公司法视角下上市公司反收购措施研究

发布时间：2018-04-21 17:47

本文选题：上市公司收购 + 反收购　；参考：《吉林大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：自2014年起我国进入了新一轮的并购狂欢季,而全国瞩目的万科收购战无疑是此次并购潮中最为精彩的部分。受宝万大战的影响,我国许多上市公司如惊弓之鸟般一夜之间纷纷修改公司章程,引入反收购措施,一时间反收购措施鱼龙混杂。这充分暴露了我国上市公司对反收购措施的陌生。而我国现行法对具体反收购措施的合法性问题规定较为模糊,许多反收购措施的合法性在学理上处于不明晰的地位。而另一方面,现行法对部分合理的反收购措施限制过死,导致目标公司经理层在面对恶意收购时束手无策。针对上述问题,本文拟运用公司法理论并结合美国的先进经验对反收购措施进行剖析,论证目标公司管理层反收购权限的范围,并就具体反收购措施的合法性问题及改进路径提出自己的观点。文章分为四部分:第一部分主要介绍了美国学界关于上市公司经理层面对敌意收购时的立场之争并论证了我国上市公司采取反收购措施的理论基础及制度空间。第二部分运用公司法原理对部分典型反收购措施进行了法理剖析。该部分主要分为四节。第一节主要探讨了公司章程选出公司法的限制所在及其原因,并在此基础上分析了提高行权条件这一章程策略为何无效。第二节主要基于忠实义务的视角探讨了“皇冠宝石”、资本杠杆化、交叉董事会等问题。认为对于“皇冠宝石”及资本杠杆化应分情况进行讨论,而交叉董事会中的董事则受忠实义务所困,在收购成功后处于尴尬境地。第三节主要阐述了金色降落伞的的对价理论,并论证了该对价在我国的缺失,进而提出金色降落伞在我国构成了公司财产的纯粹浪费,主张法律应当禁止该策略。第四节主要论述了交叉持股条款原理及其针对派克人防御这一特殊情形的适用问题。此外,笔者还介绍了美国派克人防御中出现的“赛跑问题”,并指出我国并不会出现该问题。第三部分主要讨论了“白衣骑士”及股份回购这两个反收购措施在我国的困境。并提出了公司法解决进路——确立授权资本制及放松对股份回购的管制。第四部分主要在授权资本制及放松回购管制的基础上探讨了毒丸及绿邮回购合法性问题(授权资本制构成了毒丸的基础,而绿邮回购则以放松回购管制为前提)。针对毒丸,笔者介绍了其常见的类型及运行机理并从股东歧视问题,单方设定义务问题,苛刻性问题,股票自由转让问题等方面对其合法性问题展开讨论,并得出毒丸非法的结论。针对绿邮,笔者主要介绍了美国学界就绿邮回购的争论。其大致分为反对说、支持说与中立说,而笔者比较倾向于中立说,认为法律不应一味地禁止或允许绿邮回购,而应将该权利赋予股东大会,由股东大会明确可以进行绿邮回购的情形。
[Abstract]:Since 2014, China has entered a new round of M & A carnival season, and the Vanke acquisition war is undoubtedly the most exciting part of the M & A tide. Under the influence of the war of Baowan, many listed companies in our country have amended their articles of association overnight, introduced anti-takeover measures, and have mixed up anti-takeover measures for a time. This fully exposed our country's listed companies to the strange measures of anti-takeover. However, the current law of our country has vague regulations on the legality of specific anti-takeover measures, and many anti-takeover measures are in a unclear position in theory. On the other hand, the current law limits some reasonable anti-takeover measures, which results in the managers of the target company being helpless in the face of the hostile takeover. In view of the above problems, this paper intends to use the theory of company law and combined with the advanced experience of the United States to analyze the anti-takeover measures, and to demonstrate the scope of the scope of the authority of the target company's management anti-takeover. The author also puts forward his own views on the legality of specific anti-takeover measures and the ways to improve them. The article is divided into four parts: the first part mainly introduces the position of the American academic circles on the hostile takeover of listed companies and demonstrates the theoretical basis and institutional space of the anti-takeover measures taken by listed companies in China. The second part analyzes some typical anti-takeover measures by using the company law principle. This part is divided into four sections. In the first section, the author mainly discusses the limitation of the company's articles of association and its reasons, and on this basis, analyzes why the constitution strategy of improving the exercise conditions is ineffective. The second section mainly discusses the crown gem, capital leverage and cross board of directors from the perspective of loyalty obligation. It is considered that the crown gem and capital leverage should be discussed separately, while the directors in the cross board are trapped by the duty of loyalty and are in an awkward position after the successful acquisition. The third section mainly elaborated the consideration theory of the golden parachute, and demonstrated the lack of the consideration in our country, then proposed that the golden parachute constituted the pure waste of the company property in our country, and advocated that the law should prohibit the strategy. The fourth section mainly discusses the principle of cross-shareholding clause and its application to the special situation of Peck's defense. In addition, the author introduces the "race problem" in American Parker defense, and points out that this problem does not appear in China. The third part mainly discusses the predicament of "White Knight" and share repurchase in China. And put forward the company law solution-to establish the authorized capital system and relax the regulation of share repurchase. The fourth part mainly discusses the legality of poison pill and green mail repo on the basis of authorized capital system and deregulation of repurchase control. The authorized capital system forms the basis of poison pill, while the premise of green mail repo is to relax repo control. In view of poison pill, the author introduces its common types and operation mechanism and discusses its legality from the aspects of shareholder discrimination, unilateral obligation, harshness, free transfer of stock, etc. And draw the conclusion that poison pill is illegal. In view of Green Mail, the author mainly introduces the debate on Green Mail repo in American academic circles. It is roughly divided into opposition theory, support theory and neutral theory, and the author tends to say that the law should not blindly prohibit or allow green mail repurchase, but should grant this right to the shareholders' general meeting. The general meeting of the shareholders shall specify the circumstances in which the green mail repurchase can be carried out.
【学位授予单位】：吉林大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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