不确定性对董事会机制的影响研究

发布时间：2018-04-16 19:45

本文选题：不完备契约 + 不确定性　；参考：《合肥工业大学》2016年博士论文

【摘要】：在剩余索取权与剩余控制权相分离的委托-代理模型中,委托人和代理人通过签订契约来约定各自的权利和义务,明确双方目标和收益。但契约不能准确描述未来状态以及每种状态下的各方权利和责任,并事先约定相应的对策写在契约里,即这样的契约是不完备的。由于委托人和代理人之间信息不对称、有限理性和不确定性的影响,往往使得最终的结果偏离了预期。现有研究多是从信息不对称(信息经济学)和人的有限理性方面(心理学和行为金融)去研究不完备契约的,较少从不确定性的角度去探讨不完备契约以及公司治理机制。董事会是公司治理的核心,是联系股东和管理层之间的桥梁。董事会对内代表股东行使监督、激励、聘任管理层的职能,对外进行信息披露,降低股东投资风险。研究不确定性对董事会机制的影响,既丰富了公司治理理论,也为委托人理解代理人行为,制定更完备的契约,提高投资者回报提供了的经验借鉴。本文通过对不确定性的界定,从企业面临的内部不确定性和外部不确定性两个维度出发,构建了包括组织不确定性、管理不确定性、技术不确定性、宏观经济不确定、市场不确定性和系统性风险6个方面的指标体系,并对指标的选取依据、衡量方法进行了阐述。在实证研究中,根据董事会机制的基本职能,分别研究不确定性对董事会监督机制、制定管理层薪酬机制、替换管理层机制以及在不确定性条件下董事会机制对权益资本成本的影响。本文系统地研究了不确定性作为影响企业活动的重要因素对影响董事会行为和结果的影响。本文主要研究内容和创新性工作如下：(1)研究了不确定性对董事会监督管理层机制的影响。采用盈余管理水平和事会会议次数两个指标作为被解释变量,实证结果发现,不确定性对盈余管理水平的影响较为一致,除股权制衡度之外,其他指标均是正向影响盈余水平,说明了不确定性弱化了董事会监督机制。在进一步的研究中发现董事会结构变化、业务复杂性、权益乘数和系统性风险等因素对盈余管理与董事会次数表现出同向发展的特征。而股权制衡度、企业财务危机预测和宏观经济不确定性等因素对盈余管理与董事会会议次数表现出反向发展的特征。通过理论分析认为,在不确定性环境下,董事会弱化了监督职能,而强化了咨询、建议和战略制定等职能。(2)研究了不确定性对董事会激励管理层机制的影响。采用高管薪酬集中度和高管人均薪酬两个指标作为被解释变量,分析不确定性对高管薪酬激励机制的影响。在单独考察各种类型不确定性对薪酬影响时,组织不确定性对薪酬集中度的负向影响较为明显,对人均薪酬数影响不明显。而宏观经济不确定性对人均薪酬的负向影响更加明显,对薪酬集中度的影响不明显。一定程度上说明内部不确定性导致董事会更注重薪酬“公平”,外部不确定性导致其更注重“效率”。当考察所有不确定性因素对薪酬的综合影响时,管理不确定性增加高管薪酬,宏观经济不确定性仍会减少高管薪酬。此外,独立董事的大幅度变动将导致少数有控制力的高管获得相对更多的薪酬。(3)研究了不确定性对董事会替换管理层机制影响。运用logistic回归模型发现了董事会结构变化和股权制衡度变化是影响管理层变更的因素,进一步分析发现,相对于董事会规模变动,独立董事变动对管理层变更的影响更小,说明独立董事发挥作用还受到一定的限制。财务危机预测得分与管理层替换负相关,印证了财务危机是公司治理弱化的观点。宏观经济不确定性对管理层替换影响不显著,市场不确定性和系统性风险减小管理层替换的可能性。实证结果说明董事会替换管理层,主要是基于企业经营管理的需要,而非受外部不确定性环境的影响。(4)研究了不确定性对权益资本成本的影响。权益资本成本是投资者对权益资本风险价值的期望贴现率,体现了公司治理机制对投资者利益的保护水平。本章多元回归分析对比发现内部不确定性和外部不确定性对权益资本成本有正向影响,不确定性将会导致会引起权益资本成本升高。弱化的董事会机制会增加权益资本成本。当董事会机制与不确定性共同作用下,一方面减弱了不确定性对权益资本成本的正向影响,另一面也降低了董事会的作用,产生了抵消效应。在进一步分析来看,内部不确定性条件下董事会与权益资本成本的影响显著。企业需积极提升面对不确定性的能力,同时提高董事会机制有效性,共同降低权益资本成本。
[Abstract]:In the principal-agent model residual claim and residual control of phase separation, the principal and the agent by signing contracts to define their respective rights and duties, clear both goals and benefits. But the contract can not accurately describe the future state and each state of the parties rights and obligations, and agreed in advance corresponding countermeasures in writing in this contract, the contract is not complete. Because of the information asymmetry between the principal and the agent, the impact of bounded rationality and uncertainty, often makes the final results deviate from the expected. The existing researches are from asymmetric information (Information Economics) and the limited rationality (Psychology and behavioral finance to study) incomplete contract, less uncertainty perspective to explore the incomplete contract and the mechanism of corporate governance. The board of directors is the core of corporate governance, is the relationship between shareholders and managers The board of directors of the bridge. On behalf of shareholders to exercise supervision, incentive, appointment management functions, information disclosed, reduce shareholder investment risk. Effects of uncertainty on the board mechanism, not only enrich the theory of corporate governance, but also to understand the agent acts as the principal, to develop a more complete contract, improve the return of investors to provide the experience. Through the definition of the uncertainty, starting from two dimensions of internal enterprises are facing uncertainties and external uncertainties, including the construction of organization management of uncertainty, uncertainty, technological uncertainty, macroeconomic uncertainty, the index system of 6 aspects of market uncertainty and systemic risk. And select the indexes based on the measurement methods are described. In the empirical study, according to the basic functions of the board of directors mechanism, supervision mechanism of uncertainty on the board of directors, system Set the management compensation mechanism, management mechanism and the effect of replacement of directors under uncertainty mechanism on the cost of equity capital. This paper systematically studies the influence of uncertainty as an important factor affecting the activities of the enterprise behavior and will influence on the board. The main research contents of this paper are as follows: (1) study the impact of uncertainty on the supervision of the board of directors management mechanism. The level of