基于前景理论的水污染治理政企合谋监管

发布时间：2018-03-01 02:07

本文关键词： 水污染生态补偿政企合谋前景理论　出处：《系统工程》2017年02期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：在生态补偿机制约束下,地方政府面临治理水污染、保护生态环境与支持地方企业、发展经济的两难困境。为了保障全流域的可持续发展,减少地方政府与企业在水污染治理中合谋行为,破解地方政府与企业的利益格局,构建了政企合谋的监管模型。该模型基于前景理论,充分考虑了水污染治理过程中地方政府、企业以及中央政府的心理特征,得到了对地方政府和排污企业合谋监管的均衡解。针对不同参数下的模型合谋条件进行讨论,辨别出合谋主体对名誉损失系数、惩罚系数以及厌恶损失系数等的敏感性。提出了需要加强对地方政府的监管力度,进行差异化监管以形成威慑心理效应,以及鼓励全社会监督等监管策略,来降低地方政府与企业合谋的概率,可以为水污染治理提供理论参考借鉴。
[Abstract]:Under the restriction of ecological compensation mechanism, local governments are faced with the dilemma of controlling water pollution, protecting ecological environment, supporting local enterprises and developing economy. This paper reduces the collusion behavior of local government and enterprise in water pollution control, deciphers the benefit pattern of local government and enterprise, and constructs the regulatory model of government and enterprise collusion. The model is based on the theory of prospect and fully considers the local government in the process of water pollution control. The psychological characteristics of the enterprises and the central government have obtained the equilibrium solution to the collusion supervision of the local government and the sewage enterprises. The model collusion conditions under different parameters are discussed, and the coefficient of the collusion subject's reputation loss is identified. The sensitivities of penalty coefficient and loss aversion coefficient etc. The paper puts forward some supervision strategies, such as strengthening the supervision of local government, carrying out differential supervision to form deterrent psychological effect, and encouraging the whole society to supervise. In order to reduce the probability of collusion between local government and enterprises, it can provide theoretical reference for water pollution control.
【作者单位】：河海大学商学院;桂林电子科技大学商学院;
【基金】：国家社科基金资助项目(12CGL070) 河海大学中央高校业务费项目(2013B12314)
【分类号】：X52

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