中国制造业转型升级中产业政策的绩效研究

发布时间：2018-04-24 05:15

  本文选题：产业政策 + 绩效　； 参考：《山东大学》2016年博士论文

【摘要】：产业政策是市场经济国家在工业化进程中普遍采用的干预经济运行的手段,在各国经济发展初期,政府通过产业政策保护和扶植特定产业,对推动国民经济快速发展发挥了重要作用。改革开放之后,中国政府相继出台了大量的产业政策文件,从产业政策的范围来看,制造业是政府实施产业政策较多的领域,可以说,中国的工业化进程和制造业转型升级都是在产业政策的引导下完成的。对于中国产业政策的有效性,学术界一直存在较大争论,很多学者从中国产业政策的特征出发研究产业政策的实施效果,认为中国的产业政策延续了计划经济时期政府直接干预经济的传统,阻碍市场竞争,产业发展滞后；也有学者认为,政府制定的产业政策对经济转型期产业结构调整和经济快速发展具有重要的推动作用。本文认为,要对产业政策的绩效进行评价,需要区分不同类型的产业政策。根据1994年国务院颁布的《90年代国家产业政策纲要》中将产业政策划分为产业结构政策、产业组织政策、产业技术政策和产业布局政策,以及拉尔(Lall,2003)关于选择性产业政策和功能性产业政策的划分。我们界定中国制造业转型升级中产业政策的目标主要包括：结构调整、组织优化、技术进步和就业稳定四个方面,并运用理论和实证分析相结合的方法研究产业政策的有效性。最后基于实证分析的结论,指出了传统选择性产业政策存在的缺陷,以及实施功能性产业政策的政策建议。主要内容分别如下：第一,从理论和实证两方面分析了产业政策在制造业结构调整中的实施效果。根据耗散结构理论,产业发展的动因源自分工网络内部的自发演进,产业结构变迁是在市场条件下自发实现的,产业政策发挥作用的基础是市场机制正常运转,产业政策的作用方向与产业自身发展规律相一致。中国传统的“选择性产业政策”倾向于挑选规模较大且国有资本比重较高的特定行业进行扶持,这种选择性行为违背了市场规律,产业政策的效果往往并不理想。我们选取了2004—2014年中国工业34个细分行业的面板数据实证分析产业政策对产业结构调整的影响,把政府固定资产投资作为资本投入,政府研发资金投入作为技术投入,以要素投入倾斜来衡量产业政策偏向。结果发现,固定资产投资倾斜与行业产出增长率之间存在负向关系,政府投资倾向于规模较大且国有资本比重较高的行业,这些行业的产出增长率较低；固定资产投资倾斜对全要素生产率和技术改进有显著的正向影响,对技术效率的影响不显著,中国全要素生产率的提升主要得益于技术改进,技术改进则表现为对国外先进机器设备的引进,这主要是通过固定资产投资来完成的。研发资金倾斜对产出增长率和全要素生产率的影响都不显著,表明中国政府研发支出的利用效率较低1。第二,对比分析中国钢铁行业和家电行业的产业政策特征及产业政策的绩效。首先系统梳理了1994年以来的钢铁产业政策,分析产业政策的演变过程和特征,发现钢铁产业政策的最大特点是政府行政权力对经济的强势干预。通过测算钢铁行业的市场集中度和生产效率来反映产业政策的实施效果,结果显示：钢铁行业市场集中度偏低,2012年钢铁行业的集中度CR4和CR10分别只有27%和45.9%；钢铁企业空间分布比较离散,各地区重复建设严重；钢铁行业的生产效率呈下降趋势,从2006年的0.617下降到2012年的0.586。中国钢铁产业政策失效的原因主要包括政策制定不合理和执行不到位两方面的缺陷：钢铁产业政策延续了计划经济的传统,政府选择代替市场竞争,不利于激励企业提高生产效率；地方政府对企业的直接干预,扭曲了企业的投资行为,导致过度投资和产能过剩2。作为对比,我们以家电产业的发展历程为起点,探讨家电产业政策的特征及其对家电产业发展的影响。总体来看,家电产业政策遵循了产业发展的客观规律,针对产业发展的特点采取扶植和诱导的政策手段。选取了18家家电上市公司作为样本实证分析家电企业的市场结构和技术进步：首先,采用新实证产业组织方法测算家电企业的市场势力,结果显示市场势力溢价为0.842,说明家电企业不存在很强的市场势力,属于竞争型市场结构；其次,采用DEA-Malmquist方法测算了家电企业的全要素生产率,结果显示,家电企业的全要素生产率不断提高,这主要得益于技术改进,而技术效率和规模效率还不高。家电产业政策以优先发挥市场机制的作用为前提,充分的市场竞争促使整个行业的技术水平不断提升,宽松的外部环境和产业政策的有效引导共同推动家电产业快速发展。第三,基于行业和区域两个层面实证分析了中国高技术产业的创新效率以及产业政策在促进技术创新方面的绩效。借鉴余泳泽(2010)的研究,价值链视角下,高技术产业的创新过程可分为技术研发和成果转化两个阶段,采用随机前沿生产函数模型(SFA)研究中国高技术产业研发效率和转化效率及产业政策的绩效。行业层面：2000-2012年中国高技术产业16个细分行业两阶段创新效率水平总体偏低,2012年两阶段创新效率分别为0.41和0.25,相对而言,研发效率高于转化效率；从动态趋势看,两阶段创新效率都处于不断提升过程,研发效率发展更快,2000-2012年研发效率的平均增长率达到8.36%,转化效率年平均增长率只有0.3%1。区域层面：2000-2012年中国23个省份高技术产业的研发效率总体偏低,转化效率相对较高,区域层面上两阶段创新效率与行业层面截然不同,说明大部分省份的高技术企业还不具备核心技术的研发能力,新产品销售的利润率较低,企业主要从事技术含量较低的加工组装工作,依靠资源和劳动力的低成本优势来获取微薄利润；分区域来看,不同省份研发效率差距较小,但转化效率差距较大,东部发达省份在成果转化阶段优势明显,北京、天津、上海、江苏、福建、山东、广东等省份的高技术产业发展较快2。我们用政府研发支出和知识产权保护来表示产业政策,实证分析产业政策和市场因素对两阶段创新效率的影响,结果发现：政府研发支出和知识产权保护对两阶段创新效率都有正向影响,但政府研发支出的贡献度较小,知识产权保护对研发阶段创新效率的正向影响更大；比较发现,企业研发支出对技术创新的正向促进作用比政府研发支出的效果更大,市场竞争对两阶段创新效率的正向作用显著。因此,市场机制下,企业应该成为研发活动的主体,政府构建企业研发创新的激励机制,间接引导和鼓励企业创新,而不是主导企业的研发活动。第四,基于财政支出的视角分析中国制造业转型升级中产业政策的就业效应。中国经济步入新常态,制造业转型造成经济增速下滑,经济增长对就业的拉动作用趋弱,稳定就业必将成为产业政策的重要内容。作为政府实施产业政策的重要工具,财政支出对就业具有重要影响,本文基于财政支出的增长效应和社会效应将财政支出分为经济建设支出、教育支出、技术支出和社会保障支出四类,理论分析不同类型财政支出对就业的影响机制。然后采用2007-2013年中国30个省份的面板数据,实证检验财政支出规模和结构对就业的影响。研究发现：中国财政支出对就业的影响存在滞后效应,滞后一期财政支出规模对就业具有正向影响；不同类型财政支出的就业效应差别较大,其中,经济建设支出对就业的影响不显著,技术支出只在当期对就业有正向影响,而教育和社会保障支出对就业的长期正向影响显著。因此,政府可以通过调整财政支出规模和结构来实现“稳就业、调结构”的目标,提高政府在教育、技术和社会保障方面的财政支出比重,改善教育支出结构、技术创新激励机制和社会保障缴费体制1。第五,在实证分析产业政策绩效的基础上,本文指出了选择性产业政策存在的缺陷,以及功能性产业政策的转型方向。选择性产业政策体现出政府直接干预微观经济、政府选择代替市场竞争的特征。随着市场经济体制不断完善,其阻碍竞争、创新激励不足和维系行政垄断等弊端逐步显现出来,制约了产业结构调整和经济长期增长。因此,适应于市场经济发展和制造业转型的需要,产业政策应该由选择性产业政策向功能性产业政策转型,形成竞争政策优先、产业政策与竞争政策协调互补的公共政策体系。产业政策的作用范围应局限在市场失灵和社会服务领域,政策手段由直接干预向市场监管和间接引导转变2。
[Abstract]:Industrial policy is a means for the market economy countries to intervene in the economic operation generally in the process of industrialization. In the early stages of economic development of various countries, the government has played an important role in promoting the rapid development of the national economy through industrial policy protection and support of specific industries. After the reform and opening up, a large number of industrial policies have been issued by the Chinese government. According to the scope of industrial policy, the manufacturing industry is the field that the government implements more industrial policies. It can be said that the process of industrialization and the transformation and upgrading of the manufacturing industry are all completed under the guidance of industrial policy. There has been a great debate on the effectiveness of China's industrial policy, and many scholars have from China's industrial policy. This paper studies the effect of