农作物商业化育种合作的契约模式选择及效率研究
发布时间：2018-11-22 13:49
【摘要】：长期以来,我国实行以公益性科研单位为主体的种业创新体系,科研单位负责育种技术创新及其推广使用,因此科研单位拥有大部分农作物育种资源。这种资源分布状况使得企业不得不与科研单位建立长期、正式的商业化育种合作关系,以保证稳定的技术供给。而商业化育种合作契约往往不能描述和界定未来所有或然状态下契约双方的权、责、利,双方会为了追求私人利益而背离育种合作的共同利益,引发机会主义行为,导致合作关系不稳定甚至破裂,形成了商业化育种资源的低效率配置。因此设计和选择可有效规制机会主义行为的契约模式,成为缓解上述困境的重要议题,本文以契约不完全性——契约模式选择——效率(I-C-E)为分析范式,以农作物商业化育种的技术和交易属性为切入点,从商业化育种合作剩余最大化的视角,对农作物商业化育种合作的契约模式选择及其效率进行分析,探索农作物商业化育种合作发展的规律性,为推进现代农作物种业发展提供决策依据。主要观点如下:(1)分析范式。在产权理论和交易费用理论的基础上,提出了本文所采用的分析范式,即契约不完全性——契约模式选择——效率。根据这一分析范式,契约的不完全性是经济社会中交易的显著特征,需要选择相应的契约模式预防和规制机会主义行为,而最优的契约模式是能最大程度降低资源配置效率损失的契约模式。(2)农作物商业化育种合作契约的不完全性分析。本文以农作物商业化育种合作契约的技术属性和交易属性(技术交易结构)为切入点,分析契约的不完全性。这类技术交易结构主要包括育种合作的资产专用性、育种技术的公共品属性、育种技术的可转移性差和育种交易的不确定性等。交易技术结构产生了描述和界定育种技术非独占性、关键信息不可契约化以及要素非完全替代性的交易成本,是形成商业化育种合作契约不完全的基本原因。契约的不完全引发了信息窃取和项目交叉资助的机会主义行为,成为签订和实施契约的主要障碍,需要设计相应的协调机制来弥补育种合作的效率损失。这种协调机制主要包括契约的产权结构、支付结构和声誉(关系契约),不同的协调机制及其结构形成了不同的契约模式。(3)最优商业化育种合作契约模式选择。本文通过一个关系契约模型,分析了最优商业化育种合作契约模式的适用范围。从博弈次数的维度,若契约双方的贴现率低于临界贴现率,声誉机制将发挥作用,多次的商业化育种合作契约(关系契约)可以有效避免机会主义行为,优于单期的商业化育种合作契约,达到最优效率。然而这一贴现率依赖于双方选择关系契约的机会成本,在新品种差异化较小的情况下,单期契约即可获利,关系契约的机会成本较高,从而难以将贴现率维持在低于临界贴现率的水平。从关系契约适用边界的维度,在关系契约中,当植物新品种保护程度较低时,多次的委托育种、共同研发和准纵向一体化契约均可实现最优效率。同一条件下,随着契约双方要素投入的替代性增加,契约双方对关系契约的选择顺序为多次的准纵向一体化、共同研发和委托育种契约。(4)农作物商业化育种合作的效率分析。本文通过结构方程模型,对最优契约模式选择的影响因素与效率进行实证分析,验证契约的协调机制实现效率的路径。本文用主体满意度表示契约双方的育种合作效率,将影响因素归纳为预期收益因素、契约层面影响因素和法律层面影响因素等三类因素。预期收益因素主要包括预期收益及其支付结构、新品种的价格高低等观察指标,契约层面影响因素主要包括交易风险高低、适应性成本承担比例等观察指标,法律层面影响因素主要包括植物新品种保护强度、侵权时的维权成本等观察指标。研究发现这三类因素对契约行为主体的满意度均存在显著正向影响,其中预期收益因素对主体满意度的影响最大,标准化路径系数达到53.0%。
[Abstract]:For a long time, our country implements the seed industry innovation system with the public welfare scientific research unit as the main body, the scientific research unit is responsible for the breeding technology innovation and the promotion and use, so the scientific research unit has most of the crop breeding resources. This kind of resource distribution condition makes the enterprise have to establish a long-term and formal commercial breeding cooperative relationship with the scientific research unit to ensure the stable technology supply. The commercial breeding cooperation contract is often unable to describe and define the rights, responsibilities and interests of the contractual parties in all or the future states of the future, and the two parties will, in order to pursue the private interests, depart from the common interests of the breeding and cooperation, trigger the opportunistic behavior, and lead to the instability and even the rupture of the cooperative relationship, the low-efficiency configuration of the commercial breeding resource is formed. Therefore, it is an important topic to design and choose the contract model that can effectively regulate the opportunistic behavior, and it is an important topic to alleviate the above-mentioned difficulties. In this paper, the contract incomplete _ contract mode selection _ efficiency (I-C-E) is the analytical paradigm, and the technology and transaction attributes of the commercial breeding of the crops are the starting point. From the perspective of the maximization of the commercial breeding cooperation, the contract model selection and the efficiency of the commercial breeding cooperation of the crops are analyzed, the regularity of the development of the commercial breeding and breeding of the crops is explored, and the decision-making basis for promoting the development of the modern crop breeding industry is provided. The main points of view are as follows: (1) Analysis paradigm. On the basis of the theory of property right theory and transaction cost, this paper puts forward the analysis paradigm adopted in this paper, that is, the contract incomplete _ contract mode selection _ efficiency. According to this analysis model, the incompleteness of the contract is the significant characteristic of the transaction in the economy and society, and it is necessary to select the corresponding contract mode to prevent and regulate the opportunistic behavior, and the optimal contract mode is the contract mode which can minimize the loss of the resource allocation efficiency. (2) The incomplete analysis of the commercial breeding cooperation contract of the crops. This paper analyzes the incompleteness of the contract with the technical