earnings management and business meetings two indicators as explanatory variables, the empirical results show that the impact of uncertainty on the earnings management level is the same, except the equity balance degree, other indicators are positively affect the earnings level, the uncertainty the weakening of the supervision mechanism of the board of directors. In the further research found that the board structure changes, business complexity, equity multiplier and systemic risk factors of earnings The number of the board of directors and management to show the same characteristics. The development and equity balance degree, enterprise financial crisis prediction and macroeconomic uncertainty factors such as meetings characterized by reverse development of earnings management and the board of directors. Through theoretical analysis, in an uncertain environment, the board of directors has weakened the function of supervision, and strengthen the the consultation, advice and strategy functions. (2) studied the effect of the uncertainty of management incentive mechanism for the board of directors. The executive compensation concentration and executives remuneration per capita two indicators as explanatory variables, analysis of the impact of uncertainty on the executive compensation incentive mechanism. In a separate survey of various types of uncertainty on compensation the influence of uncertainty on the organization, compensation concentration negative effect is more obvious, is not obvious to pay per capita number. The macroeconomic uncertainty negatively influence on per capita salary Sound is more obvious, is not obvious. The effects of concentration of compensation to a certain extent on the internal uncertainty leads to the board of directors pay pay more attention to the "fair", the external uncertainty leads to more focus on "efficiency". When examining all the uncertainty factors influence on salary management, increase the uncertainty of executive compensation, macro economy the uncertainty will reduce executive pay. In addition, substantial changes will lead to a small number of independent directors have control executives receive relatively more salary. (3) study the uncertainty of the board of directors to replace the management mechanism. Using the logistic regression model found that the board structure change and equity balance degree change is affecting factors a change of management, further analysis found that, compared to the size of the board of directors of independent directors changes, changes on the impact of management change is smaller, that independent directors play a role also Subject to certain restrictions. The financial crisis forecast score with management to replace negative correlation, confirms the financial crisis is weakening corporate governance point of view. The macroeconomic uncertainty on the management of replacement did not significantly affect the market uncertainty, and reduce systemic risk management replacement is possible. The empirical results show that the board of directors to replace management major is based on the needs of management, not affected by external environment uncertainty. (4) studied the effect of uncertainty on the cost of equity capital. The cost of equity capital is the expected discounted value of equity investors to the risk rate reflects the level of protection of corporate governance mechanism on the interests of the investors. In this chapter, the multiple regression analysis comparison of internal uncertainty and external uncertainty has a positive impact on the cost of equity capital, the uncertainty will lead to the cost of equity capital will cause weak rise. The board of directors mechanism will increase the cost of equity capital. When the board of directors mechanism and uncertainty together, a reduced uncertainty have a positive effect on the cost of equity capital, the other side also reduces the role of the board of directors, the offsetting effect. Further analysis, the internal uncertainty condition of board of directors and significantly influences the cost of equity capital. Enterprises need to actively promote the ability to face uncertainty, and improve the mechanism of board effectiveness, to reduce the cost of equity capital.

【学位授予单位】：合肥工业大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F275;F271

【参考文献】