闭环供应链的定价博弈模型研究

发布时间:2018-02-13 09:09

  本文关键词: 博弈 闭环供应链 参考价格 混沌 双渠道回收 出处:《天津工业大学》2017年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文


【摘要】:本文从博弈的角度出发,运用博弈论和混沌等相关知识研究了闭环供应链博弈模型,并分析比较了不同销售渠道和不同回收渠道下的最优定价。主要内容包括:第一,阐述了闭环供应链动态博弈模型的研究背景、意义以及研究现状。第二,系统地介绍了论文模型中所涉及的一些概念和理论基础,包括闭环供应链、博弈论、系统的稳定性和混沌理论。第三,提出了由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的闭环供应链的定价博弈模型。研究了在零售商主导回收决策下的动态博弈模型。通过数值模拟,利用稳定域图、分岔图和最大Lyapunov指数图研究了动态模型的复杂动力学行为。结果表明:在动态重复博弈中,过快的调整速度会使系统进入混沌。第四,建立了一个双渠道闭环供应链的定价模型。模型中考虑了参考价格对决策的影响。文章分析了在静态博弈模型下渠道参数以及参考价格系数对定价决策的影响。并研究了动态模型的复杂动力学行为。结果表明:回收率与参考价格系数成正比,而与渠道偏好系数成反比,在有效的渠道参数取值范围内以及适当的参考价格系数下,制造商利润均随着它们的增大而减小,而零售商利润随着它们的增大而增大。第五,构建了闭环供应链单渠道回收和双渠道回收两种博弈模型。在分散化决策下,研究了在两种不同回收模式下的Stackelberg模型和NASH模型,并求出了在不同权力主导下的最优定价和最优利润,进一步分析比较了他们在不同模型下的结果。结果表明:在双渠道回收模型下零售商利润高于在单渠道回收下零售商的利润。双渠道回收模型更有利于闭环供应链的良性发展和稳定运行。最后,对本文的主要内容进行了总结,并对未来的研究方向提出了展望。
[Abstract]:In this paper, based on the game theory, studies the closed-loop supply chain game model using game theory and the chaos and other related knowledge, and analyzes the optimal pricing of different sales channels and different recycling channels. The main contents include: first, elaborated the research background of the closed-loop supply chain dynamic game model, significance and research status. Second. This paper systematically introduces the model involved in some of the concepts and theoretical basis, including the closed-loop supply chain, game theory, system stability and chaos theory. Third, put forward the pricing game model of closed-loop supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. The study of the dominant dynamic game model under the recovery decision at the retailer. Through numerical simulation, the stability region, complex dynamics of dynamic model of bifurcation and the maximum Lyapunov index chart. The results showed that: in the dynamic repeat In the game, adjust the speed will bring the system into chaos. Fourth, set up a pricing model of dual channel closed-loop supply chain model. Considering the effect of reference price on the senior high school entrance examination decision. This paper analyzes the influence of the channel parameters and the reference price coefficient on the pricing decision in the static game model and complex dynamic behavior. Study on the dynamic model. The results show that the recovery rate and the reference price coefficient is proportional, and inversely proportional to the channel preference coefficient in the channel parameters are within the scope of the effective and appropriate reference price coefficient, manufacturers profit decrease with the increase of them, and with them the retailer's profit increases. Fifth. The construction of closed-loop supply chain with single channel and dual channel recovery recovery of two. In the decentralized decision game model, Stackelberg model and NASH were studied in two different recovery modes The model, and derive the optimal pricing and profit in different dominant power, further analysis and comparison of them in different model results. The results show that: in the double channel recycling model of retailers profit higher than in single channel recycling the retailer's profit. Benign development and stable operation of the dual channel model is more conducive to the recovery of the closed-loop supply chain. Finally, the main contents of this paper are summarized, and put forward the direction of future research.

【学位授予单位】:天津工业大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F274;F224.32

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