the implementation of the industrial policy, and holds that China's industrial policy continues the government's direct intervention in the economy during the planned economy, hinders the market competition and the industrial development lags behind, and some scholars believe that the industrial policy formulated by the government has an important impetus to the restructuring and rapid economic development of the industrial transition period. In order to evaluate the performance of industrial policy, it is necessary to distinguish different types of industrial policies. According to the national industrial policy outline of the <90 years promulgated by the State Council in 1994, industrial policy is divided into industrial structure policy, industrial organization policy, industrial technology policy and industrial layout policy, and raler (Lall, 2003). The division of selective industrial policy and functional industrial policy. We define the target of industrial policy in the transformation and upgrading of China's manufacturing industry, which include four aspects: structural adjustment, organizational optimization, technological progress and employment stability, and the effectiveness of industrial policy by combining theory with empirical analysis. Finally, it is based on empirical analysis. It points out the shortcomings of the traditional selective industrial policy and the policy suggestions for the implementation of the functional industrial policy. The main contents are as follows: first, the implementation effect of industrial policy in the structural adjustment of manufacturing industry is analyzed from two aspects of theory and demonstration. The motivation of industrial development is derived from the division of labor according to the theory of dissipative structure. The spontaneous evolution of the network within the network, the industrial structure changes are realized spontaneously under the market conditions. The basis of the role of industrial policy is the normal operation of the market mechanism. The direction of the role of industrial policy is consistent with the law of the industry itself. The traditional "selective industrial policy" in China is inclined to select a larger scale and the proportion of the state-owned capital. Higher specific industry support, this selective behavior is contrary to the law of the market, the effect of industrial policy is often not ideal. We selected the panel data of the 34 segments of China's industry from 2004 to 2014 to analyze the impact of industrial policy on industrial structure adjustment, and the government fixed assets investment as capital input, the government As a technical input, R & D investment is used as a technical input to measure the bias of industrial policy. The result shows that there is a negative relationship between the investment inclination of fixed assets and the growth rate of industry output, and the government investment tends to be larger and the proportion of the state-owned capital is higher, and the output growth rate of these industries is low; the investment in fixed assets is relatively low. There is a significant positive impact on total factor productivity and technological improvement, and the impact on technical efficiency is not significant. The promotion of total factor productivity in China is mainly due to technical improvement, and the improvement of technology is the introduction of advanced machinery and equipment abroad. This is mainly done through investment in fixed assets. The effect of growth rate and total factor productivity is not significant, which indicates that the utilization efficiency of R & D expenditure of the Chinese government is 1. second. It compares and analyses the characteristics of industrial policy and the performance of industrial policy in China's iron and steel industry and household electrical appliance industry. The biggest characteristic of the steel industry policy is the strong intervention of the government administrative power to the economy. By measuring the market concentration and production efficiency of the iron and steel industry, it reflects the effect of the implementation of the industrial policy. The results show that the market concentration of the steel industry is low, and the concentration of the iron and steel industry in 2012 is only 27% and 45.9%, respectively, CR4 