管理防御、会计稳健性与权益资本成本研究

发布时间：2018-04-03 11:10

本文选题：管理防御　切入点：会计稳健性　出处：《中国矿业大学》2016年博士论文

【摘要】：现代企业两权分离的治理特征突出了企业管理者在决策中的重要地位,但是在信息不对称和契约不完备的情况下,自利的管理者与股东之间的目标不一致,引发管理者固守职位并最大化自身效用的管理防御行为,进而影响企业的会计稳健性与权益资本成本。论文基于当前中国上市公司大股东控制和内部人控制双重控制并存,企业会计稳健性水平低和权益资本相对较高的现实背景下,研究管理防御、会计稳健性与权益资本成本三者之间的关系。论文首先从经济人假说、委托代理理论、信息不对称理论和控制权理论提炼管理防御理论的基础,在整体上为管理防御、会计稳健性与权益资本成本研究奠定理论基础。在此基础上,从高阶管理理论、行为一致性假说、不完全契约理论、信号传递理论、信息风险理论等相关理论,系统提炼出管理防御与会计稳健性理论基础、会计稳健性与权益资本成本理论基础。最后,基于上述理论基础,提出了管理防御、会计稳健性与权益资本成本关系的理论分析框架。论文利用多元线性回归、主成分分析法、中介效应检验法和结构方程等方法探讨以下几个方面的规律:管理防御程度的变量(包括管理者个人特征、管理者激励特征、管理者所受约束特征)和上市公司会计稳健性之间的关系规律、管理防御和上市公司权益资本成本的关系规律、会计稳健性对权益资本成本影响规律、管理防御通过会计稳健性影响权益资本成本的传导规律。研究发现:(1)管理防御影响会计稳健性,管理防御程度越高,会计稳健性越低。(2)管理防御影响权益资本成本,管理防御程度越高,权益资本成本越高。(3)会计稳健性影响权益资本成本,会计稳健性越高,权益资本成本越低。(4)在总体样本中和国有样本中,管理防御通过会计稳健性影响权益资本成本的假设成立。论文的最后提出了取消国有企业高管的行政任命体制,关注管理者股权激励,完善职业经理人市场,健全管理者内部约束机制等建议。论文立足中国特殊制度和背景,一定程度上拓展了管理防御理论,同时丰富了权益资本成本度量模型理论,拓展了权益资本成本研究的分析框架,为权益资本成本传导相关问题研究提供了一种分析思路。为上市公司选拔高管、完善公司财务治理机制和降低公司融资成本提供了依据。
[Abstract]:The governance characteristics of the separation of two rights in modern enterprises highlight the important position of enterprise managers in decision-making, but in the case of asymmetric information and incomplete contracts, the objectives of self-interest managers and shareholders are not consistent.The management defense behavior, which causes managers to stick to their positions and maximize their own utility, thus affects the accounting conservatism and equity capital cost of enterprises.Based on the dual control of large shareholders and insiders of listed companies in China, the paper studies the defense of management under the background of low level of accounting conservatism and relatively high equity capital.The relationship between accounting conservatism and equity capital cost.Firstly, the thesis refines the foundation of management defense theory from economic man hypothesis, principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory and control rights theory, which lays a theoretical foundation for the research of management defense, accounting conservatism and equity capital cost.On this basis, from the high order management theory, behavior consistency hypothesis, incomplete contract theory, signal transmission theory, information risk theory and other related theories, systematically extract the management defense and accounting conservatism theory.The theoretical basis of accounting conservatism and equity capital cost.Finally, based on the above theoretical basis, the paper puts forward the theoretical analysis framework of the relationship between management defense, accounting conservatism and equity capital cost.In this paper, we use the methods of multiple linear regression, principal component analysis, intermediary effect test and structural equation to discuss the following aspects: the variables of the degree of management defense (including the personal characteristics of managers, the characteristics of managers' motivation, etc.)The relationship between accounting conservatism of listed companies, the relationship between management defense and the cost of equity capital of listed companies, the influence of accounting conservatism on the cost of equity capital,Management defense affects the conduction law of equity capital cost through accounting conservatism.The study found that: 1) Management defense affects accounting conservatism. The higher the degree of management defense, the lower accounting conservatism. 2) Management defense affects the cost of equity capital, and the degree of management defense is higher.The higher the cost of equity capital, the higher the cost of equity capital, and the higher the cost of accounting conservatism, the lower the cost of equity capital.The assumption that the defence of management affects the cost of equity capital through accounting conservatism is established.Finally, the paper puts forward some suggestions such as abolishing the administrative appointment system of senior executives in state-owned enterprises, paying attention to the incentive of managers' equity, perfecting the market of professional managers, and perfecting the internal restraint mechanism of managers.Based on China's special system and background, the thesis expands the theory of management defense to some extent, enriches the theory of measurement model of cost of equity capital, and expands the analytical framework of research on cost of equity capital.It provides an analytical idea for the research of the related problems of equity capital cost transmission.It provides the basis for the listed companies to select senior executives, perfect the financial governance mechanism and reduce the financing costs of the companies.
【学位授予单位】：中国矿业大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F275

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