinking, this paper intends to start with the practical manifestation, harm and general causes of the alienation of public power, taking the game theory as the analytical method, and based on the assumption that the relevant subject of public power is "economic man". This paper constructs a three-stage dynamic game model involving public power agent, public power trustor and profit-driven person, finds out the equilibrium solution of the three-party dynamic game, and makes use of the relevant conclusions of the equilibrium solution. To deepen the understanding of the alienation of public power, and put forward more effective countermeasures and suggestions to restrict the alienation of public power.
【学位授予单位】:江西财经大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2010
【分类号】:D035

【引证文献】

相关硕士学位论文 前2条

1 褚君;博弈论在历史街区更新中的应用研究[D];河北工业大学;2012年

2 谷雨璐;网络权力下的公民与政府委托代理关系分析[D];中国政法大学;2013年



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