基于网络外部性的链与链竞争纵向结构和合同选择

发布时间：2018-03-09 17:39

本文选题：网络外部性　切入点：链与链竞争　出处：《电子科技大学》2016年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：经济的全球化和市场竞争的加剧,使竞争的形式在悄然发生变化,由企业相互之间的竞争逐渐演变为供应链链际间的竞争。同时信息技术和网络的快速发展,促进了具有网络外部性特征的网络经济的发展。而网络外部性特征并不是仅限于网络经济中,传统经济中也存在网络外部性特征。在网络外部性的环境下,竞争供应链在纵向运作机制上不仅会受竞争因素的影响,势必会受到网络外部性因素的影响。本文应用博弈论和网络外部性的理论与方法,研究最终产品具有网络外部性特征时,竞争供应链纵向结构选择的博弈均衡,以及基于供应链上下游企业同时改善收益或利润的角度,研究竞争供应链纵向合同选择问题,并分析网络外部性强度、竞争强度等因素对结构选择边界与合同参数的影响,为处在网络外部性环境下的竞争供应链上的企业提供理论参考。首先,研究了最终产品具有网络外部性特征时的数量竞争供应链的纵向结构和合同选择,揭示了网络外部性强度和竞争强度对纵向结构和合同选择演变路径和均衡状态的影响。主要结论表明:如果网络外部性对竞争范围的影响很弱,在纵向结构选择上一体化结构为占优的均衡结构,在合同选择策略上,纵向联盟的收益共享合同实现零售商和供应商收益的改进,数量折扣合同也会促进制造商和零售的收益。当网络外部性对竞争范围的影响强烈时,竞争供应链上纵向联盟的收益共享合同失效,同时数量折扣合同也会失效;如果在网络外部性强度很大,同时网络外部性对数量竞争的范围影响激烈时,在供应链的纵向结构选择上,分散化结构为占优均衡。其次,当市场存在不确定风险时,研究了最终产品具有网络外部性特征时的数量竞争供应链的纵向结构和纵向合同选择,揭示了网络外部性强度、数量竞争强度和市场风险因子对竞争供应链纵向结构和合同选择演变路径和均衡状态的影响。结论表明:从节点企业的绩效角度出发,当产品的竞争强度较弱地依赖于网络外部性强度系数,同时市场不确定性因素波动较大时,在纵向结构选择上,一体化结构为竞争供应链占优的均衡结构,在竞争供应链合同选择策略上,利润分享合同能实现节点企业的利润改进。从供应链的角度出发,供应链的纵向结构选择与市场风险无关。最后,在供应链上游企业进行技术创新情形下,研究了最终产品具有网络外部性特征时的数量竞争供应链的纵向结构和合同选择,揭示了网络外部性强度和竞争强度对纵向结构和合同选择演变路径和均衡状态的影响。研究表明:当产品的网络外部性强度较弱、数量竞争强度也较弱时,在无技术溢出效应时,利润分享合同能实现供应链节点企业的利润改进,在有技术溢出效应时,一体化结构为供应链系统利润改进的均衡。
[Abstract]:With the globalization of economy and the aggravation of market competition, the form of competition is changing quietly, from the competition among enterprises to the competition between supply chains, at the same time, the rapid development of information technology and network. It promotes the development of network economy with the characteristics of network externality, and the characteristics of network externality are not limited to the network economy, but also exist in the traditional economy. The vertical operation mechanism of competitive supply chain is not only affected by competition factors, but also by network externalities. This paper applies the theory and method of game theory and network externality. When the final product has the characteristics of network externality, the game equilibrium of the competitive supply chain vertical structure selection is studied, and the vertical contract selection problem of the competitive supply chain is studied based on the point of view that the upstream and downstream enterprises simultaneously improve the income or profit. The influence of network externality intensity and competition intensity on the structure selection boundary and contract parameters is analyzed, which provides a theoretical reference for the enterprises in the competitive supply chain under the network externality environment. This paper studies the vertical structure and contract selection of quantitative competitive supply chain when the final product has the characteristics of network externality. The effects of network externality and competition intensity on vertical structure, evolution path and equilibrium state of contract selection are revealed. The main conclusions are as follows: if the influence of network externality on competition scope is very weak, The integration structure is the dominant equilibrium structure in the vertical structure selection. In the contract selection strategy, the vertical alliance revenue-sharing contract realizes the improvement of retailer and supplier income. When the influence of network externality on the scope of competition is strong, the profit sharing contract of vertical alliance in competitive supply chain will be invalid, and the quantity discount contract will also be invalid. If the intensity of network externality is great and the influence of network externality on the range of quantitative competition is fierce, the decentralized structure is dominant equilibrium in the vertical structure selection of supply chain. Secondly, when there is uncertain risk in the market, This paper studies the vertical structure and vertical contract selection of quantitative competitive supply chain when the final product has the characteristics of network externality, and reveals the intensity of network externality. The influence of quantity competition intensity and market risk factor on the vertical structure of competitive supply chain, the evolution path and equilibrium state of contract selection. When the competitive intensity of the product depends on the network externality intensity coefficient and the market uncertainty fluctuates greatly, the integrated structure is the dominant equilibrium structure of the competitive supply chain in the vertical structure selection. In the competitive supply chain contract selection strategy, profit sharing contract can achieve the profit improvement of node enterprises. From the point of view of supply chain, the vertical structure selection of supply chain has nothing to do with market risk. Finally, In the case of technological innovation in upstream enterprises of supply chain, the vertical structure and contract selection of quantitative competitive supply chain with the characteristics of network externality are studied. The effects of network externality and competition intensity on vertical structure, evolution path and equilibrium state of contract selection are revealed. The results show that when the product network externality intensity is weak, the quantity competition intensity is also weak. When there is no technology spillover effect, the profit sharing contract can realize the profit improvement of the enterprise in the supply chain node. In the case of the technology spillover effect, the integrated structure is the equilibrium of the profit improvement in the supply chain system.
【学位授予单位】：电子科技大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F274

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