狐狸的执著：价值多元论与自由主义的关系

发布时间：2018-10-24 12:47

【摘要】： 价值多元论和自由主义是当代政治哲学和道德哲学领域内的两个重要主题,这两个主题共同存在于以赛亚·伯林的思想中。一方面,他坚持价值多元论的主张,认为人类的生活世界存在着多种不同的终极价值,彼此之间常常不可通约,而且可能发生严重的冲突；另一方面,作为一名自由主义者,他坚信在人类的多种价值中,自由的价值对于实现生活的其他价值而言是基本必需的,具有优先性,这集中表现在他对“消极自由”的首肯。但是,价值多元论与自由主义之间也存在着某种张力,并产生很多疑问：自由主义的普遍性要求是否必然被价值多元论排斥?价值多元论是对自由主义的证成还是反对?价值多元论和自由主义究竟存在着何种关系?本文将针对这一问题展开论述。首先我们将分析伯林思想中蕴含的将价值多元论与自由主义相结合的尝试,并着重分析价值多元论这一概念；但是,作为伯林思想的主要阐释者之一,约翰·格雷反对这种尝试,他认为价值多元论的特殊主义要求使我们必须拒绝自由主义的普遍性要求,自由主义并非是关于最佳生活和实现这种生活的政治体制的理性共识,而是一种在不同政权和生活方式之间求得的“权宜之计”；查尔斯·拉莫尔则认为,自由主义的基础是合理分歧而非价值多元论,价值多元论是非常具有争议的学说,无法为自由主义做出合法性辩护；乔治·克劳德批判了这两种割裂价值多元论与自由主义之关系的学说,他从三个方面进行了论证,坚持价值多元论本身蕴含了对自由主义的一种有力和独特的辩护,并提倡多元论的自由主义,这是一种自由主义的较强的形式,是普遍主义的和至善论的,它的核心是个人自律,并最终指向积极自由。由此,克劳德的答案又回到了伯林最初的尝试,但又有所不同。
[Abstract]:Value pluralism and liberalism are two important themes in the field of contemporary political philosophy and moral philosophy. On the one hand, he insists on the idea of value pluralism, that there are many different ultimate values in the world of human life, that there are often inaccessible and potentially serious conflicts between each other, and that, on the other hand, as a liberal, He firmly believes that among the various values of mankind, the value of freedom is essential to the realization of other values of life and has priority, which is manifested in his approval of "negative freedom". However, there is a tension between value pluralism and liberalism, and many questions arise: is the universal requirement of liberalism necessarily excluded by value pluralism? Is value pluralism a testament to or opposition to liberalism? What is the relationship between value pluralism and liberalism? This paper will discuss this problem. First of all, we will analyze the attempt to combine value pluralism with liberalism in Berlin's thought, and focus on the concept of value pluralism; however, as one of the main interpreters of Berlin's thought, John Gray objected to such attempts, arguing that the particularity of value pluralism necessitated the rejection of the universal demands of liberalism, which was not a rational consensus on the best life and the political system to achieve it. It is a kind of "expediency" between different regimes and ways of life; Charles Lamar believes that liberalism is based on reasonable differences rather than value pluralism, and that value pluralism is a very controversial doctrine. There is no justification for liberalism; George Crowder criticizes these two theories that separate the relationship between value pluralism and liberalism, and he argues in three ways. Insisting on value pluralism itself contains a kind of powerful and unique defense to liberalism and advocates pluralism liberalism, which is a stronger form of liberalism, universal and perfect. Its core is personal self-discipline, and ultimately points to positive freedom. As a result, Claude's answer returned to Berlin's initial attempt, but it was different.
【学位授予单位】：浙江大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：D09

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