and CR10; The spatial distribution of iron and steel enterprises is relatively discrete and the repeated construction in each region is serious. The production efficiency of the iron and steel industry is declining. The reasons for the failure of the 0.586. China's steel industry policy from 0.617 in 2006 to 2012 mainly include the unreasonable policy making and the defective implementation of the two side of the iron and steel industry: the steel industry policy continues the plan. In the traditional economy, the government chooses to replace the market competition, which is not conducive to encouraging the enterprise to improve the production efficiency; the direct intervention of the local government to the enterprise distorts the investment behavior of the enterprise, and results in the excess investment and overcapacity 2. as a contrast. We take the development course of the household electrical appliance industry as the starting point, and discuss the characteristics of the household appliance industry policy and the household appliance. In general, the household electrical appliance industry policy follows the objective law of the industrial development, and adopts the policy means to support and induce the industrial development. 18 electric listed companies are selected as samples to analyze the market structure and technical step of the household electrical appliance enterprises. First, the new empirical industrial organization method is used to measure the industrial development. The market power of household electrical appliance enterprises shows that the premium of market power is 0.842, indicating that there is no strong market power in the household electrical appliance enterprises, which belongs to the competitive market structure. Secondly, the total factor productivity of household electrical appliance enterprises is calculated by DEA-Malmquist method. The result shows that the total factor productivity of household electrical appliance enterprises is increasing, which is mainly benefited. The technical efficiency and the scale efficiency are not high. The household appliance industry policy is the premise of giving priority to the market mechanism. The full market competition promotes the technological level of the whole industry. The loose external environment and the effective guidance of industrial policies promote the rapid development of the household electrical appliances industry. Third, based on the industry and the industry, The innovation efficiency of China's high-tech industry and the performance of industrial policy in promoting technological innovation are analyzed in two aspects. From the study of Yu Yongze (2010), from the perspective of value chain, the innovation process of high technology industry can be divided into two stages of technology R & D and transformation of results, and the study of the stochastic frontier production function model (SFA) The efficiency of R & D and conversion efficiency and the performance of industrial policy in China's high-tech industry. Industry level: the level of innovation efficiency in the two stages of the 16 segments of China's high technology industry in the 2000-2012 years is generally low, and the efficiency of innovation in the two stage of 2012 is 0.41 and 0.25 respectively. Relatively speaking, the efficiency of R & D is higher than the conversion efficiency; from the dynamic trend, two The efficiency of the stage innovation is in the process of continuous promotion, the efficiency of R & D development is faster, the average growth rate of R & D efficiency in 2000-2012 years reaches 8.36%, the average annual growth rate of conversion efficiency is only 0.3%1. regional level: the efficiency of R & D in the 23 provinces of China in 2000-2012 years is generally low, the conversion efficiency is relatively high, and the regional level is two. The efficiency of the stage innovation is completely different from the industry level, indicating that the high-tech enterprises in most provinces do not have the research and development ability of the core technology, the profit rate of the new product sales is low, the enterprises mainly engage in the processing and assembly with low technical content, and rely on the low cost advantage of the resources and labor to obtain the small profit. The efficiency gap of R & D in different