环境规制下工业共生链制造商决策行为分析

发布时间：2018-01-21 12:48

本文关键词： 废弃物排放水平废弃物排放收费政府补贴环境绩效工业共生链　出处：《系统管理学报》2017年03期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：考虑政府废弃物排放标准、废弃物排放收费和废弃物交易补贴的环境规制,构建由1个上游制造商和1个下游制造商组成的工业共生链寡头垄断模型,研究了政府、制造商从环境效益和经济效益出发时各自的决策行为。结果表明:政府废弃物排放标准设定必须考虑制造商生产运营影响因素,而政府补贴和排污费对外部环境效益的作用优于单一政策;环境规制的介入驱使制造商参与工业共生,而制造商集中式决策能实现环境效益和经济效益的双赢;同时,通过采用废弃物排放契约和数量折扣契约能改进分散式共生链绩效;顾客对产品环境关切意识的提升能迫使制造商通过降低产品价格来刺激需求,并促使其进行产品环境绩效创新。
[Abstract]:Considering the environmental regulation of government waste emission standards, waste emission charges and waste trading subsidies, an industrial symbiotic chain oligopoly model consisting of one upstream manufacturer and one downstream manufacturer is constructed. The decision behaviors of government and manufacturer are studied in terms of environmental benefit and economic benefit. The results show that the factors affecting manufacturers' production and operation must be taken into account in the setting of government waste emission standards. The effect of government subsidies and sewage charges on the external environmental benefits is better than that of a single policy. The intervention of environmental regulation drives manufacturers to participate in industrial symbiosis, and the centralized decision of manufacturers can realize the win-win of environmental and economic benefits. At the same time, the performance of decentralized symbiotic chain can be improved by adopting waste emission contract and quantity discount contract. Customer awareness of environmental concerns can force manufacturers to reduce product prices to stimulate demand and promote product environmental performance innovation.
【作者单位】：西安交通大学管理学院;火箭军工程大学908教研室;海尔特种电冰箱有限公司;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71671136,71390333)
【分类号】：F272.2;X32
【正文快照】： 3.海尔特种电冰箱有限公司,山东青岛266000)近年来,消费者、环境组织和政府越来越关注可持续发展以及产品对环境的影响作用[1]。政策制定者和政府也越来越意识到供应链中存在的环境危机,特别是供应链中废弃物排放的利用问题。政府机构、非盈利性组织以及利益相关者施加的环境

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