基于激励理论的监理工程师信用治理研究

发布时间：2018-07-24 18:28

【摘要】：近年来,在我国建筑业迅速发展的同时,建筑市场信用秩序混乱,市场主体信用意识薄弱,信用环境恶化等问题日益显现,导致整个社会资源使用效率降低。监理工程师是建筑市场重要的参与主体之一,其失信行为严重威胁了建设工程的质量和安全,扰乱了建筑市场秩序。因此,如何约束和规范监理工程师的市场行为,构建有效的信用治理体系显得尤为重要。本文以监理工程师为研究对象,针对当前执业资格人员信用体系不完善、委托人监督效率低等问题,运用区间直觉模糊集、模糊偏好语言、委托代理模型、博弈论、心理契约等理论知识,从显性激励与隐性激励相结合的角度,对监理工程师的信用行为进行短期治理和长期治理,论文的主要内容和创新概括如下:(1)考虑各利益相关者的权重不同,分别基于区间直觉模糊集和二元语义模糊偏好评价集构建监理工程师信用评价模型,结果表明区间直觉模糊集可以较好地反映各信用指标信息之间的差异程度,避免各利益相关者由于内在主观性所导致的偏差;二元语义模糊偏好评价集更贴近评审专家的思维过程和自然语言表达方式。(2)在监理工程师自利偏好基础上,运用静态博弈构建业主与监理工程师之间的多任务协调均衡激励模型,模型分析表明,业主对监理工程师激励强度的设定受其风险规避度、努力水平的可观测度及边际成本、信用偏好的影响;另外,通过构建业主、监理工程师和承包商间的三方博弈模型,发现监理工程师是否选择守信,与业主的监督成本、监督概率、业主对其违规行为进行惩罚的金额有关。(3)在监理工程师公平心理偏好基础上,构建业主和监理工程师间的最优风险分担与激励契约模型,探究公平心理偏好和信用偏好对最优风险分担与激励契约的影响。研究结果表明:监理工程师风险分担与其公平心理偏好正相关,与信用偏好负相关,若保持公平心理偏好和信用偏好适度均衡,则业主只需对监理工程师提供固定薪酬契约即可达到帕累托最优。(4)考虑监理工程师的异质性心理特征,构建心理契约与其信用行为作用机理的结构方程模型,从隐性契约的视角对监理工程师进行长期信用治理。研究结果表明,心理契约、组织承诺和组织公平感由工作满意度间接影响监理工程师的信用行为;工作满意度对监理工程师的信用行为有正向显著影响。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the rapid development of the construction industry in China, the credit order of the construction market is chaotic, the credit consciousness of the main body of the market is weak, and the credit environment is deteriorating, which leads to the decrease of the utilization efficiency of the whole social resources. The supervision engineer is one of the important participants in the construction market, whose dishonesty seriously threatens the quality and safety of the construction project and disturbs the order of the construction market. Therefore, how to restrict and standardize the market behavior of supervision engineers and build an effective credit management system is particularly important. This paper takes supervisory engineer as the research object, aiming at the problems of imperfect credit system and low efficiency of client supervision, using interval intuitionistic fuzzy set, fuzzy preference language, principal-agent model, game theory, etc. From the angle of combination of explicit incentive and implicit incentive, the theory of psychological contract is used to deal with the credit behavior of supervision engineer in the short and long term. The main contents and innovations of this paper are summarized as follows: (1) considering the different weights of stakeholders, the credit evaluation model of supervision engineer is constructed based on interval intuitionistic fuzzy set and binary semantic fuzzy preference evaluation set, respectively. The results show that interval intuitionistic fuzzy sets can better reflect the degree of difference between credit index information and avoid the deviation caused by internal subjectivity of stakeholders. The binary semantic fuzzy preference evaluation set is closer to the process of thinking and natural language expression of the evaluation experts. (2) based on the self-interest preference of the supervision engineer, A multi-task coordinated and balanced incentive model between the owner and the supervisory engineer is constructed by using static game. The model analysis shows that the incentive intensity of the employer is set by its risk aversion, the observability of the effort level and the marginal cost. In addition, by constructing the tripartite game model between the owner, the supervision engineer and the contractor, the author finds out whether the supervision engineer chooses to keep his word, the supervision cost with the owner, and the supervision probability. (3) on the basis of the supervision engineer's fair psychological preference, the optimal risk sharing and incentive contract model between the owner and the supervision engineer is constructed. This paper probes into the influence of fairness psychological preference and credit preference on optimal risk sharing and incentive contract. The results show that the risk sharing of supervision engineers is positively correlated with their fair psychological preferences and negatively correlated with their credit preferences. Then the employer can achieve the Pareto optimum only by offering the fixed salary contract to the supervision engineer. (4) considering the heterogeneous psychological characteristics of the supervision engineer, the structure equation model of the psychological contract and its credit action mechanism is established. From the perspective of recessive contract, the supervision engineer has long-term credit management. The results show that psychological contract, organizational commitment and sense of organizational fairness indirectly affect the credit behavior of supervisory engineer by job satisfaction, and job satisfaction has a positive and significant effect on the credit behavior of supervisory engineer.
【学位授予单位】：天津大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F426.92

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