provinces is small, but the gap of conversion efficiency is large. The advantages of the eastern developed provinces are obvious in the stage of transformation of achievements. The high-tech industries in Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong and other provinces are developing faster. We use government R & D expenditure and intellectual property protection to express industrial policy, and analyze the industrial policies with empirical analysis. The effects of policy and market factors on the efficiency of the two stage of innovation are found: the Government R & D expenditure and intellectual property protection have a positive impact on the efficiency of the two stage of innovation, but the contribution degree of the Government R & D expenditure is smaller and the intellectual property rights protection has a greater positive impact on the innovation efficiency in the R & D stage; and the comparison found that the enterprise R & D expenditure is on the technology. The positive effect of innovation is more effective than the Government R & D expenditure. Market competition has a positive effect on the efficiency of the two stage of innovation. Therefore, under the market mechanism, the enterprise should be the main body of R & D activities, the government constructs the incentive mechanism of enterprise R & D innovation, indirectly guides and encourages enterprise innovation, but not the leading enterprise's R & D activity. Fourth, based on the perspective of financial expenditure, this paper analyzes the employment effect of industrial policy in the transformation and upgrading of China's manufacturing industry. China's economy has entered a new normal state, the transformation of manufacturing industry has caused economic growth to decline, economic growth has weakened the pull effect on employment, and stable employment will become an important content of the policy of industry. Important tools, financial expenditure has an important impact on employment. Based on the growth effect and social effect of fiscal expenditure, this paper divides the fiscal expenditure into four categories: economic construction expenditure, educational expenditure, technical expenditure and social security expenditure, and analyzes the influence mechanism of different types of fiscal expenditure on employment. Then it adopts 30 provinces in China for 2007-2013 years. The study shows that there is a lag effect on the impact of Chinese fiscal expenditure on employment, and the scale of fiscal expenditure has a positive impact on employment; the employment effect of different types of fiscal expenditure is quite different, among which, the shadow of economic construction expenditure on Employment The government can achieve the goal of "stabilizing employment, adjusting the structure" by adjusting the scale and structure of financial expenditure, so as to improve the government's financial expenditure ratio in education, technology and social security. To improve the structure of educational expenditure, the incentive mechanism of technological innovation and the social security payment system 1. fifth. On the basis of the empirical analysis of the performance of industrial policy, this paper points out the shortcomings of the selective industrial policy and the transformation direction of the functional industrial policy. The selective industrial policy embodies the government's direct intervention in the micro economy, the government is directly interfering with the micro economy. Choosing to replace the characteristics of market competition, with the continuous improvement of the market economy system, the drawbacks of its hindrance to competition, the lack of innovation incentive and the maintenance of administrative monopoly have gradually emerged, which restrict the adjustment of industrial structure and the long-term economic growth. Therefore, the industrial policy should be selected from the needs of the market economy and the transformation of the manufacturing industry. The policy of industry policy should be limited in the field of market failure and social service, and the policy means should be changed from direct intervention to market supervision and inter connection guidance by 2..

【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F424
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本文编号：1795304