property and the transaction property (the technical transaction structure) of the commercial breeding cooperative contract of the crops. The structure of this kind of technology mainly includes the asset specificity of the breeding cooperation, the common property of the breeding technology, the transferability of the breeding technology, the uncertainty of the breeding transaction, and the like. The transaction technology structure has produced a description and a definition of the non-exclusive nature of the breeding technology, the non-contract of the key information, and the cost of the non-complete alternative of the elements, which is the basic reason for the incomplete development of the commercial breeding cooperation contract. The contract does not completely trigger the opportunistic behavior of information theft and cross-financing of the project, becomes the main obstacle to the signing and implementation of the contract, and needs to design the corresponding coordination mechanism to make up for the efficiency loss of the breeding cooperation. This kind of coordination mechanism mainly includes the property right structure of the contract, the payment structure and the reputation (relationship contract), the different coordination mechanism and its structure form different contract modes. (3) The choice of the best commercial breeding cooperative contract model. In this paper, through a relationship contract model, the application scope of the optimal commercial breeding cooperative contract model is analyzed. From the dimension of the number of times of game, if the discount rate of the two parties is lower than the critical discount rate, the reputation mechanism will play a role, and the multiple commercial breeding cooperation contract (the relationship contract) can effectively avoid the opportunistic behavior, which is superior to the commercial breeding cooperation contract of the single period, so as to achieve the optimal efficiency. However, this discount rate is dependent on the opportunity cost of the relationship contract between the two parties. In the case of small new varieties, the opportunity cost of the relationship contract is high, so it is difficult to maintain the discount rate at a level lower than the critical discount rate. From the dimension of the application boundary of the relationship contract, in the relationship contract, when the protection degree of the new plant new variety is lower, the optimal efficiency can be achieved by the multi-time entrusted breeding, the common research and development and the quasi-longitudinal integration contract. Under the same condition, with the alternative increase of the input of the two parties, the contract of contract selection is the quasi-longitudinal integration of many times, and the contract of co-development and commission of the contract is co-developed and commissioned. (4) Efficiency analysis of the commercial breeding cooperation of crops. Based on the structural equation model, this paper makes an empirical analysis on the influence factors and efficiency of the optimal contract mode selection and the path of the efficiency of the coordination mechanism of the verification contract. In this paper, the main body satisfaction is used to express the efficiency of the two parties' breeding and cooperation, and the influencing factors are summarized into three kinds of factors, such as the expected income factor, the influence factor of the contract level and the influence factors at the legal level. The expected income factor mainly includes the expected income and its payment structure, the price of the new variety, and other observation indexes, and the influence factors of the contract level mainly include the transaction risk, the proportion of the adaptability cost and other observation indexes. The influence factors at the legal level mainly include the protection strength of new varieties of plants, and the cost of protecting the rights in the case of infringement. The study found that these three factors had a significant positive impact on the satisfaction of the principal of the contract, of which the expected income factors had the greatest impact on the satisfaction of the subject, and the standardized path coefficient reached 53.0%.
