非税收入竞争与环境污染——基于省级空间面板模型的估算
发布时间：2018-10-07 20:30
【摘要】：非税收入是地方政府扶持地方经济发展的重要财政竞争工具。基于空间计量模型,运用中国2004—2012年非税收入、非税收入竞争和环境污染的省级面板数据,对地方政府之间非税收入竞争行为及其对环境污染影响进行定性和定量研究。研究发现:第一,中国省级政府之间均采取了相互模仿的非税收入竞争行为;第二,省级政府非税收入竞争与环境污染具体关系表现为本省环境污染程度与本省非税收入负担率成反比,与邻省非税收入负担率也成反比;第三,省级政府非税收入竞争对环境污染的影响,呈现出"趋劣竞争"的特性。本文研究结果从非税收入角度为"清费立税"和开征环境税提供理论和实证支持。
[Abstract]:Non-tax income is an important financial competition tool for local government to support local economic development. Based on spatial measurement model, using provincial panel data of non-tax income, non-tax income competition and environmental pollution in China from 2004 to 2012, the qualitative and quantitative study on non-tax revenue competition behavior among local governments and its impact on environmental pollution is carried out. The findings are as follows: first, the provincial governments in China have adopted non-tax revenue competition behaviors that imitate each other; second, The specific relationship between non-tax revenue competition and environmental pollution of provincial governments is that the degree of environmental pollution in the province is inversely proportional to the non-tax income burden rate of the province, and the non-tax income burden rate in neighbouring provinces is also inversely proportional; third, The influence of non-tax revenue competition on environmental pollution by provincial governments is characterized by "worse competition". From the perspective of non-tax income, this paper provides theoretical and empirical support for "clearing fees and establishing tax" and levying environmental tax.
【作者单位】： 西安交通大学经济与金融学院;
【基金】：陕西省社会科学基金项目(2016D013)
【分类号】：F812.43;X22
，
本文编号：2255572
[Abstract]:Non-tax income is an important financial competition tool for local government to support local economic development. Based on spatial measurement model, using provincial panel data of non-tax income, non-tax income competition and environmental pollution in China from 2004 to 2012, the qualitative and quantitative study on non-tax revenue competition behavior among local governments and its impact on environmental pollution is carried out. The findings are as follows: first, the provincial governments in China have adopted non-tax revenue competition behaviors that imitate each other; second, The specific relationship between non-tax revenue competition and environmental pollution of provincial governments is that the degree of environmental pollution in the province is inversely proportional to the non-tax income burden rate of the province, and the non-tax income burden rate in neighbouring provinces is also inversely proportional; third, The influence of non-tax revenue competition on environmental pollution by provincial governments is characterized by "worse competition". From the perspective of non-tax income, this paper provides theoretical and empirical support for "clearing fees and establishing tax" and levying environmental tax.
【作者单位】： 西安交通大学经济与金融学院;
【基金】：陕西省社会科学基金项目(2016D013)
【分类号】：F812.43;X22
，
本文编号：2255572
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