考虑成员行为的双渠道供应链最优策略研究

发布时间：2018-05-04 03:25

  本文选题：双渠道供应链 + Stackelberg博弈　； 参考：《天津大学》2015年博士论文

【摘要】：近年来,双渠道营销模式已经成为越来越多品牌制造商的主要运营模式.由于网络渠道的开设,制造商与零售商之间不仅存在传统渠道的纵向博弈,而且还存在着传统零售渠道与网络渠道之间的横向竞争.这种激烈的竞争和需求环境的不确定性,可能会引起供应链成员的公平关切行为或风险规避行为.不同于大多文献中成员是完全理性的传统假设,本文考虑了成员的行为因素,并结合双渠道供应链的应用背景,来进一步研究决策者的决策策略与供应链协调问题.显然,本文的研究问题更接近于现实情况,拓展了供应链管理问题的研究范畴,研究成果对供应链系统中的协调决策问题来说有着重要的理论指导意义.本文主要的研究成果包括如下几个方面:首先,考虑由一个制造商和一个独立的零售商构成的双渠道供应链.零售商为消费者提供增值服务且具有公平关切行为,使用Stackelberg博弈来建立数学模型,求解出均衡解.研究发现:当零售商为消费者提供增值服务且具有公平关切行为时,不能通过一个常数批发价合同来协调整个供应链.其次,以目前消费者先在实体店享受售前体验式服务后转移到网络渠道下单购买产品的问题背景为基础,设计了两类问题情景,并求出了相应的均衡解.基于解的分析,探索了供应链成员之间应如何签订对于双方都有利的服务合作合同,分析了售前体验式服务对成员的定价和利润产生的影响.第三,在制造商引入直销渠道的问题背景下,考虑市场规模信息不对称的情况.假设零售商具有更为精确预测市场规模的能力.但零售商为了应对制造商入侵零售渠道的情况,可能会扭曲向制造商订货的数量,以诱导制造商作出错误的决策.本文采用均值-方差方法来度量零售商的风险规避行为,证明了唯一的贝叶斯均衡解的存在性,并求解出制造商为了准确判断真实的市场规模而设定的阈值.还求解出了使供应链各成员的利润或效用达到最优情况的零售商的最优订货量与制造商的最优直销量.最后,本文研究了由一个制造商和一个独立的传统零售商构成的动态双渠道系统.为了提升销量,制造商投资全国性广告,而零售商决策地方性广告.比较了单渠道和双渠道供应链中的均衡解和利润,且分析了制造商引入网络渠道后双方的利润变化,设计了一个双向收益共享合同来实现供应链的协调.
[Abstract]:In recent years, two-channel marketing mode has become the main operation mode of more and more brand manufacturers. Because of the opening of the network channel, there is not only the vertical game of the traditional channel between manufacturer and retailer, but also the horizontal competition between the traditional retail channel and the network channel. This fierce competition and uncertainty of demand environment may lead to fair concern behavior or risk aversion behavior of supply chain members. Different from the traditional hypothesis that members are completely rational in most literatures, this paper considers the behavior factors of members, and combines the application background of two-channel supply chain to further study the decision-making strategy and supply chain coordination of decision makers. Obviously, the research in this paper is closer to the reality and extends the research scope of supply chain management. The research results have important theoretical significance to coordinate decision-making in supply chain system. The main research results of this paper are as follows: firstly, a two-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and an independent retailer is considered. Retailers provide value-added services to consumers and have fair concern behavior. Stackelberg game is used to establish mathematical model to solve the equilibrium solution. It is found that when retailers provide value-added services to consumers and have fair concerns, they cannot coordinate the whole supply chain through a constant wholesale price contract. Secondly, based on the background of the problem that consumers first enjoy the pre-sale experience service in the physical stores and then transfer to the network channel to issue orders to purchase products, two kinds of problem scenarios are designed, and the corresponding equilibrium solutions are obtained. Based on the analysis of the solution, this paper explores how to sign a service cooperation contract between the members of the supply chain which is beneficial to both parties, and analyzes the influence of the pre-sale experience service on the pricing and profit of the members. Thirdly, under the background of direct marketing channel, the information asymmetry of market scale is considered. Assume retailers have the ability to predict market size more accurately. But retailers may distort the amount of orders they place with manufacturers in response to manufacturers breaking into retail channels to induce them to make the wrong decisions. In this paper, we use mean-variance method to measure retailers' risk-averse behavior, prove the existence of a unique Bayesian equilibrium solution, and solve the threshold set by manufacturers in order to judge the real market size accurately. The optimal order quantity of the retailer and the optimal direct selling quantity of the manufacturer are also obtained, in which the profit or utility of each member of the supply chain reaches the optimal condition. Finally, this paper studies a dynamic dual channel system composed of a manufacturer and an independent traditional retailer. To boost sales, manufacturers invest in national advertising, while retailers make decisions about local advertising. This paper compares the equilibrium solution and profit between single channel supply chain and double channel supply chain, analyzes the profit variation of both sides after the manufacturer introduces network channel, and designs a two-way revenue-sharing contract to realize the coordination of supply chain.
【学位授予单位】：天津大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F274
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本文编号：1841378