【学位授予单位】：山东农业大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F324.6
，
本文编号：2349551
[Abstract]:For a long time, our country implements the seed industry innovation system with the public welfare scientific research unit as the main body, the scientific research unit is responsible for the breeding technology innovation and the promotion and use, so the scientific research unit has most of the crop breeding resources. This kind of resource distribution condition makes the enterprise have to establish a long-term and formal commercial breeding cooperative relationship with the scientific research unit to ensure the stable technology supply. The commercial breeding cooperation contract is often unable to describe and define the rights, responsibilities and interests of the contractual parties in all or the future states of the future, and the two parties will, in order to pursue the private interests, depart from the common interests of the breeding and cooperation, trigger the opportunistic behavior, and lead to the instability and even the rupture of the cooperative relationship, the low-efficiency configuration of the commercial breeding resource is formed. Therefore, it is an important topic to design and choose the contract model that can effectively regulate the opportunistic behavior, and it is an important topic to alleviate the above-mentioned difficulties. In this paper, the contract incomplete _ contract mode selection _ efficiency (I-C-E) is the analytical paradigm, and the technology and transaction attributes of the commercial breeding of the crops are the starting point. From the perspective of the maximization of the commercial breeding cooperation, the contract model selection and the efficiency of the commercial breeding cooperation of the crops are analyzed, the regularity of the development of the commercial breeding and breeding of the crops is explored, and the decision-making basis for promoting the development of the modern crop breeding industry is provided. The main points of view are as follows: (1) Analysis paradigm. On the basis of the theory of property right theory and transaction cost, this paper puts forward the analysis paradigm adopted in this paper, that is, the contract incomplete _ contract mode selection _ efficiency. According to this analysis model, the incompleteness of the contract is the significant characteristic of the transaction in the economy and society, and it is necessary to select the corresponding contract mode to prevent and regulate the opportunistic behavior, and the optimal contract mode is the contract mode which can minimize the loss of the resource allocation efficiency. (2) The incomplete analysis of the commercial breeding cooperation contract of the crops. This paper analyzes the incompleteness of the contract with the technical property and the transaction property (the technical transaction structure) of the commercial breeding cooperative contract of the crops. The structure of this kind of technology mainly includes the asset specificity of the breeding cooperation, the common property of the breeding technology, the transferability of the breeding technology, the uncertainty of the breeding transaction, and the like. The transaction technology structure has produced a description and a definition of the non-exclusive nature of the breeding technology, the non-contract of the key information, and the cost of the non-complete alternative of the elements, which is the basic reason for the incomplete development of the commercial breeding cooperation contract. The contract does not completely trigger the opportunistic behavior of information theft and cross-financing of the project, becomes the main obstacle to the signing and implementation of the contract, and needs to design the corresponding coordination mechanism to make up for the efficiency loss of the breeding cooperation. This kind of coordination mechanism mainly includes the property right structure of the contract, the payment structure and the reputation (relationship contract), the different coordination mechanism and its structure form different contract modes. (3) The choice of the best commercial breeding cooperative contract model. In this paper, through a relationship contract model, the application scope of the optimal commercial breeding cooperative contract model is analyzed. From the dimension of the number of times of game, if the discount rate of the two parties is lower than the critical discount rate, the reputation mechanism will play a role, and the multiple commercial breeding cooperation contract (the relationship contract) can effectively avoid the opportunistic behavior, which is superior to the commercial breeding cooperation contract of the single period, so as to achieve the optimal efficiency. However, this discount rate is dependent on the opportunity cost of the relationship contract between the two parties. In the case of small new varieties, the opportunity cost of the relationship contract is high, so it is difficult to maintain the discount rate at a level lower than the critical discount rate. From the dimension of the application boundary of the relationship contract, in the relationship contract, when the protection degree of the new plant new variety is lower, the optimal efficiency can be achieved by the multi-time entrusted breeding, the common research and development and the quasi-longitudinal integration contract. Under the same condition, with the alternative increase of the input of the two parties, the contract of contract selection is the quasi-longitudinal integration of many times, and the contract of co-development and commission of the contract is co-developed and commissioned. (4) Efficiency analysis of the commercial breeding cooperation of crops. Based on the structural equation model, this paper makes an empirical analysis on the influence factors and efficiency of the optimal contract mode selection and the path of the efficiency of the coordination mechanism of the verification contract. In this paper, the main body satisfaction is used to express the efficiency of the two parties' breeding and cooperation, and the influencing factors are summarized into three kinds of factors, such as the expected income factor, the influence factor of the contract level and the influence factors at the legal level. The expected income factor mainly includes the expected income and its payment structure, the price of the new variety, and other observation indexes, and the influence factors of the contract level mainly include the transaction risk, the proportion of the adaptability cost and other observation indexes. The influence factors at the legal level mainly include the protection strength of new varieties of plants, and the cost of protecting the rights in the case of infringement. The study found that these three factors had a significant positive impact on the satisfaction of the principal of the contract, of which the expected income factors had the greatest impact on the satisfaction of the subject, and the standardized path coefficient reached 53.0%.
【学位授予单位】：山东农业大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F324.6
，
本文编号：2349551
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