政策失灵:不对称互动视角下的美国对朝战略研究(1993-2015)
发布时间:2018-01-21 15:19
本文关键词: 不对称互动 政策失灵 正常化 常态化 朝鲜核问题 出处:《外交学院》2016年博士论文 论文类型:学位论文
【摘要】:本文的研究问题是:为什么美国没能使朝鲜弃核?这一问题来源于美国对朝政策目标与朝鲜半岛核问题实际发展路径的反差,是对外政策效用的衍生问题。基于朝鲜半岛核问题的结构性矛盾,现有研究多从系统性视角出发,将解释方法锁定于国内——国际双层路径上,强调美国国内因素、美国与盟国关系、朝鲜特殊性、第三方影响等是造成美国促使朝鲜弃核政策失灵的原因。这些研究为本文的研究问题提供了较为丰富的解释,但是却多是静态分析或场景性分析,缺少对历史性互动的把握,在战略过程意义上有所欠缺。针对上述研究问题与现有解释的不足,本文以美朝不对称战略互动为出发点,将结构性矛盾作为论述的背景性知识,着眼于两个决策者在互动过程中出现的认知异位现象,认为美国政策失灵的原因是没能使正常化成功转变为常态化。究其根本,是因为在不对称战略互动中,大国和小国之间对彼此的关注是不对称的,大国对小国往往存在关注不足的情况,而小国对大国通常存在关注过度,这与国家体量密切相关,是脆弱性决定下国家权力的表现,体现在不对称战略互动过程中,就是对彼此行动预期估计的差异,容易导致双方对彼此的承诺以及履行承诺的程度产生不满,出现双方都不满意的情况,造成双方政策都不成功的状况。本项研究采取过程追踪的研究方法,通过梳理二十年来美国与朝鲜关于核问题的不对称互动,将克林顿政府、小布什政府、奥巴马政府等三个时期按照战略内容在同一光谱上归位,具体观察每位美国总统任内美朝围绕核问题不对称互动过程中的认知异位现象。在克林顿政府时期,美朝达成《朝美框架协议》,缓解了第一次朝核危机,但是在后续实施过程中,却没能化解认知分歧,常态化努力失败;在小布什政府时期,虽然六方会谈使美朝双方以多变协议的方式达成弃核共识,但是缺少常态化所需要的制度保障,认知异位现象仍然没有得到解决,期间努力也多以失败告终;在奥巴马政府时期,美国对朝采取战略忍耐的态度,双方缺少走向合作的基本承诺,无法实现正常化,更勿论常态化。
[Abstract]:The question in this paper is: why did the United States fail to get North Korea to abandon nuclear weapons? This problem is derived from the contrast between the policy goal of the United States towards the DPRK and the actual development path of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, which is a derivative of the effectiveness of the foreign policy, and is based on the structural contradiction of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. Most of the existing studies focus on the domestic and international two-tier approaches from a systematic perspective, emphasizing the internal factors of the United States, the relationship between the United States and its allies, and the particularity of North Korea. Third party influence is the cause of the failure of North Korea's nuclear policy. These studies provide a rich explanation for the research of this paper, but mostly static analysis or scenario analysis. The lack of historical interaction in the strategic process of the lack of understanding. In view of the above research problems and the shortcomings of the existing explanations, this paper starts with the US-DPRK asymmetric strategic interaction as the starting point. Taking the structural contradiction as the background knowledge, this paper focuses on the cognitive heterotopia of the two decision makers in the process of interaction. The reason for the failure of American policy is the failure to normalize the normalization. The fundamental reason is that in the asymmetric strategic interaction, the attention between big and small countries is asymmetrical. Large countries tend to pay insufficient attention to small countries, while small countries usually pay too much attention to large countries, which is closely related to the size of the country and is the manifestation of state power under the decision of vulnerability. In the process of asymmetric strategic interaction, the difference in the estimation of each other's action expectations can easily lead to dissatisfaction with each other's commitments and the degree to which they fulfill their commitments, resulting in a situation where both sides are not satisfied with each other. This study adopts a process-tracking approach that combs the asymmetrical interactions between the United States and North Korea on the nuclear issue over the past two decades, bringing together the Clinton administration and the Bush administration. Obama administration and other three periods according to the strategic content in the same spectral position, observe the United States and North Korea during each US president's term of office in the process of asymmetric interaction around the nuclear issue, cognitive heterotopia. In the Clinton administration. The United States and North Korea reached the "DPRK-US Framework Agreement", which alleviated the first North Korean nuclear crisis, but in the course of subsequent implementation, it failed to resolve the cognitive differences and the regular efforts failed; During the Bush administration, although the Six-Party talks made the United States and North Korea reach a consensus on denuclearization in the form of a changeable agreement, it lacked the institutional safeguards needed for normalization, and the phenomenon of cognitive ectopic still remained unresolved. Efforts during the period also ended in failure; During the Obama administration, the United States adopted a strategic patience with North Korea, and the two sides lacked the basic commitment to cooperate and could not normalize, let alone normalize.
【学位授予单位】:外交学院
【学位级别】:博士
【学位授予年份】:2016
【分类号】:D771.2
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本文编号:1451829
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